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I.  TAKING COURTS FOR GRANTED: UNPACKING THE “GIVEN” 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: LADY OF JUSTICE, WILLIAM EICHOLTZ, 2002,  
VICTORIA COUNTY COURT, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA. 
Photographer: Ken Irwin.  Photograph reproduced with the permission of the sculptor and 
the Liberty Group, owner and manager of the Victoria County Court Facility. 
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This six-meter aluminum female form hangs on a building, opened in 2002, 
on a busy street corner in Melbourne, Australia.1  Why did the designers assume 
that passers-by would understand the figure as “Justice” and the building as a 
court of law, rather than see the sculpture as a warrior princess, an opera singer, 
or find it incomprehensible? 
That question reflects one theme in Representing Justice: Invention, 
Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms,2 in which 
Dennis Curtis and I explored the relationship, over centuries, between courts and 
democracy.  The legibility of this oddly-garbed hulking female figure, with 
scales, sword, and a blindfold, is a tribute to the political energies of diverse 
governments that have valorized this shared referent.  “Justice” serves as a sign 
of courts, which provides a service so taken for granted that the novelty of its 
contemporary import and its social welfarist implications are easily lost. 
Representations of the female Virtue Justice date back to the European 
Renaissance, when such figures were among many Virtues displayed in public 
buildings.  Yet, unlike imagery of her siblings, the Cardinal Virtues Prudence, 
Temperance, and Fortitude, Justice is a remnant that remains accessible to a 
diverse audience.  We—onlookers—know her because governments of all 
stripes have deployed her to bolster their legitimacy as they imposed the violence 
of law—mandating property reallocation and limiting liberty in the name of the 
state.  Imperial conquests and colonialism, democratic governments, 
professional organizations, commercial entrepreneurs, and media have 
interacted in the production of political, visual, literary, and social practices that 
have formed a trans-temporal and transnational set of conventions for courts.  
While not ubiquitous, Justice has had a remarkable run as political propaganda. 
Yet, during the last three centuries, the courts that Justice has come to mark 
have developed obligations radically disjunctive with the Renaissance traditions 
from which the icon of Justice emerged.  Social movements succeeded in many 
countries in transforming adjudication into a democratic practice to which all 
persons—regardless of gender, race, class, and nationality—have access to open 
 
 1.  Figure 1 is a photograph by Ken Irwin of Lady of Justice, created by William Eicholtz in 
2002 and set above the front entrance of the Victoria County Court, a building designed by Daryl 
Jackson of SKM Lyons Architects, and which serves as an intermediate trial court with both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction.  See COUNTY COURT VICTORIA, http://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au (last 
visited May 7, 2012).  Thanks to Chief Judge Michael Rozenes of the County Court of Victoria for 
assistance in obtaining permission to reproduce the image, to the Challenger Financial Services 
Group and the Liberty Group, and to the sculptor, William Eicholtz, for permitting reproduction of 
this figure.  This image, as well as the others (aside from Figure 10) that are printed in conjunction 
with this Lecture, are reproduced in relationship to the book REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011) that 
Dennis Curtis and I co-authored and that formed the basis for aspects of my lecture. 
 2. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, 
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). 
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and public courts in which independent and impartial judges are required to treat 
disputants with dignity and respect.  Egalitarian social movements not only 
produced new rights to courts but also generated new rights in courts to reflect 
new understandings of whose courts those institutions were.  When rights to 
adjudication expanded, demand curves soared.  Purpose-built structures—
courthouses—became a signature marker not only of the work of adjudication 
but of government more generally. 
This Lecture addresses—and expands on—one facet of an argument set 
forth in Representing Justice.  Here, my focus is on courts in the United States 
as a constitutionally-obliged substantive entitlement, a positive and regulated 
service that the government subsidizes. During the twentieth century, this 
entitlement became, at a formal level, universal in its availability, as are public 
education and government benefits such as social security.  Further, in the wake 
of large numbers of indigent litigants (drawn into courts either as criminal 
defendants or seeking to enter as plaintiffs), governments have come to offer 
additional, targeted court-related services, such as fee waivers and subsidized 
lawyers, for certain subsets of disputants. 
This government service is deeply embedded in constitutional texts and 
doctrines, explicitly recognizing obligations to provide courts.  Given that this 
Symposium is hosted by the Saint Louis University Law Journal, I use the 1820 
Missouri Constitution as a first example. 
That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person, property, or character; and that right and 
justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private 
property ought to be taken or applied to public use without just compensation.3 
Before I turn to the import of such provisions, a sketch of the components 
of the larger argument set forth in Representing Justice is in order.  First, 
adjudication is proto-democratic in that courts were an early site of constraint 
on government.  Government provision of dispute resolution can be traced from 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, Greece, and Rome4 to the formation of 
Medieval European city-states.5  The content of what was entailed varied 
dramatically, but the concept of adjudicatory power—that rulers had the power 
to identify certain behavior as wrongful and to impose sanctions, and that some 
 
 3. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text for 
amendments and current interpretations. 
 4. See Kathryn E. Slanski, The Law of Hammurabi and Its Audience, 24 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 97 (2012); J.G. Manning, The Representation of Justice in Ancient Egypt, 24 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 111 (2012); Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 119  (2012). 
 5. See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Re-Presenting Justice: Visual Narratives of Judgment 
and the Invention of Democratic Courts, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 19  (2012). 
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sectors of a population had enforceable rights to property and relationships—
spans millennia. 
Furthermore, even in eras when judges were obliged to be loyal servants of 
monarchies and of republican states, judges were bound by rules dictating their 
treatment of disputants.  Instructions such as “hear the other side” date from the 
fifth century C.E.6  By publicly resolving disputes and punishing violators, rulers 
acknowledged through rituals of adjudication that something other than pure 
power legitimated their authority.  Because performance required an audience, 
adjudication was an avenue for authority to shift away from rulers.  Spectators 
became active observers, able to see and, eventually, to assess and to stand in 
judgment of a state’s provision of dispute resolution services and the laws that 
were applied. 
Second, democracy changed adjudication.  Aspects of modern 
adjudication—obligatory public access, judicial independence, critical 
appraisals of procedural fairness even if rules comported with ancient customs 
and usage, and equal access of all persons—are the result of political and social 
movements of the past three centuries that render today’s courts novel.  During 
the Renaissance, the public was invited to watch spectacles of judgment and of 
punishment.  While witnessing power, the public was not presumed to possess 
the authority to contradict it.  Yet unruly crowds were a possibility, serving as 
one prompt for what Michel Foucault famously charted—the privatization of 
punishment.7 
In contrast to the shifting of state punishment into prisons closed to the 
public, court-based proceedings became obligatorily public.  Illustrative is the 
1676 Charter of the English Colony of West New Jersey, which provided that 
“in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person 
or persons . . . may freely come into, and attend . . . .”8  The practice of 
“publicity,” to borrow Jeremy Bentham’s term, enabled what Bentham 
imaginatively called the “Public-Opinion Tribunal”9 to assess government 
 
 6.  According to John Kelly, although the concept is credited to St. Augustine, it predated 
him; a fourth-century manuscript by a Sardinian bishop, Lucifer of Cagliari, argued that God had 
interrogated Adam and Eve because they could not be “condemned by us unheard.”  John M. Kelly, 
Audi Alteram Partem, 9 NAT. L.F. 103, 109 & n.36 (1964). 
 7. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 73–74 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
 8. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, ch. XXIII (1677), reprinted in 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 184, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959) [hereinafter Concessions and 
Agreements of West New Jersey]. 
 9. See 9 JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 41 
(John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).  See generally FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY 
BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE (1983). 
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actors.  As Bentham explained, while presiding at trial, a judge was also on 
trial.10 
By the eighteenth century, the new states in North America took this idea to 
heart.  The words “[a]ll courts shall be open,”11 often coupled (as Missouri’s 
Constitution illustrates) with clauses promising remedies for harms to person’s 
property and person, were reiterated in many state constitutions.  From the 
baseline of the Renaissance, the public’s new authority to use courts and to judge 
judges (and, inferentially, the government) worked a radical transformation.  
“Rites” turned into “rights,” as requirements proliferated to provide “open” and 
“public” hearings and to respect the independence of judges.  The more that 
spectators were active participants (“auditors,” to borrow again from 
Bentham12), the more courts could serve as one of many venues contributing to 
what twentieth-century theorists termed the “public sphere”—disseminating 
authoritative information that shaped popular opinion of governments’ output.13 
Courts were not only contributors to the public sphere but were also 
transformed by new ideas about the position of the judge and by a deepening 
sense of equality before the law.  Instead of subservience to rulers, judges gained 
their status as independent actors, authorized to stand in judgment of the very 
power that gave them their jurisdiction.14  The circle of those eligible to come to 
court enlarged radically, and the kinds of harms recognized as legally cognizable 
multiplied. 
Yet only in the twentieth century did all persons become able to be in courts 
in all roles—from litigants, witnesses, jurors, lawyers, and (yet more recently) 
 
 10. See 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter 
6 BENTHAM] (“Of Publicity and Privacy, as Applied to Judicature in General, and to the Evidence 
in Particular”).  See generally Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror 
Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2011); Frederick Schauer, 
Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339. 
 11. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12.  See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80–81, 104–05 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]. 
 12. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 356. 
 13. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 236–37 (Thomas Burger & Frederick 
Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1991) (1962); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 359 (William Rehg trans., 
MIT Press 1996) (1992).  The degree to which courts can perform those functions depends on their 
configuration, in both material and legal senses.  For example, putting prisoners in “the dock” and 
limiting space for the public reflect hierarchies of authority rather than egalitarian values.  See 
generally LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF 
LAW (2011). 
 14. This development in England is mapped by PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL 
DUTY 148−59 (2008). 
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judges.15  Formal principles of equal treatment entitled a host of claimants to be 
heard and treated with dignity, whatever their race, class, ethnicity, and gender.  
Constitutions and transnational conventions insisted that such hearings be both 
“public” and “fair,” permitting litigants and judges to assess whether a particular 
process accorded with changing understandings of what the demands of justice 
entailed.  The transnational codification of the 1966 United Nations Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights summarizes these new tenets: “everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”16 
A measure of the success of the expanded role for courts can be seen from 
the rising number of filings in courts.  The United States offers one example.  
The federal courts, which each year handle some 400,000 civil and criminal 
filings and a million-plus bankruptcy petitions, provide a window into twentieth-
century commitments to courts.17  Fewer than 30,000 cases were brought before 
the federal courts in 1901; ten times that number were filed by 2001.18  Yet those 
 
 15. Nebraska and Delaware amended their constitutions in 1996 and 1999, respectively, to 
make the point of gender equality explicit.  Each added the words “him or her” to their 
constitutional guarantees that all courts be open.  See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual 
Commitments to Rights to Remedies.  In 1984, Indiana shifted its nomenclature from rights for 
“every man” to “every person.”  See IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 12, amended by IND. CONST. 
amend. LXVIII.  Rhode Island did so as well in 1986.  See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: 
Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies (changing “he” and “his” to “person”). 
 16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 14, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).  See generally THE 
CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL 
CHALLENGES (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE].  In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.N. in 1985 created the “Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary.” Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Aug. 26–Sep. 6, 1985, Basic Principles on the Independence 
of the Judiciary, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1.  In 1994, the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights authorized the post of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers.  Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, OFF. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/Judiciary/ Pages/IDPIndex.aspx 
(last visited May 9, 2012). 
 17. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2–3 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statis 
tics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter 2009 AO REPORT]. 
 18. These data are drawn from Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics 6 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Judicial Caseload Statistics], and from the American Law 
Institute’s 1934 study of the business of the U.S. Courts, American Law Institute, A Study of the 
Business of the Federal Courts Part I: Criminal Cases 107 (1934), American Law Institute, A Study 
of the Business of the Federal Courts Part II: Civil Cases 111 (1934).  For additional details, see 
generally Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments 
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numbers are minute when viewed against the volume in state courts, where more 
than forty million civil and criminal cases (traffic, juvenile, and domestic 
relations cases aside) are filed annually.19  Figure 2—a chart offering a 
comparison of the numbers of filings in state and federal courts in 2009—
provides a glimpse of the volume.20  Another marker is that more than two 
million people are incarcerated21 and a total of more than seven million under 
state supervision.22 
 
 
COMPARING THE VOLUME OF FILINGS: STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Growing dockets beget judges.  Again, the federal system offers a way to 
track the changes.  In the middle of the nineteenth century, fewer than forty 
 
of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building 
the Federal Judiciary]. 
 19. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2011), available at http://www.courtstatis 
tics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS]. 
 20.  2009 AO REPORT, supra note 17, at 2–3 (federal and bankruptcy statistics); 2009 STATE 
COURT CASELOADS, supra note 19, at 3.  The state court data are composite estimates that do not 
include traffic, juvenile, or domestic relations cases. 
 21. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_ 
FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf. 
 22. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS 5 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_ 
1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf. 
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federal trial judges sat in courtrooms around the entire United States.  By 2001, 
more than 650 authorized judgeships existed at the trial level.  Judges and 
cases—and money and politicians—beget courthouses.  In 1850, virtually no 
buildings owned by the federal government bore the name “courthouse” on their 
doors.  The occasional federal courtroom was tucked inside federal buildings 
called custom houses or in spaces borrowed from states or private entities.  In 
contrast, by 2010, more than 550 federal courthouses—so named—had been 
built. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE, COURT HOUSE, AND 
CUSTOM HOUSE, BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records 
Administration. 
In days of fewer filings, three-story federal courthouses sufficed.  One 
example is the 1908 federal building in Biloxi, Mississippi that was given the 
name Post Office, Courthouse, and Custom House.23  By 1929, another new 
federal building opened for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
 
 23. James Knox Taylor, who held the position of Supervising Architect from 1897 until 1912, 
is credited with the three-story building, whose design has much in common with other of his 
structures, “[n]early all . . . classical or colonial revival.”  See ANTOINETTE J. LEE, ARCHITECTS TO 
THE NATION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE SUPERVISING ARCHITECT’S OFFICE 209 (2000). 
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Iowa.24  The building could instead have had a title capturing its multiple 
functions as a post office and federal office building for it also housed 
administrators from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce as well as a 
court.25  But the name chosen—the U.S. Court House—denoted the growing 
importance of adjudication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: THE U.S. COURT HOUSE FOR THE SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF IOWA 
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records 
Administration. 
Today’s volume of court filings continues to produce purpose-built, 
segregated facilities now routinely designated as “courthouses,” and their 
dimensions have likewise grown.  The state of Missouri is home to the tallest 
federal courthouse in the country, the Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Courthouse 
 
 24. U.S. Courthouse, Des Moines, IA: Building Overview, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN. 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuilding/ 
buildingId/444 (last visited May 8, 2012). Renovated and enlarged in 1995, the courthouse remains 
in use.  Id. 
 25. Id.  The 1929 building joined several other “monumental public buildings” along the 
riverfront, and their style and placement reflected the City Beautiful Movement efforts to create 
important civic spaces.  Id. 
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(Figure 5), opened in 2000 in St. Louis.26  Standing 557 feet, it was, when built, 
also the “largest Federal courthouse in the United States,”27 with more than one 
million square feet that cost 200 million dollars to construct.28  That courthouse 
provides space for seven hundred employees, of whom (as of 2012), twenty-
three were district, magistrate, bankruptcy, senior, or appellate judges.29 
Courthouse construction marked the changing import and parameters of 
rights.  During the twentieth century, whole new bodies of law emerged, 
restructuring family life, responding to domestic violence, reshaping employee 
and consumer protections, and recognizing indigenous and civil rights.  
Spanning borders, governments came together to create multi-national 
adjudicatory bodies, from the “Mixed Courts of Egypt” and the Slave Trade 
Commissions of the nineteenth century to the contemporary regional and 
international courts, such as the European Court of Justice and the International 
Criminal Court. 
The first point (adjudication was proto-democratic) and the second 
(democratic norms changed adjudication) are the predicates to a third claim in 
Representing Justice—that the new equality of adjudication has put pressures of 
various kinds on the work taking place within courthouses.  As women and men 
of all colors gained recognition as rights-holders, entitled to sue and be sued, to 
 
 26. Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa. 
gov/portal/content/101471 (last visited May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. 
Courthouse]; see also U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THOMAS F. EAGLETON UNITED STATES 
COURTHOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 12 (2001) [hereinafter GSA EAGLETON COURTHOUSE 
BOOKLET]. 
 27. GSA EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 26, at 12; Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. 
Courthouse, supra note 26.  The GSA website specifies that it is the largest single federal 
courthouse built.  The Eagleton Building is the third highest in St. Louis, designed to avoid 
overshadowing the city’s logo, the Gateway Arch. 
 28. See Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 1995, 
at 36; City of St. Louis Development Activity: Eagleton Federal Courthouse, CITY OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070818174938/http://stlcin.missouri.org/devprojects/proj 
Info.cfm?DevProjectID=47&isComGov=1 (last updated May 19, 2005); Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. 
Courthouse, supra note 26.  Some states have yet larger courthouses; a 2001 courthouse for the 
Brooklyn Supreme and Family Courts houses more than eighty courtrooms in more than 1.1 million 
square feet; that structure is thirty-two stories and 473 feet high.  Brooklyn Supreme and Family 
Courthouse, New York, United States of America, DESIGN BUILD NETWORK, 
http://www.designbuild-network.com/projects/brooklyn-supreme (last visited May 8, 2012). 
 29. In 2012, the building provided chambers for eight district judges, Judges of the Court, U.S. 
DISTRICT CT. FOR E. DISTRICT MO., http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/judges-court (last visited May 
8, 2012), seven magistrate judges, id., four senior judges, id., three bankruptcy judges, Judge & 
Courtroom Information, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR E. DISTRICT MO., http://www.moeb.uscourts. 
gov/judge_info.htm (last visited May 8, 2012), and one Eighth Circuit judge, Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR EIGHTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/ 
newcoa/judge.htm (last visited May 8, 2012).  Twenty-five courtrooms were provided.  GSA 
EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 26, at 12. 
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testify, and to judge, a female figure of Justice became less an abstraction and 
more a representation of a person.  Controversies erupted about what “she”—
Justice—should look like and whether such images captured the didactic 
messages that democratic courts needed to convey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: THOMAS F. EAGLETON FEDERAL COURTHOUSE 
Photographer: The Honorable David D. Noce, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the 
Eastern District of Missouri.  Photograph courtesy of and reproduced with 
the permission of the photographer. 
Pressures of another kind are affecting the public, information-forcing 
qualities of adjudication.  Democracy has not only changed courts but also now 
challenges them profoundly.  Once a government became committed to showing 
“equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion” (to 
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borrow Ronald Dworkin’s description of equality’s entailments),30 courts have 
new tasks.  Yet implementation of equal treatment obligations in courts becomes 
difficult when individuals have disparate resources—or none at all.  What forms 
of access ought to be subsidized, and what costs imposed on users directly?  How 
should the activities of adjudication be funded? 
The response in the United States has been a robust and entrenched 
commitment of public financing of courts, albeit not at the level to meet all the 
demands.  Moreover, subsidies have been put into place for certain indigent 
litigants, such as fee waivers for some kinds of litigants, free lawyers for 
criminal defendants facing incarceration, and procedural mechanisms permitting 
aggregation of claims through class actions.  Courts are therefore a form of 
positive provisioning not often associated with United States liberal theory,31 
which has generally taken the vast supply of government dispute resolution 
mechanisms for granted. 
On occasion, the constitutional relationship to the court subsidy question 
comes to the fore.  Illustrative is Justice Harlan’s explanation in 1971 about why 
filing fees for poor persons seeking divorce had to be waived as a matter of 
constitutional right.32  “Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive 
society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of 
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to 
govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, 
predictable manner.”33  As Justice Harlan’s commentary reveals, justice services 
are welfarist rights that are self-serving from the perspective of the state.  While 
rights to education and health enable individuals to contribute to and participate 
in social ordering, the historical sweep sketched above makes plain that courts 
are forms of government support of a special kind, on which the state (as well 
as individuals) depends.  States did not always supply education, nor roads, but 
states always had mechanisms for enforcing rules of civil and criminal order 
through courts.  States need those resident within to participate in adjudicatory 
processes, both to maintain peace and security as well as to generate and to 
reinforce their own authority to do so.  Adjudication, whether civil or criminal, 
both confirms and produces the power to impose and enforce sanctions.  Courts 
in democracies do more, as their egalitarianism constrains and disciplines the 
state through obligations of third-party access and dignified treatment of 
disputants that circumscribe state authority. 
 
 30. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2 (2011).  His other condition of equality 
was that government had to respect “fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide . . . 
how to make something valuable” out of his or her life.  Id. 
 31. See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 
1906–12 (2001) [hereinafter West, Rights, Capabilities]. 
 32. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372–74 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 374. 
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Justice services therefore offer another paradigm in which to explore the 
import of constitutional rights and through which to move beyond the categories 
of positive and negative rights and liberties.  Courts partake of both, as they 
forge and reflect the interconnections of government and its populace through 
providing frameworks in which individuals and communities shape their 
relationships.  Courts are places in which to document and respond to conflicts 
and deep disagreement, and, when working well, courts generate collective 
narratives of identity and obligation.  “Connective justice” is a phrase proffered 
to describe the efforts of ancient Egypt to bridge the worlds of humans and the 
gods,34 but those words could be transposed to capture aspirations for courts 
operating in democratic political systems. 
Given the ambitions of contemporary justice services, the political 
unwillingness to commit all the resources needed to fund the adjudicatory 
opportunities promised, and contemporary debates about state welfarist efforts, 
the project of adjudication is filled with tensions.  As the ranks of rights-holders 
expanded and as states enlarged the aegis of their criminal laws, the numbers of 
those seeking or drawn into courts swelled.  Governments responded not only 
by creating more judgeships, more courthouses, more prisons, and by waiving 
some access fees or funding lawyers and other services for subsets of claimants, 
but also by moving some forms of adjudication offsite, to administrative 
tribunals and to procedures that have come to be known by the acronym ADR—
alternative dispute resolution.35  Inside court, rules encourage or mandate efforts 
at private accommodations (settlements and plea bargaining).36  In addition, 
 
 34. Manning, supra note 4, at 114. 
 35. As Amalia Kessler explains, conciliatory efforts were part of judges’ repertoire long before 
the twentieth century and hence have “remarkable staying power,” even as some of their forms may 
be problematic for democratic governance.  See Amalia D. Kessler, Delineating Between 
Conciliation and Adjudication: A Comment on Resnik and Curtis’s Representing Justice, 56 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1099 (2012) [hereinafter Kessler, Conciliation and Adjudication]. Kessler’s 
commendation to look toward aggregation is made complex by recent Supreme Court limitations 
on that form of adjudication. See Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication 
in a Post–Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203 (2012); David Marcus, From “Cases” to 
“Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Procedural Legitimacy, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1231 
(2012). 
 36. On the criminal side, see generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003), and WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).  The civil litigation trends are reflected in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 16.  See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 
(2005); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter 
Resnik, Managerial Judges].  The history of earlier eras’ use of conciliation is detailed in Kessler, 
Conciliation and Adjudication, supra note 35, and in Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against 
Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a 
Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 
(2009). 
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courts promote use of other decision makers, public and private.  The resulting 
fragmentation and privatization of adjudication has profound implications for 
the democratic character of courts. 
Once again, examples come from the U.S. federal system.  In 2008, four 
times more judges (often termed hearing officers or administrative judges) sat 
in federal agencies than in federal courts, and these administrative judges 
rendered tens of thousands of decisions in disputes brought by recipients of 
government benefits, such as veterans, employees, and immigrants seeking 
adjustment of their status.37  In some respects, this evolution has served to 
increase the domain of adjudication, because agencies have modeled their own 
decision-making processes after those of courts.  Yet this work occurs with 
judges less insulated from oversight by other branches of government and at 
sites generally inaccessible to outside onlookers. 
In addition to this devolution, a good many conflicts that would otherwise 
have been eligible for courts are now, by law, outsourced.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent interpretations of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act have 
preempted state laws to enforce contracts requiring many consumers and 
employees to use private providers,38 such as the Better Business Bureau and the 
American Arbitration Association, where no rights of access for third parties 
exist and where few obligations of transparent accounting are imposed. 
Parallels can be found abroad.  England led the way in the 1950s with its 
legal aid programs, as it also fashioned forms of administrative or tribunal 
adjudication to shape various “paths to justice.”39  Yet, in the 1990s, England 
and Wales reformatted procedural rules to facilitate settlements.40  Moreover, in 
the last few decades, England and Wales adopted a user-pay system for civil 
litigation that aspires for courts to derive their funding through fees garnered for 
each procedural step.41  In 2010, the English government mounted a campaign 
 
 37. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative 
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004). 
 38.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011), discussed in 
Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, in Gilles, supra note 35, in Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012), and in Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life after Concepcion?: State Courts, 
State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269 (2012). 
 39. See generally HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT 
GOING TO LAW (1999). 
 40. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES §§ 1(7), 1(9) (1996).  See generally Hazel 
Genn, What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
397 (2012) [hereinafter Genn, What is Civil Justice For?]; Simon Roberts, ‘Listing Concentrates 
the Mind’: The English Civil Court as an Arena for Structured Negotiation, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 457 (2009). 
 41. The policy shifts over two centuries that helped reduce fees and has now returned the 
system to one heavily dependent on user fees is tracked in a 2004 lecture, The Maintenance of Local 
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against what it termed “unnecessary” litigation, as it pushed to close courthouses 
and proposed significant retrenchment in legal aid.42  Crossing the channel, 
Europe has expressed its enthusiasm for ADR through a 2008 directive that all 
national courts promote mediation of cross-border disputes.43  Thus, social 
movements across borders promote reformatting judging away from public acts 
of adjudication toward more private managerial roles in which judges either 
meet with lawyers and litigants to press for non-adjudicative conclusions of 
cases or rules send disputants elsewhere. 
Various and diverse arguments are made on behalf of ADR.44  One account 
of ADR’s development is that it is a second-best response to systemic overload, 
produced because governments cannot support all those who seek to use their 
courts (or their roads, health systems, and the like).  But another analysis comes 
from a developing critique of the public process and redistributive impact of 
courts.  Not all celebrate the trajectory that has produced more rights, more 
claimants knocking at courthouse doors, and more information pouring into the 
public domain.  The intersection of high demand for courts, the burdens of 
procedures, the costs of lawyers, and the regulatory successes achieved by some 
plaintiffs have prompted critiques, styling the civil justice system as 
overburdened, overreaching, and overly adversarial. 
Critics argue that courts can generate unwise policies and that the risk of 
being sued chills productive economic exchanges and useful social interactions.  
Too easy access, they charge, produces unnecessary social conflict.  Alternative 
forms of resolution, they assert, are more accurate, less expensive, more 
generative, and more user-friendly.  Energetic enthusiasts, sometimes gaining 
funds from institutions identified with repeat-player defendants, have fueled 
 
Justice, by Lord Justice Thomas, then senior presiding judge of England and Wales.  See Lord 
Justice Thomas, Senior Presiding Judge of Eng. & Wales, The Maintenance of Local Justice  (Dec. 
4, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/ 
speech_lj_thomas_maintenance_local_justice_04122004.pdf [hereinafter Thomas, The 
Maintenance of Local Justice]. 
 42. The recent developments are tracked in Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 40, 
at 412–15; see also Lady Brenda Hale, Justice, Supreme Court of the U.K., Sir Henry Hodge 
Memorial Lecture 2011: Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society 5 (2011), available at 
http://soundoffforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Henry-Hodge-lecture-
FINAL.pdf. 
 43. Directive 2008/52/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3, 6. 
 44. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A 
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); 
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995). 
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movements to shape avenues outside courts for dispute resolution (becoming 
known as “DR”) and to encourage judges to discourage parties from seeking the 
proverbial day in court.45  These approaches entail policies that can be 
understood as managerial, administrative, and rights-enabling.  Alternatively, 
this shift away from public courts can be read as a political backlash, in that 
some “repeat players” found the glare of open courts disruptive to business 
practices and governance policies and successfully “play for rules” by limiting 
the reach of courts and by constricting access to public adjudication.46 
With the devolution of adjudication to agencies, the outsourcing to private 
providers, and the reconfiguration of court-based processes toward settlement 
for both civil and criminal cases, the occasions for public observation of and 
involvement in adjudication diminish.  In the federal courts of the United States 
for example, while filings increased, trial rates dropped over the last few 
decades.  By 2010, trials were completed in about one of every hundred federal 
civil cases pending.47  The decline gained the moniker of the “vanishing trial.”48 
  
 
 45. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1988).  For a critique of anti-litigation analyses, see Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike 
in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998). 
 46. This concern was forecast in Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  Galanter has also 
analyzed the interrelationship between the development of the access to justice movement and the 
initial ADR movement.  See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social 
Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010). 
 47. The figure is drawn from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 168 tbl.C-4 (2011) 
(Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. Recorded are 309,361 
civil cases pending, and 3,309, or approximately 1.1%, terminated “during or after trial.”  Id.  The 
category of cases terminated “during or after trial” could include cases that settle during trial. 
 48. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); see also Stephen B. Burbank 
& Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS 935 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: PHOTOGRAPH OF CAMP JUSTICE, 
GUANTÁNAMO BAY, 2009 
Photograph reproduced with the permission of the 
photographer, Travis Crum (November 2009). 
Dramatic evidence of the retreat from courts came from decisions by all 
branches of the U.S. government responding to the terrorist destruction of the 
World Trade Center’s Twin Towers in September of 2001.  Eschewing both the 
federal and the long-standing military court system, the Department of Defense 
created a detention camp and a decision-making process at Guantánamo Bay, a 
United States naval base in Cuba.  “Camp Justice” is the makeshift name, 
reflecting the ad hoc efforts that have pieced together rules of procedure and 
evidence that mime aspects of adjudication, just as the flags that fly over the sign 
(Figure 6) with the logo of the Office of Military Commissions (Figure 7) 
appropriates the iconography of Justice’s scales.49  The eagle in this version 
 
 49. The photographs of Camp Justice, reproduced in Figures 6 and 7, were taken in the fall of 
2009 by Travis Crum (Yale Law School, 2011), and are provided and reproduced with his 
permission. 
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becomes the balance, shown with the shield of red, white, and blue, three arrows, 
thirteen stars, and the Department’s name. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE SEAL AT CAMP JUSTICE 
Photograph reproduced with the permission of the 
photographer, Travis Crum (November 2009). 
The imagery is (unwittingly or not) revelatory; the effort to dress 
Guantánamo Bay up as a court aims to bolster its legitimacy.  Yet placing a bird 
of prey with arrows at the center of the balance inside a pentagon reflects just 
how enclosed those at Guantánamo are.  The proceedings are located at a venue 
to which the public does not have ready access, lawyers face challenges meeting 
with clients, and at which military personnel designate the individuals who serve 
as prosecutors and as judges.50  These detainees are not to be accorded the same 
equal, public, and dignified treatment that became the rights of ordinary civil 
and criminal litigants in the twentieth century.  The words at the logo’s bottom 
 
 50. The process failures are the subject of several articles in this Symposium.  See Janet 
Alexander, Military Commissions: A Place Outside the Law’s Reach, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115 
(2012); Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: Assessing Actual Practice, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153 
(2012); Eugene R. Fidell, Charm Offensive in Lilliput: Military Commissions 3.1, 56 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1177 (2012); Jonathan Hafetz, Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror, 56 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1055 (2012). 
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likewise underscore the distance; eschewed is the phrase ensconced in 1935 at 
the top of the Supreme Court—”Equal Justice Under Law”—instead the words 
are “Freedom through Justice.”  Although one might be tempted to bracket the 
rules for alleged terrorists as unique responses to horrific events, a close analysis 
of other government regulations shows the continuum on which the decision-
making regime at Guantánamo Bay sits.  Ordinary prisoners confined in the 
United States, ordinary claimants under various federal laws, and ordinary 
individuals in administrative agencies also have few opportunities for 
independent judges to decide claims of right in public.51 
Amidst the high volume of filings, the demand for more services, and the 
spate of courthouse building projects creating architecturally important 
structures, the diminution in the aegis of adjudication and the incursions on 
courts’ authority can be overlooked.  But the turn towards alternatives puts the 
new courthouses, built with cutting-edge technologies, at risk of being 
anachronistic.  Just as nineteenth century governing powers, eager to maintain 
control, moved punishment practices from public streets into closed prisons,52 
adjudication itself is at risk of being removed from public purview—rendering 
the exercise and consequences of public and private power harder to ascertain. 
Recall that a first claim of Representing Justice is that adjudication was 
proto-democratic; the second was that democracy changed adjudication and the 
third was that democracy challenges adjudication.  A fourth argument in 
Representing Justice is that the movement away from public adjudication is a 
problem for democracies because adjudication has important contributions to 
make to democracy.  By democracy, I refer here not to majoritarian political 
processes nor only to the role of juries in courts but to aspirations for lawmaking 
through egalitarian methods that foster popular input into the development and 
the revision of governing norms and that impose robust constraints on both 
public and private power.  In turn, the discussion of courts aims to put in focus 
not only on the high level courts that garner a great deal of academic attention 
but also on the quotidian activities of ordinary litigation. 
The debate about courts and democracy tends to center on questions of the 
legitimacy of judicial review, with concern directed at when and why judges 
ought to dislodge legislative judgments that have a majoritarian pedigree.53  
Courts are posited as the site of contestation about the lawfulness of actions of 
the executive and the legislature, as mediating (legitimately or not) between 
interest groups while not themselves part and parcel of social and political 
forces. In contrast to the angst expressed in the name of democracy by some 
 
 51. See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An 
Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010). 
 52. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 8–11. 
 53. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
938 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
constitutional scholars writing about courts, Dennis Curtis and I argue that 
adjudication is itself a democratic process, which reconfigures power by 
obliging disputants and judges to treat each other as equals, to provide 
information to each other, and to offer public justifications for decisions based 
on the interaction of fact and norm.  Courts’ mandate to operate in public endows 
the audience—the public—with the ability and the authority of critique.  
Through such “participatory parity,” public processes both teach about 
democratic practices of norm development and offer the opportunity for popular 
input to produce changes in legal rights.54  The redundancy produced by litigants 
raising parallel claims of rights enables debate about the underlying legal rules.  
The particular structural obligations of trial level courts have advantages for 
producing, redistributing, and curbing power in a fashion that is generative in 
democracies. 
On our account, courts are institutions constituted by and expressing—
enacting—political judgments about the allocation of authority and relationships 
among individuals and institutions, public and private.  Courts are thus an 
amalgam of longstanding needs of states to do violence in the name of law, of 
more recent centuries of commitments to “rights to remedies,” and of new ideas 
about equality.  The constitutive elements—open access, independent judges 
authorized to sit in judgment of the state and to assess the fairness of their own 
as well as other decision-making procedures, equal and dignified treatment of 
all participants—are outgrowths of social movements that transformed the 
meaning of “personhood,” the idea of justice, the entailments of equality, and 
the obligations of government.  Our book, Representing Justice, provides a 
reconstruction of a many-century history of the idea of “courts,” and a normative 
exploration of the utility of courts, so as to make plain the inventiveness and 
achievements, as well as the fragility and contingency, of the twentieth-century 
project for which the word “court” has become shorthand. 
While monumental in ambition and often in physical girth, the durability of 
courts as active sites of public exchange before independent jurists ought not to 
be taken for granted.  Like other venerable institutions of the eighteenth century 
(such as the postal service and the press, which serve in parallel fashion to 
disseminate information and which support democratic competency55), courts 
are vulnerable.  Current obligations of courts to provide services and subsidies 
are exemplary of the success of egalitarian regulatory policies, just as the efforts 
to limit these forms of government provisioning reflect widespread efforts to 
 
 54. Nancy Fraser invoked the term “participatory parity,” when arguing that the idea that the 
public sphere was unitary missed the many dynamic sites of exchange in democracies.  See Nancy 
Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). 
 55. See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A 
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
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restrict government efforts in favor of privatization.  The continuation of 
accessible court services for ordinary disputants seeking state-based dispute 
resolution assistance is far from assured but requires, as it always has, political 
commitments to sustaining the services that courts provide to the government 
and its peoples. 
II.  COURTS AS OBLIGATORY AND REGULATED CONSTITUTIONAL SERVICES 
“That every Freeman for every Injury done him in his Goods, Lands or Person, 
by any other Person, ought to have Remedy by the Course of the Law of the 
Land, and ought to have Justice and Right for the Injury done to him freely 
without Sale, fully without any Denial, and speedily without Delay, according 
to the Law of the Land.” 
DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 12 
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend V (ratified in 1791) 
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, 
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right 
and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.” 
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 1456 
“That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person, property, or character; and that right and 
justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private 
property ought to be taken or applied to public use without just compensation.” 
MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 757 
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, 
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice 
administered without denial or delay.” 
NEB. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 958 
 
 
 56. The current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901, has an almost identical clause.  See 
infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies. 
 57. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text, discussing amendments and judicial 
interpretations of this provision, and infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments 
to Rights to Remedies. 
 58. As discussed infra notes 275–82 and accompanying text, the current Nebraska 
Constitution, passed in 1875, and amended in 1996, has a similar clause.  See infra Appendix I, 
State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies. 
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The remainder of this Lecture explores the idea that rights to court are 
positive entitlements, a form of social services universally provided and 
subsidized by the state.  As the epigrams opening this section make plain, my 
interest is in constitutional commitments to courts—made expressly in most 
state constitutions and implicitly in others, including the federal Constitution.  
Texts such as Missouri’s 1820 Constitution—that “courts of justice ought to be 
open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, 
property, or character”59—demonstrate a deeply-entrenched and widespread 
constitutional norm that using courts is an ordinary opportunity that 
governments provide. 
Before turning to the excavation of those provisions, a reminder is in order.  
The words “every person” then did not have the same meaning as they do today.  
Missouri’s 1820 Constitution also protected slave owners by providing that the 
general assembly had 
[N]o power to pass laws; First, For the emancipation of slaves without the 
consent of their owners, or without paying them, before such emancipation, a 
full equivalent for such slaves so emancipated; and, Second, To prevent bona 
fide emigrants to this state, or actual settlers therein, from bringing from any of 
the United States, or from any of their territories, such persons as may there be 
deemed to be slaves, so long as any persons of the same description are allowed 
to be held as slaves by the laws of this state.60 
Moreover, many rights-to-remedy clauses were inserted out of concern that 
“renegade legislatures” would impair contract obligations and thereby 
undermine creditors’ capacity to collect debts.61  Further, in 1946, Missouri’s 
Supreme Court relied on its remedy clause when protecting patterns of 
segregated housing by holding that racially-restrictive covenants were 
enforceable, in part to avoid denying court access for enforcement of contractual 
obligations.62  Courts were thus once institutions centered on the protection of 
property and status-conventional relationships. 
The idea of courts as sources of the recognition of all persons as equal rights-
holders and as ready resources for the array of humanity is an artifact of both 
the first and second Reconstruction.  Not until well into the twentieth century 
did the law and practice of the United States fully embrace the proposition that 
race, gender, and class ought not preclude the use of courts.63  “Every person” 
 
 59. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7. 
 60. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 26. 
 61. See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Mo. 2000) (citing David Schuman, The Right to 
a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992)). 
 62. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. 1946), (famously) rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 63. In addition to doctrine elaborating that proposition, in the 1980s and thereafter, state and 
federal courts charted “task forces” on gender, race, and ethnic bias in the courts so as to respond 
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only came to reference all of “us” as a result of twentieth-century aspirations 
that democratic orders provide “equal justice under law” (to borrow again from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1935 facade).  As a consequence, the content of the 
phrase “every injury to person, property, or character” changed.  New forms of 
harm fell within the rubric of what constituted an injury.  Rights to be free from 
discrimination are an obvious example, and so are the developments of rights 
for consumers, employees, household members, criminal defendants, and (if 
“every person” retains its meaning) detainees at Guantánamo Bay. 
It is the interaction between the constitutional obligations of earlier eras and 
developing commitments to equality that turned courts into universal 
entitlements and pressed them to be, on occasion, redistributive as well.  The 
promises of access and remedies become illusory when courts charge fees that 
systematically exclude sets of claimants and when the resources of the disputants 
are widely asymmetrical.  But concerns about equal treatment are only one 
aspect of what animated efforts to ease access.  The other is the political 
dependency of governments on courts.  Polities—ancient and modern, autocratic 
and democratic—rely on courts as one method to maintain peace and security 
and to sustain commercial stability.  Because enforcement of court orders rests 
largely on voluntary compliance, courts need popular acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the rulings.64  The coherence of adjudication comes under strain 
when litigants are patently unable to participate.  The doctrine in U.S. law that a 
criminal prosecution cannot proceed unless a defendant is able to understand the 
charges levied and assist in a defense65 is one acknowledgment of court 
dependence on participants to function.  Another is the development of 
constitutional doctrine insistent on court fee waivers and other government 
subsidies through adjustments based on indigency, on resource asymmetries 
between parties, or the stakes of a proceeding.  Further, in rare instances, courts 
have also mandated legislative support for their own work.66 
Below I explore the range of services that constitutions in the United States 
direct courts to offer and how egalitarian movements of the twentieth century 
changed the self-understanding of those who run and who use courts.  I argue 
that courts provide a model, an exemplum iustitiae (borrowing the Renaissance 
phrase for exemplary lessons about justice67), of the ordinariness of government 
 
to such problems.  See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 
(1996). 
 64. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
(2010). 
 65. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 718–20 (1972). 
 66. Christine M. Durham, Open Courts/Remedies Guarantees and State Court Funding: An 
Emerging Narrative, KEN. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 67. See 1 ELIZABETH MCGRATH, RUBENS: SUBJECTS FROM HISTORY 7, 33–35 (13(1) Corpus 
Rubenianum Ludwig Burchard, 1997).  As McGrath explained, “history was principally valued for 
the lessons it taught,” and a tradition of didacticism that lined the “walls of Renaissance palaces 
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subsidies and of their propriety and feasibility as well as of the challenges and 
conflicts that such provisioning produces in social orders.  In the everyday 
activities in courts and the battles over what courts, one finds a “progressive 
realisation”68 of constitutional commitments to equal justice, redefinitions of the 
entailments of equality, and counter-efforts to limit redistributive activities and 
to shift authority toward private and less regulated ordering. 
A. Affirmative Provisioning 
Constitutional lawyers in the United States often assume that, in contrast to 
other political orders,69 the government has few obligations to provide services.  
The federal Constitution is replete with instructions protecting the citizenry from 
government (the negative rights produced by prohibitions, for example, on 
“abridging the freedom of speech”70 and on “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”71) but less by way of textual commitments expressly obliging the 
government to ensure security and safety.  Some constitutional scholars and 
jurists do argue that constitutional references to “promote the general 
Welfare,”72 coupled with the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, should 
be read to impose affirmative obligations on the government,73 but the more 
general view is that “negative” rather than “positive” liberties abound.74  Less 
attention has been paid to the idea that structures of government—set forth in 
 
and town halls” relied on “citation of some deed or saying of the past.” Id. at 33–34; see also Hugo 
van der Velden, Cambyses for Example: The Origins and Function of an Exemplum Iustitiae in 
Netherlandish Art of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETH. Q. 
FOR HIST. ART 5 (1995). 
 68.  See South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 57 para. 13 (quoting S. AFR. 
CONST., 1996 ch. 1 § 26(2) (that the goal of the constitutional obligation to provide shelter will be 
met through “progressive realisation”)). 
 69. See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Gráinne de Búrca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005); 
VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 72. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 73. For example, Robin West argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality and due 
process guarantees ought to be read to include that the government support the “‘positive liberties’ 
of civic participation, meaningful work, and unthreatened intimacy.”  See ROBIN WEST, 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2–3  
(1994); see also Stephen Reinhardt, Keynote Address, The Role of Social Justice in Judging Cases, 
1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 18 (2003).  Such entitlements would not, however, necessarily result in court-
based enforcement.  Rather, West called for congressional and state legislative action.  West, 
Rights, Capabilities, supra note 31. 
 74. How such categorization relates to Isaiah Berlin’s famous delineation of negative and 
positive freedom and liberties is much debated.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in 
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); JEREMY WALDRON, Liberal Rights: Two Sides of the Coin, 
in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 1 (1993). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS 943 
both state and federal constitutions—are themselves a species of positive rights75 
and, moreover, examples undermining the assumption that forms of services 
deemed “social rights” impose obligations for government-provisioning that 
political and civil rights do not.76 
This categorization echoes international conventions and the discourse 
associated with T.H. Marshall’s classic 1950 essay, Citizenship and Social 
Class.77  Writing after World War II and on the cusp of British support for 
various social services (legal aid included78), Marshall famously delineated what 
 
 75. A few scholars have noted that courts (providing a “taxpayer-salaried judge”) are a form 
of entitlement, and argued the utility of subsidizing access to courts as “a highly visible gesture of 
inclusion.”  See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 45, 219 (1999).  Also detailed are “some numbers” on the costs, with the 
federal judicial system as their exemplar.  Id. app. at 234.   Courts are the specific focus of a more 
recent discussion that raised questions about the wisdom of the current subsidies to courts and 
suggested instead that differential subsidies would protect the “social positives” produced by 
litigation but reduce the government costs of providing the service.  See Brendan S. Maher, The 
Civil Justicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L. J. 1527, 1528 (2010). 
  Robin West’s analysis of the positive entitlement to “protection against private violence” 
could also be linked to state enforcement mechanisms, courts included.  See West, Rights, 
Capabilities, supra note 31, at 1923–24; see also David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1230–32 (2002) [hereinafter Sklansky, 
Quasi-Affirmative Rights].  Focused on criminal procedure, Sklansky characterizes these rights as 
“quasi” in that they are artifacts of state efforts to limit liberty.  In an earlier essay, Sklansky 
addressed the “affirmative entitlement to policing” that the state owed its citizens.  David A. 
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1999); see also PAUL BREST, 
SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1606–16 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing 
the “rights of indigents in the criminal justice system” in the context of an analysis of whether the 
U.S. Constitution affirmatively guarantees any “welfare rights”).  In addition, Sandra Fredman’s 
analysis of human rights notes that effective access to courts is a right protected under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that, as a result, courts have provided judicial review of failures 
to do so.  SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE 
DUTIES 77–79 (2008). 
 76. As Jeremy Waldron detailed, “[m]any first-generation rights (for example, the right to 
vote) require the positive establishment and maintenance of certain frameworks,” and hence impose 
costs.  WALDRON, supra note 74, at 24. 
 77. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, was originally published in 1950; citations 
here are to the edition, T.H. MARSHALL & TOM BOTTOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 
(1992) [hereinafter T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class]. 
 78. See Joan Mahoney, Green Forms and Legal Aid Offices: A History of Publicly Funded 
Legal Services in Britain and the United States, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 223 (1998).  
England’s 1949 Legal Aid Program was remarkably ambitious, initially aiming to be responsive to 
need.  See ROSS CRANSTON, HOW LAW WORKS: THE MACHINERY AND IMPACT OF CIVIL JUSTICE 
46–47 (2006).  See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND 
STATE: THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003).  Major revisions came in 1999, in an act (“the 
Access to Justice Act”) that abolished the Legal Aid Board and created a Legal Services 
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he saw to be the progressive enhancement of three kinds of citizenship 
entailments—civil rights (“liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and 
faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to 
justice”), political rights (“to participate in the exercise of political power” either 
as a member of the legislature or as an “elector” of such a body), and “social 
rights” (such as economic support, education, and housing).79  The United 
Nation Conventions that separate “civil and political rights” from socio-
economic rights80 further embedded distinctions among the kinds of rights, even 
as commentators have come to question the utility and wisdom of this 
categorization that echoes Cold War divides.81 
Redistribution obligations are typically associated with Marshall’s third 
category, social rights,82 which some legal systems presume to be non-
justiciable; given the complex allocation issues involved, legislative decision-
making can be seen as preferable to adjudication.  But non-justiciability has not 
prevented claims from being understood as rights and moreover, on occasion, 
courts do find enforceable entitlements in arenas falling under the rubric of 
“social rights.”  In the United States, state constitutional guarantees of education 
are often cited as an instance of a judicially-enforceable social rights 
entitlement.83 
 
Commission to work through decentralized groups charged with identifying local needs, eligible 
lawyers, and requesting funding.  Id. at 226–34; CRANSTON, supra, at 47–49. 
 79. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8.  Marshall also argued 
their interconnectedness (e.g., that compulsory education, a social right, was requisite to civil and 
political competencies) and moreover the relevance of collective rights (trade unionism being the 
example) developed out of industrialization.  See id. at 13–14, 44–49.  Further, inequalities in civil 
rights stemmed from the “lack of social rights . . . .”  Id. at 21. 
  The categories that Marshall discussed echoed debates in the United States about the reach 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including whether the “privileges and immunities” clause 
guaranteed federal protection against state-imposed impediments to earning a livelihood.  See, e.g., 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 
(1872). 
 80. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 81. See FREDMAN, supra note 75, at 227–28. 
 82. See, e.g., Cécile Fabre, Social Rights in European Constitutions, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE, supra note 69, at 15. 
 83. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause rendered unconstitutional school financing predicated on local property 
taxes. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  In contrast, dozens of 
state courts have identified education rights based on specific provisions in state constitutions.  See, 
e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); 
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 
(N.H. 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); see also Peter 
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The obvious Marshallian category for courts is civil rights, for he located 
the “right to justice” as a part of that description.84  (Indeed, “the institutions 
most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice.”85)  Given that 
“the formal recognition of an equal capacity for rights was not enough,” 
Marshall recognized access to courts as in need of welfarist support,86 akin to 
those provided for health and education.87  Courts also come within his 
discussion of the function of social rights, requisite to sharing “to the full in the 
social heritage . . . .”88  Moreover, as I outlined above, courts in democracies 
provide a venue for development of norms through iterative exchanges that bring 
litigation within the category of “political” rights.  This sense of the political 
both expands on Marshall’s definition (focused on the electoral) and underscores 
that full formal equality (i.e. women and men in all roles in courts from disputant 
to juror and judge) came later in the twentieth century than did equality in the 
franchise.  Further, when guarantees of court rights for “every person” came 
literally to mean all people, courts became another example of Marshall’s point 
that enhanced citizenship rights puts pressure on governments to respond to 
 
Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 101 app. at 185–94 (1995).  See generally Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting 
“Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003). 
  Several articles address state constitutions as sources of rights beyond education.  See, e.g., 
Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social 
and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010); Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights 
and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002); Burt Neuborne, Foreword: 
State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989); Jeffrey Omar 
Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights 
in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2010).  Many credit Justice Brennan with launching 
the focus on state courts, in part as an antidote to the U.S. Supreme Court’s retrenchment under 
Chief Justice Warren Burger’s leadership.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 84. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8. 
 85. Id.  Marshall also distinguished “the right to justice” from the other civil rights of personal 
liberty, free speech, and property and contract competencies on the grounds that rights to justice 
protected the others through “the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality 
with others and by due process of law.”  Id. 
 86. Id. at 24.  He thought political rights were relatively inexpensive to distribute (“it costs 
little or nothing to register a vote”) and that payment to legislators, coupled with access to funds 
through parties and campaign contribution regulation diminished problems of inequality in politics.  
Id. at 22–23.  But “litigation, unlike voting, is very expensive.”  Id. at 23.  Further, because litigation 
was also a “contest,” support of one litigant but not another produced another form of unfairness in 
that a “measure of class-abatement” could “in some cases, create a form of class privilege.”  Id. at 
31.  Universal support, coupled with price regulation, was one response, but not without difficulties.  
Id. 
 87. Id. at 47.  The development of legal aid in England as part of a network of social services 
is detailed by Richard I. Morgan, The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England and Wales, 1914–
1949, 5 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 38 (1994). 
 88. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8. 
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economic inequality through forms of subsidies.89  Constitutional commitments 
to courts thus encompass all three of the Marshallian kinds of rights, provide 
examples of occasional judicial enforcement of such rights, and underscore the 
redistributive entailments of each genre as well as the intersections of the 
“social,” the “political,” and the “civil.” 
Below, I detail the degree to which constitutions require the provision of and 
regulate court services.  Such positive law, coupled with natural and common 
law traditions, generates what Jeremy Waldron has termed “waves of duty,” 
instantiating rights over time and with variation rather than through a single 
act.90  I examine facets of court services that are judicially enforceable, and I 
sketch how courts responded to new entrants (“everyone”) by elaborating 
constitutional obligations to be open to all; to waive fees for some and to equip 
certain indigent litigants with counsel or experts; to reconfigure their own 
processes; to limit legislative retraction on certain kinds of remedies, and, on 
rare occasion, to order the political branches to comply with the mandate to 
support the courts themselves.91 
Three additional, prefatory comments are in order.  First, the discussion 
below of some constitutional case law should not obscure the centrality of 
legislatures in the creation and support of courts.  While often posited as critics 
of courts, legislatures have been—and will continue to be—the primary sources 
for supporting court functions.  Second, this analysis is court-centric but falls 
within a larger examination of American legal history that details longstanding 
and diverse commitments to various forms of government regulation and 
provisioning.92  The density over centuries of government regulation at local, 
state, and national levels undermines the construction of a national identity 
predicated on hostility to formal legal ordering. 
Third, this positive legal account, sketching constitutional stipulations for 
courts and government implementation, is the product of a series of normative 
justifications for courts and regulation more generally.  Several theories of 
courts’ utilities and values sustain the project of courts and the law that 
surrounds them.  Now-classic explanations for adjudication’s contributions 
come from Frank Michelman, who explained that access to litigation gives 
individuals opportunities for participation, for efficacy, and for dignified 
 
 89. Id. at 45–47.  See generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social 
Contract: When Will the United States Finally Guarantee its People the Equality Before the Law 
the Social Contract Demands? 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 (2010). 
 90. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 509–12 (1989). 
 91. See infra Parts II.B–III.C.  As Sklansky noted in the context of constitutional criminal 
procedure, courts have done less than they might to materialize (or as he puts it, to “honor”) some 
guarantees.  See Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights, supra note 75, at 1287–90. 
 92. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
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treatment from the state.93  Jerry Mashaw noted another value, that decision-
making by governments needed to treat similarly-situated claimants equally.94  
Both Justices Brennan and Powell invoked another value—accuracy—as they 
linked forms of process to outcomes that accorded with facts and law,95 and a 
law and economics literature debates the efficiencies that result and prompt 
investments into judiciaries.96  The argument that Dennis Curtis and I proffer in 
Representing Justice puts forth an additional, distinct value, focused on the 
relationship and interactions among disputants, governments, and third parties 
in adjudication.  Litigation contributes to democracy through its public processes 
in which the government is required to demonstrate its commitments to equal 
and dignified treatment, to commit itself to forms of self-restraint and 
explanation, and to reveal its exercise of authority in the face of conflicting 
claims of right.  The argument is not that litigation (or other forms of democratic 
practices) generates optimal rules but rather that the iterative participatory 
practices in courts are one method of giving practical expression to democratic 
values. 
B. Specifying Services 
Dozens of state and federal provisions (both constitutional and statutory) 
require governments to provide judges, who are obliged to perform in 
accordance with variously-detailed requirements.  The obvious (and taken for 
granted) specifications include selection of judges, the number of justices 
required for decisions, tenure in office and other mechanisms for protecting 
independence,97 and the parameters of jurisdiction.  In addition, constitutions 
provide directions to judges, specify some procedures for criminal defendants 
and civil plaintiffs, and build in roles for jurors, witnesses, and the public. 
 
 93. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect 
One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153, 1172–77 [hereinafter Michelman, Part I]. 
 94. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 28, 52–54 (1976).  For Mashaw, these values that animate a theory of due process do not 
necessarily result in the public format of adjudicatory procedures, whereas for Michelman, these 
values support fee waivers for indigent litigants to enable effective access to courts, but not to 
require necessarily free lawyers for all indigent civil litigants. Compare Mashaw, supra, at 57–59, 
with Michelman, Part I, supra note 93, at 1172–77. 
 95. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Justice Brennan); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976) (Justice Powell). 
 96. Classic commentary includes J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial 
Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997), 
and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
 97. Article III is often the standard bearer, but the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the 
Massachusetts Constitution offered earlier guarantees of judicial independence.  MD. CONST. of 
1776, pt. 1, art. XXX; MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXIX. 
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For example, the early constitutions of both Idaho and Illinois called on their 
judges to “report” to the legislature or governor on “defects and omissions” in 
the laws.98  Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island instruct justices 
to reply when their governors or legislatures ask for their opinions.99  Some state 
constitutions direct their Supreme Courts to write or to publish opinions, to make 
them freely available, to let anyone publish them, and to explain reasons for 
dissent.  For example, Kentucky’s 1792 Constitution imposed the “duty of each 
judge of the Supreme Court, present at the hearing of such cause, and differing 
from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in writing.”100  West Virginia 
directed judges in its 1872 Constitution to “prepare a syllabus of the points 
 
 98. Idaho’s 1890 constitutional requirement (that its judges report to the legislature “such 
defects and omissions in the Constitution and laws as they may find to exist”) remains in place.  
See IDAHO CONST. of 1890, art. V, § 25 (same as of 2012).  The current version of the Illinois 
requirement is that the Illinois Supreme Court “shall report” to the general assembly, in writing, 
“improvements in the administration of justice.”  ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 17 (in effect 2012).  
This instruction, which did not appear in the Illinois Constitutions of 1818 or of 1848, was put into 
the 1870 Constitution in a form akin to that of Idaho—that all judges of inferior courts “report in 
writing” each year, to the supreme court, who would report to the governor, “such defects and 
omissions in the constitution and laws as they may find to exist, together with appropriate forms of 
bills to cure such defects and omissions in the laws.”  ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 31. 
 99. This mandate, dating from each state’s first constitution, continued, and is found variously 
placed in these states’ current constitutions.  See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II (“Each 
branch of the Legislature, as well as the Governor and Council, shall have authority to require the 
opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, upon important questions of law, and upon 
solemn occasions.”) (substantially the same as of 2012); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, art. 74 (“Each 
branch of the legislature, as well as the president and council, shall have authority to require the 
opinions of the justices of the superior court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn 
occasions.”) (substantially the same as of 2012); R.I. CONST. of 1986, art. X, § 3 (“The judges of 
the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by 
the governor or by either house of the general assembly.”) (taken in substantially the same form 
from R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. X, § 3, replacing its 1663 charter). 
 100. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4.  The section continues, 
And the said court shall have power, on the determination of any such case, to award the 
legal costs against either party or to divide the same among the different parties, as to them 
shall seem just and right.  And the said court shall have full power to take such steps as they 
may judge proper, to perpetuate testimony in all cases concerning such titles:  Provided, 
That a jury shall always be empaneled for the finding of such facts as are not agreed by the 
parties; unless the parties or their attorneys, shall waive their right of trial by jury, and refer 
the matter of fact to the decision of the court:  Provided also, That the Legislature may, 
whenever they may judge it expedient, pass an act or acts to regulate the mode of 
proceedings in such cases, or to take away entirely the original jurisdiction hereby given to 
the said court in such cases. 
Id. (superseded by the KY. CONST. of 1891 and no such provision appears in the version in place 
as of 2012). 
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adjudicated” in those cases with written opinions.101  Arizona, California, and 
Michigan insisted that opinions “shall be free for publication by any person.”102  
Moreover, both Illinois’s current Constitution, adopted in 1970, and Kentucky’s 
current Constitution, adopted in 1891, require that courts create rules for 
“expeditious and inexpensive appeals.”103  Utah’s Constitution guarantees the 
right of appeal itself.104 
Turning to disputants, the epigrams with which this section opens illustrate 
that state constitutions endow civil litigants with entitlements to use courts.  
“Right-to-remedy” clauses are traced to the Magna Carta,105 as it was invoked 
 
 101. W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII, § 5.  West Virginia’s current Constitution is an amended 
version of its 1872 Constitution, and includes the same requirement at article eight, section four.  
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 
 102. ARIZ. CONST. of 1910, art. VI, § 16 (“Provisions for the speedy publication of the opinions 
of the supreme court shall be made by law, and they shall be free for publication by any person.”) 
(the current provision, which is substantially similar, is at ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 8); CAL. CONST. 
of 1849, art. VI, § 12 (“The Legislature shall provide for the speedy publication of all statute laws, 
and of such judicial decisions as it may deem expedient; and all laws and judicial decisions shall 
be free for publication by any person.”) (superseded by the California Constitution of 1879, which 
had a similar provision at art. 6, § 16; following a 1966 amendment, article six, section fourteen 
now reads, “The Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the 
Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions 
shall be available for publication by any person.  Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of 
appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 35 
(“All laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person.”).  The same provision 
existed in Michigan’s 1850 Constitution, MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 36, but not in Michigan’s 
initial 1835 Constitution.  The current Michigan Constitution also provides: “Decisions of the 
supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a 
concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to 
appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing the reasons for his dissent.” 
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
  Maryland’s Constitution provides similarly that “Provision shall be made by Law for 
publishing Reports of all causes, argued and determined in the Court of Appeals and in the 
intermediate courts of appeal, which the judges thereof, respectively, shall designate as proper for 
publication.”  MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, pt. 2, § 16 (current as of 2102).  In addition, New 
Jersey’s 1844 Constitution required judges to provide “reasons” “in writing,” N.J. CONST. of 1844, 
art. VI, § II, para. 5, but neither New Jersey’s original 1776 Constitution nor its current Constitution, 
in place since 1947, contain a similar provision. 
 103. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 16 (current as of 2012) (similar provision did not appear in 
the previous 1870 Constitution); KY. CONST. of 1891, § 115 (applies to both civil and criminal 
cases, and includes “as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court, except that the 
Commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than for the 
purpose of securing a certification of law”) (current as of 2012) (this provision did not exist in the 
original 1891 Kentucky Constitution, but was added in 1975). 
 104. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12. 
 105. Chapter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta provided: “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, 
or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other 
wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his 
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and extrapolated by Lord Coke and by Blackstone106 and filtered through natural 
and common law customs.  New Americans were heirs to an English tradition 
 
Peers, or by the Law of the land.  We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man 
either Justice or Right.”  MAGNA CHARTA, ch. 29 (1225), translated and reprinted in EDWARD 
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1, 45 (London, E. & R. 
Brooke 1797).  Chapter 40 of King John’s 1215 Magna Carta reads: “To none will we sell, to none 
will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice.”  MAGNA CHARTA, ch. 40 (1215), reprinted in 
BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 228, 
239 (1900). 
 106. An account of the development is provided Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right 
to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1319–24 (2003), and in William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening 
Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the 
Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 357–63 (1997).  Koch focused on the state 
constitutional drafters’ use of Lord Coke’s explanation of Chapter 29, with its promise that “[t]o 
no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice,” Koch, supra, at 356 (quoting 
chapter twenty-nine of the Magna Carta), to which Lord Coke added: 
  This is spoken in the person of the king, who in judgement of law, in all his courts of 
justice is present, and repeating these words, nulli vendemus, etc. 
  And therefore, every subject of this realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel 
persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or bond, man, or 
woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other without exception, 
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done 
to him, freely without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay. 
  Hereby it appeareth, that justice must have three qualities, it must be libra, quia nehil 
iniquius venali justitia; plena, quia justitia non debit claudicare; et celeris, quia dilation 
est quaedam negatio; and then it is both justice and right. 
Koch, supra, at 359–60 (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND, A PROEME TO THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES *55–56 (London, E. & 
R. Brooke 1797)). 
  “Much of this language survives intact as the remedies guarantees of some state 
constitutions.”  Phillips, supra, at 1321.  “The constitutions in six of the original thirteen states 
contained ‘open courts’ or ‘right to remedy’ provisions derived from Chapter 40 of King John’s 
Magna Carta and Chapter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta.”  Koch, supra, at 367.  “Four of these states 
paraphrased Lord Coke’s explanation of Chapter 29.”  Id. 
  As Koch recounts, Blackstone likewise insisted on the importance of Magna Carta to 
English liberties, and identified as one of three central rights “that of applying to the courts of 
justice for redress of injuries.  Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, 
liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly 
administered therein.”  Koch, supra, at 362–63 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *141).  Blackstone continues: 
The emphatical words of magna carta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment 
of law (says Sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are these: 
nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus restum vel justitiam: “and therefore every 
subject,” continues the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel 
persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception, may 
take his remedy by the course of law, and have justice and right for the injury done him, 
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.” 
Id. (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *141). 
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in which judges owed a duty to law itself, and to decide disputes “in accord with 
the law of the land.”107  That tradition imposed constraints on the exercise of 
both public and private power.  Yet such entitlements to courts and to judicial 
remedies did not include then—nor need they now—judicial authority to 
overturn legislation.108  Whether individuals can enforce these rights in courts is 
a discrete question to which many jurisdictions respond negatively.109  
Parliamentary supremacy was understood then as ordinary, and remains a form 
of constitutionalism today. 
The epigrams also make plain that constitutions in North America built on 
“custom and usage” when making court services constitutional obligations.  As 
quoted at the outset of this section, the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights 
provided for “every freeman” to have remedy “speedily without delay” against 
any “other person” for “every injury done him in his goods, lands or person,” in 
accordance with “the law of the land.”110  The first constitutions of Maryland 
(1776) and Massachusetts (1780), and the second of New Hampshire (1784), 
had similar iterations.111  Pennsylvania’s 1776 version instructed that all “courts 
shall be open, and justice shall be impartially administered without corruption 
or unnecessary delay,”112 and North Carolina’s 1776 provision limited remedies 
to those “restrained of [their] liberty.”113 
 
 107. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 17–18, 103–06.  And as Hamburger accounts, 
judges therefore found at times that “some of the king’s acts [were] contrary to the king’s own 
law.”  Id. at 113; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Natural Law Influences on the First Generation 
of American Constitutional Law: Reflections on Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty (Jan. 
19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 108. See Epstein, supra note 107, at 31. 
 109. See id. at 30–32. 
 110. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 12; see also Dan 
Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era 
State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 944 
(2002) (suggesting that Maryland’s Declaration served as a model for Delaware). 
 111. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies. 
 112. PA. CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, § 26.  Pennsylvania’s current constitutional provision is similar: 
“All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or 
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, 
denial or delay.”  PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (current in 2012). 
 113. N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIII.  North Carolina’s second Constitution, adopted in 
1868, retained this provision, N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 18, but also added a broader provision: 
“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, 
denial, or delay.”  N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 35.  North Carolina’s current Constitution, adopted 
in 1970, includes both the narrow and broader provisions, in nearly identical form to those in the 
1868 Constitution.  N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 18, 21 (current in 2012). 
  Of the original thirteen colonies, states including due process language were Connecticut, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.  CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9 (“[N]or be deprived 
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In contrast, the United States’ 1776 Constitution did not include such a 
clause.  During ratification, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island all 
suggested the addition of a right-to-remedy clause and proffered language 
reminiscent of the provisions quoted above.114  The proposals were not adopted, 
nor did such terms, when again proffered for inclusion, become a part of the 
1791 Bill of Rights.115 
Yet one could read the 1789 creation of the federal court system that 
inscribed a Supreme Court and gave Congress authority to “from time to time 
 
of life, liberty, or property, but by due course of law.”); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I., § 7 (“[N]or 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the 
land.”); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. 21 (“That no freeman ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, 
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land . . . .”); MASS. CONST. of 
1780, pt. 1, art. XII (“[N]o subject shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the 
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV (“And no 
subject shall be . . . deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of 
the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law 
of the land.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 7 (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XII (“That no freeman ought to 
be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, 
pt. 1, art. IX  (“[N]or can any man be justly deprived of his liberty except by the laws of the land, 
or the judgment of his peers.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 10 (“[N]or shall he be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”); S.C. CONST. of 
1778, art. XLI (“That no freeman of this State be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but 
by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, § 8 (“that no 
man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers”). Those 
without any such provisions were Georgia and New Jersey.  One of the earliest uses of the phrase 
“due process” comes in a 1354 statute protecting against loss of property or life “without being 
brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”  28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) (Eng.). 
 114. North Carolina and Virginia proposed that the amendment read: 
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries 
and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character.  He ought to obtain right 
and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, 
and that all establishments, or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and 
unjust. 
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 268, 379 
(Washington, Dep’t of State 1894). 
  Rhode Island’s proposed amendment stated: 
That every freeman ought to obtain right and justice, freely and without sale, completely 
and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regulations 
contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust. 
Id. at 313.  On September 8, 1789, the Senate rejected an amendment based on Virginia and North 
Carolina’s proposals.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 76 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting that 
“[s]everal amendments were proposed, but none of them were agreed to”); HISTORY OF CONGRESS; 
EXHIBITING A CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, AND THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, FROM MARCH 4, 1789, TO MARCH 3, 1793, at 165 (Philadelphia, Lea & 
Blanchard 1843). 
 115. See Koch, supra note 106, at 372–75. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS 953 
ordain and establish” inferior courts,116 coupled with the limitation on 
congressional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus117 and the reference 
in the Supremacy Clause that federal law “bound” judges in every state,118 to 
reflect the assumption of access rights for common law remedies.  Philip 
Hamburger’s analysis about “inexplicit ideals” may provide an explanation—
that although the content of “the ideals of law and judicial duty were never a 
matter of consensus, they were sufficiently conventional that they did not 
ordinarily have to be explained.”119 
The federal Bill of Rights provides further support for a pervasive 
understanding of functioning and (by then obligatory) public courts systems, 
including the fledging federal one.  The Fifth and Sixth Amendments not only 
detail rights for criminal defendants (including the right to public trials) but also 
that “private property” cannot be taken without “just compensation.”120  And in 
1791, the federal Constitution embedded the phrase “due process of law” into 
constitutional discourse.121  Moreover, the Seventh Amendment “preserved” the 
rights to jury trials in “[s]uits at common law,” and limited the reexamination of 
jury fact-finding.122  Even the Eleventh Amendment’s divesture of some form 
of authority over claims against states123 could be read as an implicit 
endorsement of judicial power otherwise extending to civil litigants coming 
within the federal jurisdictional parameters. 
In addition, the First Amendment protects the “right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”124  In the North American 
 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  For further discussion of the suspension clause and its 
limitation upon Congress, see Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as 
Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006) and Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009). 
 118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Hamburger argued that it was  “taken for granted” that state 
judges had to decide in accord with state law and that the Constitution was needed to clarify that 
state judges had a “federal role” requiring them to decide in accord with federal law.  HAMBURGER, 
supra note 14, at 596–97. 
 119. HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 575–77. 
 120. U.S. CONST. amends. V–VI. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Due process was referenced along with other rights, such as the 
prohibition of the deprivation of private property without “just compensation.”  Id.  The lineage of 
the phrase “due process” is explained by Charles A. Miller in The Forest of Due Process of Law: 
The American Constitutional Tradition, in 18 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman eds., 1977).  Hans Linde argued that due process provisions ought not to be equated 
with open court/remedy clauses.  See Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional 
Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 136–38 (1970). 
 122. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 124. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The use of the term “government” instead of the word “legislature” 
(as proposed by James Madison in the June 8, 1789 draft, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph 
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colonies, petitioning included the filing of grievances that today would be 
understood as lawsuits, as legislatures exercised a mix of powers, including 
adjudicating claims involving both public and private parties.125  In the mid-
twentieth century, the right to petition came to be understood as protecting 
access to all branches of government, courts included.126  Federal rights to 
remedies also stem from twentieth-century interpretations of the Due Process 
Clause that recognized legal claims as a species of property that constrained 
government’s ability to extinguish them.127  Although debate is had among the 
justices about whether government has affirmative obligations to facilitate 
access to courts,128 modern federal constitutional court doctrines identify the 
First Amendment’s petition rights as well as the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment as sources of court access for both litigants and their audience—the 
public. 
 
Gales ed., 1834)), has been advanced as support for the reading that the Clause referenced all 
branches of government. 
 125. See Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the 
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144–46 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First 
Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17, 27–29 (1993).  For example, in 1770, the Connecticut General 
Assembly acted on “150 causes, in law and equity, brought by petitioners.” Higginson, supra, at 
146.  Private disputes included the lawfulness of a deed, debt actions, and estate conflicts.  Id.  
Moreover, people who were otherwise disenfranchised and might have lacked juridical authority 
in courts, such as “women, felons, Indians, and, in some cases, slaves,” brought petitions.  Id. at 
153.  The lack of nineteenth century doctrinal development of the law of petitioning is generally 
attributed to the conflict over the use of petitions in abolition; Congress rebuffed petitions during 
that era—making plain that the text of a right to petition was not, for many decades, understood as 
equal to the right to be heard or have responses, including judgments.  Id. at 163–65. 
 126. During the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked this First Amendment right 
as protecting litigation, in the context of identifying the NAACP’s right to litigate as a “form of 
political expression.”  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); see also Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainman v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).  The Court reiterated that access to 
courts fell under the protection of the Petition Clause in the context of prisoners, as well as other 
civil litigants in their pursuit of remedies, both in courts and in other branches of government.  See, 
e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 
508 (1972).  The contribution that litigation makes was recognized in 2011 in Borough of Duryea 
v. Guarnieri when the Court described litigation as protected by the Petition Clause for facilitating 
“informed public participation that is a cornerstone of democratic society.”  Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011).  The ruling, however, narrowed the grounds on which 
public employees can bring Petition Clause claims based on alleged retaliation.  Id. at 2501. 
 127. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008); Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982);  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306 (1950). 
 128. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), 
discussed infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
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Returning to the founding era, early constitutions gave civil as well as 
criminal litigants rights to jury trials and protected jury fact-finding itself.129   
 
 129. See Friedman, supra note 110, at 960–67, 992–93.  Of the first thirteen states, eleven 
drafted and ratified state constitutions between 1776 and 1780.  Connecticut and Rhode Island 
relied on their colonial charters until 1818 and 1842, respectively, when each state drafted its first 
constitutions.  CONN. CHARTER of 1662; CHARTER OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS of 1663.  
Ten of the eleven states who adopted constitutions implicitly or expressly provided for a trial by 
jury.  For example, the phrase in Article Twenty-five of Delaware’s 1776 Constitution, that the 
“common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in 
practice in this State, shall remain in force,” has been interpreted as an implicit adoption of 
common law rights to trial by jury) DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 25; see also DEL. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 13 (“That trial by jury of facts where they arise is 
one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.”); GA. CONST. of 1777, 
art. LXI (“trial by jury to remain inviolate forever.”); GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XL–XLIII 
(regarding jury’s fact-finding authority and the powers of the special jury); MD. CONST. of 1776, 
pt. 1, art. III (“That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the 
trial by jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIX (“That, in all criminal prosecutions, every 
man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he 
ought not to be found guilty.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII (“the legislature shall not 
make any law that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the 
government of the army and navy, without trial by jury”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XV 
(“In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in 
cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial 
by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high 
seas, and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter 
it.”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (“the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed 
as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (“trial 
by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall be 
established and remain inviolate forever.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. IX (“That no freeman 
shall be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in 
open court, as heretofore used.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIV (“That in all controversies 
at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the 
rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX 
(“That in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the country, without the unanimous consent of which jury he cannot be found 
guilty . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XI (“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits 
between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred.”); 
S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII (“the judges of the courts of law shall cause jury-lists to be made, 
and juries to be summoned, as near as may be, according to the directions of the acts of the general 
assembly in such cases provided.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 8 (“That in all capital or criminal 
prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his 
vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, 
§ 11 (“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient 
trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.”). 
  New Hampshire did not provide for a jury right in its initial 1776 Constitution but did so 
in its second constitution.  N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV (“no subject shall be arrested, 
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the 
protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his 
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As Appendix Three details, criminal defendants had a variety of additional 
specified protections, such as rights to disclosure of charges, representation, 
confrontation, speedy trials, and jurors pulled specifically from their vicinity.130  
In addition, several constitutions rejected the English common law prohibition 
on counsel for felony defendants and concluded that counsel could be present.131  
 
peers or the law of the land.”).  While neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island included an express 
right to trial by jury in their colonial charters, both included general language about the application 
of English common law to the territories, which was taken to include the right to trial by jury.  
CONN. CHARTER of 1662 (providing authority to “Make, Ordain, and Establish all manner of 
wholesome, and reasonable Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, Directions, and Instructions, not Contrary 
to the Laws of this Realm of England”);  CHARTER OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS of 1663 
(providing for the same legal rights and protections “as other our liege people of this our realme of 
England”).  Both states include the right in their first state constitutions.  CONN. CONST. of 1818, 
art. I, § 7 (“In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, and the 
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court.”); 
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to 
. . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 21 (“The right of 
trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I., § 10 (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . 
.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I., § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”); see also 
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. X, § 3 (imposing duty on judges to instruct juries on the law).  Vermont, 
which was admitted as the fourteenth state in 1791, wrote its first constitution in 1777 and included 
the right to a trial by jury.  VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. X (“That, in all prosecutions for criminal 
offences, a man hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the country; without 
the unanimous consent of which jury, he cannot be found guilty . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, 
art. XIII (“That, in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties 
have a right to a trial by jury; which ought to be held sacred.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § XXII 
(“Trials shall be by jury; and it is recommended to the legislature of this State to provide by law, 
against every corruption or partiality in the choice, and return, or appointment, of juries.”). 
 130. A summary of the various rights identified is provided infra Appendix 3, State 
Constitutions: Criminal Defendants’ Rights in the Thirteen Original States. 
 131. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 109 (1951); see also WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
IN AMERICAN COURTS 21, 25 (1955); DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE 
ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3–66 (1992).  A formal account of the early constitutional 
provisions follows, along with a caveat about the distinction between texts and practices before or 
after adoption.  See, e.g., Alan Rogers, “A Sacred Duty”: Court Appointed Attorneys in 
Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780–1980, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1997). 
  Four of the thirteen original colonies—Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New 
York—guaranteed defendants a right to counsel when enacting their first independent governing 
statements.  Provisions varied somewhat, either by the nature of the offense or the capacities of the 
prosecutor.  Maryland’s Constitution provided: “[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a 
right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the indictment or charge in 
due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”  MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIX.  Similarly, Massachusetts 
provided: 
No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and 
plainly, substantially, and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish 
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(The distinct question of whether those unable to pay for their own lawyers 
should receive state subsidies is discussed below).  Some constitutions offer yet 
more detail.  For example, in the little-read Treason Clause of Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution, convictions require either the “Testimony of two Witnesses” 
or “Confession in open Court.”132 
 
evidence against himself.  And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that 
may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to be fully 
heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel, at his election. 
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII.  In contrast, New York’s Constitution of 1777 granted 
counsel for impeachment or misdemeanors “as in civil actions.”  N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIV.  
New Jersey guaranteed “all criminals” the same “counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be 
entitled to.”  N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI. 
  Thereafter, six states adopted right-to-counsel provisions in two successive waves, the first 
immediately following the Revolutionary War and the second following the Civil War.  New 
Hampshire, Delaware, and Pennsylvania added a right-to-counsel provision in 1784, 1792, and 
1790, respectively.  DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 7; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV; PA. 
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9.  These states followed the model of Maryland and Massachusetts, 
lumping the right to counsel with other procedural protections, most of which echoed rights 
guaranteed in the newly established federal Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; DEL. 
CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 7; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9.  
Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted right-to-counsel provisions in their first state constitutions, 
enacted to replace the charters under which they had operated.  CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9; 
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 10.  Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina adopted similar 
provisions during Reconstruction.  GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, § 8; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 
11; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 13.  Although Virginia adopted a similar provision that protected 
many of these same procedural rights in 1864, no mention then (or now) is made in the text of a 
right to counsel.  See VA. CONST. of 1971, art. I, § 8 (“That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a 
right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and 
witnesses, and to call for evidence in his favor, and he shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found 
guilty.  He shall not be deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of 
his peers, nor be compelled in any criminal proceeding to give evidence against himself, nor be put 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense.”) (current as of 2012); VA. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 8 
(“That, in all capital or criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of 
his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, 
and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous 
consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that 
no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”). 
  In sum, of the thirteen colonies originally forming the United States, four (Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York) adopted a right to counsel with their first independent 
governments, eight had added the right by the end of the nineteenth century, and one (Virginia) did 
not, and does not, have a guarantee of a right to counsel in its state constitution. See 50 STATE 
STATUTORY SURVEYS: CRIMINAL LAWS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL 
(2011) 0030 SURVEYS 22 (Westlaw). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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Rights of the public are also specified.  Remedy clauses were often in 
tandem with the words, “all courts shall be open.”133  Those words, found in the 
Delaware Constitution of 1792,134 were reproduced in several other states,135 and 
as of 2012, twenty-seven state constitutions require that “all courts shall be 
open” or that justice shall be “openly” administered,136 while a few others call 
for “public” courts,137 prohibit “secret” proceedings,138 or otherwise protect 
attendance through jury trial (guaranteed in all the original states’ 
constitutions)139 and, in two instances, coupled with protection of the press.140 
Amendments to constitutions in the late twentieth century identified another 
set of entitled participants—”victims”—who gained express status in the texts 
 
 133. For examples of constitutions in which the phrases were in tandem, see DEL. CONST. of 
1792, art. I, § 9, and KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 13.  For an example of a constitution where 
they were not in tandem, see VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XXIII (“All courts shall be open, and 
justice shall be impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay; all their officers 
shall be paid an adequate, but moderate, compensation for their services; and if any officer shall 
take greater or other fees than the laws allow him, either directly or indirectly, it shall ever after 
disqualify him from holding any office in this State.”). 
 134.  DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9.  But how much access this provision protects has been 
debated, and Delaware courts have declined to provide access to various records, such as those 
related to divorces or jury lists, under its provisions.  See Gannet Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 736–
37 (Del. 1989); C v. C, 320 A.2d 717, 728 (Del. 1974); see also In re Trust for Gore, No. 1165-
VCN, 2010 WL 5644675, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2011). 
 135. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies, 
and Appendix 2, State Constitutions without Express Remedy Clauses and with Due Process or 
Open/Public Courts Provisions. 
 136. 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 6-91 to 6-92 app. 6 (4th ed. 2006).  The number included varies depending 
on which language is in focus.  See, e.g., Koch, supra note 106, at 435 & n.599 (identifying twenty-
two states with such provisions). 
 137. For example, South Carolina proclaims that all “courts shall be public . . . .”  See S.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 138. Oregon specifies both that courts are open and that no court shall be “secret.”  See OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 139. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. IX (“That no freeman shall be convicted of any 
crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open court, as heretofore 
used.”); see also infra Appendix 3, State Constitutions: Criminal Defendants’ Rights in the Thirteen 
Original States. 
 140. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXI (“Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain 
inviolate forever”); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 6 (“The trial by jury, as heretofore used in this 
State, and the liberty of the press, shall be forever inviolably preserved.”).  The original 
Declarations of Rights of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia all included protection of the liberty 
of the press, DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 23; MD. 
CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XXXVIII; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 12, and similar provisions remain in 
place today, DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. I, § 5 (current in 2012); MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration 
of Rights, art. 40 (current in 2012); VA. CONST. of 1971, pt. 1, art. 40; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12 
(current in 2012). 
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of thirty-three state constitutions.141  For example, the 1974 Louisiana 
Constitution provides that any “person who is a victim of crime shall be treated 
with fairness, dignity, and respect” and given rights to information and 
participation.142  More generally, such provisions accord crime victims with 
rights of notification of hearings and trial dates, of presence and an opportunity 
to be heard at certain proceedings, of submission of written victim impact 
statements at sentencing, and of restitution.143  Statutes in many jurisdictions 
 
 141. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01 (added in 1994, current in 2012); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 
24 (added in 1994, current in 2012); ARIZ. CONST.  art. II, § 2.1 (added in 1990, current in 2012); 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (added in 1982, amended in 2008, current in 2012); COLO. CONST. art. II, 
§ 16a (added in 1992, current in 2012); CONN. CONST. art. XXIX (added in 1996, current in 2012); 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (added in 1988, current in 2012); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (added in 
1994, current in 2012); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (added in 1992, current in 2012); IND. CONST. art. 
I, § 13(b) (added in 1996, current in 2012); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (added in 1992, current in 
2012); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (added in 1998, current in 2012); MD., pt. 1, art. XLVII (added in 
1994, current in 2012); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (added in 1988, current in 2012); MISS. CONST. 
art. III, § 26-A (added in 1998, current in 2012); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (added in 1992, current in 
2012); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28 (added in 1998, current in 2012); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (added 
in 1996, current in 2012); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8 (added in 1996, current in 2012); N.J. CONST. 
art. I, para. 22 (added in 1991, current in 2012); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (added in 1992, current 
in 2012); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (added in 1995, current in 2012); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a 
(added in 1994, current in 2012); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (added in 1996, current in 2012); OR. 
CONST. art. I, §§ 42, 43 (the original version of § 42 was ratified in 1996, but was subsequently 
declared unconstitutional by the Oregon Supreme Court in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 71–
72 (Or. 1998); the current version of § 42 was ratified in 1999 and § 43 was added in 2008); R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (added in 1986, current in 2012); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (added in 1998, current 
in 2012); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (added in 1998, current in 2012); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 
(added in 1989, current in 2012); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 (added in 1994, current in 2012); VA. 
CONST. art. I, §8-A (added in 1996, current in 2012); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (added in 1989, 
current in 2012); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (added in 1993, current in 2012). 
 142. LA. CONST. art I, § 25.  This provision was added in 1997, and is current in 2012. 
 143. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; LA. CONST. art I, § 25. 
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implement these rights,144 and a few reported cases reflect victims’ enforcement 
of such protections.145 
In sum, courts are not only constitutionally-stipulated branches of 
government; they are also regulated environments that endow various 
participants with entitlements that necessitate some government funding.  
Furthermore, this skim of constitutional provisions is but a small fraction of the 
legislative and court-made rules that structure interactions among participants 
inside courthouses and that invite disputants to bring claims to courthouses.  
Twentieth-century egalitarian norms come on top of these pre-existing 
commitments to and reliance on courts.  Below, I examine strands of federal 
constitutional law that delineated new duties on courts to subsidize litigants and 
take criminal defendants’ poverty into account, including by reshaping penalties 
imposing monetary fines.  I then turn to state court analyses to sketch occasions 
on which judges insisted on funding for their activities and, at times, held 
unlawful legislative limits on access rights. 
 
 144. For example, several jurisdictions authorize victims to participate in criminal proceedings.  
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3711(d)(3) (2006) (“The district court shall take up and decide any motion 
asserting a victim’s right forthwith.  If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may 
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.”); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § 30; 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)–(b)(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437 (2010);  FLA. 
STAT. §§ 960.001(1)(a)(5), 960.001(7) (2011); IND. CODE § 35-40-2-1 (Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-38-11(1) (LexisNexis 2008).  See generally ROBERT C. DAVIS, JAMES M. ANDERSON, 
JULIE WHITMAN & SUSAN HOWLEY, SECURING RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS: A PROCESS EVALUATION 
OF THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE’S VICTIMS’ RIGHTS CLINICS 52–71 (2009).  
Many states, including Idaho, Kansas, and South Carolina, specify that crime victims’ provisions 
do not permit reopening of final convictions nor provide causes of action.  See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. 
art. I, § 22; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(b)–(c); S.C. CONST. art I, § 24(B)–(C). 
 145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 875 P.2d 824 (Ariz. 1993) 
(setting aside a parole release date for an offender because state officials had failed to notify the 
victim of rights to request notice and be present at the hearing); People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 
484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a trial judge’s decision to set aside a plea bargain to which the 
victim objected); Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (awarding costs to a crime 
victim who brought suit to compel a prosecutor to provide information).  But see State v. Means, 
926 A.2d 328 (N.J. 2007) (holding that failure to notify the victim is insufficient grounds to vacate 
a plea agreement).  California’s provision, added by a ballot initiative in 2008, Proposition 9, 
authorizes “[a] victim, the retained attorney of a victim, a lawful representative of the victim, or the 
prosecuting attorney upon request of the victim, [to] enforce the rights enumerated [in the 
constitutional provision] . . . in any trial or appellate court with jurisdiction over the case as a matter 
of right,” but explicitly bars a cause of action for damages against the state.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 
28(c).  Likewise, most states that have victims’ rights provisions also preclude civil damage actions 
for alleged violations.  KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(b).  Arizona is an exception.  See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(B) (2010). 
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III.  WHOSE RIGHT TO WHAT REMEDIES?  DEMOCRATIC EGALITARIANISM, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
A. Subsidizing Litigants in Response to Economic and Information 
Asymmetries 
A lack of resources, both individual and institutional, to pursue and to 
entertain claims of right is not a new problem.  Requests of fees for services—
by judges, clerks, and sheriffs—have a long tradition.146  Historians trace back 
some form of modifications for the poor to Henry I of England who, in the 
twelfth century, permitted impoverished litigants to “pledge their faith” (rather 
than immediately to pay) the required court fees.147  Yet, in the eighteenth 
century, many fees were still imposed, rendering “the value of proceedings in 
forma pauperis  .  .  .  little or nothing when the [provisions] were repealed in 
1883.”148 
In 1793, Jeremy Bentham (who had a host of complaints against the 
common law and its judges and lawyers149) inveighed against a “law tax,” which 
he termed a “tax upon distress.”150  A part of Bentham’s proposed solution was 
 
 146. See Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons 
in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 27 (1967).  Judges received salaries as well as fees, and when 
fee payments for judges were abolished in 1826, salaries were increased.  Id.  In the 1920s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that judges could not, as a matter of due process, receive funds from fines 
levied.  See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–15, 531–32 (1927).  The costs of running for 
judgeships raise related problems.  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 147. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 
(1923).  In 1495, during the reign of Henry VII, England enacted an in forma pauperis act.  Id. at 
363, 370.  Its application was, however, highly discretionary.  Id. at 374. 
 148. Id. at 377. 
 149. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 22–24. 
 150. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Protest Against Law-Taxes: Showing the Peculiar 
Mischievousness of All Such Impositions as Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice, in THE WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter 
Bentham, A Protest Against Law-Taxes].  Bentham argued that what he termed “factitious” barriers 
to access through fees and taxes were not required, for “natural checks” included the “pain of 
disappointment” of losing, the time entailed, and the inevitable other expenses of pursuit—
rendering extra assessments both an over-deterrent of those who could not afford them and an 
under-deterrent for those who could.  Id. at 578.  Bentham has not been the only one to call for 
abolition of initiation fees in either England or the United States.  A series of reports in England 
followed in Bentham’s wake, debating whether courts should be self-supporting through user fees 
or funded by taxpayers.  See Thomas, The Maintenance of Local Justice, supra note 41. 
  In the United States, the fee issue gained scrutiny, as discussed infra, in the 1960s.  Fee 
abolition or reduction proposals can be found in AM. BAR FOUND., PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS 
AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (1966) [hereinafter ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966]; Thomas 
E. Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 253 (1968); 
Michelman, Part I, supra note 93; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access 
Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights–Part II, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527 [hereinafter Michelman, Part 
II]. 
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to create an “Equal Justice Fund” that would be supported by “the fines imposed 
on wrongdoers” as well as by government and by charities.151  Bentham wanted 
to subsidize “not only the costs of legal assistance but also the costs of 
transporting witnesses” and of producing other evidence.152  Moreover, to lower 
the expenses of litigation, Bentham suggested that a judge be available “every 
hour on every day of the year,” and that courts be put on a “budget” to produce 
one-day trials and immediate decisions.153 
In the United States, many jurisdictions made provisions to proceed “in 
forma pauperis.” In New York, for example, a statute of 1788 gave the 
chancellor discretion to waive fees for “every . . . poor person.”154  Further, 
sometimes jurisdictions insisted that lawyers provide free services, for example 
to capital defendants.155  During the nineteenth century, state courts made 
accommodations for contingency fees, again as a way for some litigants to get 
into court.156 
The challenges of impoverished litigants came to the fore in the U.S. courts 
during the twentieth century, as the ranks of rights-holders swelled.  
Legislatures—creating civil causes of action and criminal sanctions—were 
central to the upsurge in poor litigants.  On the civil side, state and federal 
legislatures crafted new statutory rights, ranging from consumer protection to 
 
  When Bentham wrote, in 1795, fees attendant to courts were substantial.  He reported that 
to complete an action at law required the plaintiff to spend at least £24 and that the average plaintiff 
costs for civil suits was £48, which he described as three and six times (respectively) the average 
annual expenditure of an Englishman or woman at the time.  See Bentham, A Protest Against Law-
Taxes, supra, at 575 n.*.  In American 2005 dollars, those figures would be approximately $2,165 
and $4,330.  Conversion computed using the calculator available at Currency Converter, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/default0. asp#mid (last visited Aug. 27, 
2012), and by multiplying by the dollar/euro exchange rate. 
 151. See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 310 (2006); see also ROSEN, supra note 9, at 154. 
 152. ROSEN, supra note 9, at 153–54. 
 153. Thomas P. Peardon, Bentham’s Ideal Republic, 17 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 184, 
196 (1951).  Bentham’s goals included enabling all persons, on foot, to be able to reach a local 
judicial officer and return home, within a day.  ROSEN, supra note 9, at 149. 
 154. Act of Feb. 27, 1788, ch. 46, 1788 N.Y. Laws 99. 
 155. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 131, at 440; see also Maguire, supra note 147, at 384–89.  
See generally James A. Brundage, Legal Aid for the Poor and the Professionalization of Law in the 
Middle Ages, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 169 (1988) (considering the rise of legal aid in the Middle Ages and 
the role the Christian Church played in requiring such aid). 
 156. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of 
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998).  Karsten identified 
the method of judicial selection as one source of the law that enabled plaintiffs access to court.  See 
id. at 247–48.  State adoption of judicial elections produced judges, he argued, that had “moral and 
religious perspectives” supportive of claimants.  Id.  Therefore, those jurists sanctioned the use of 
contingency fee contracts that enabled lawyers to advance filing, jury, and other fees and hence 
subsidize their clients’ access. 
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the environment, from family life to employment.  (Court-based constitutional 
rights are a smaller slice of the civil docket.)  On the criminal side, the dramatic 
rise in prosecutions in the last third of the twentieth century produced a vast 
number of defendants, almost all of whom were indigent. 
Legal rules shifted in an effort to accommodate the surge in claimants 
hailing from the lower and middle income ranges.  The contingency fee system 
provided no relief for civil litigants in family disputes or with modest economic 
claims.  Contingent fees were (and are) prohibited in criminal cases.  Similarly, 
legal aid societies served but a small subset of claimants.157  Some relief came 
by way of channeling claimants to small claims courts and workers’ 
compensation regimes that charged low or no fees.158 
Yet access to courts remained an issue that generated questions about 
whether the state should waive fees, provide subsidies for one side of a case 
faced with a powerful opponent (typically the state), require fee-shifting from 
the loser to the winner, and find other means to support individuals not otherwise 
able to bring cases.159  Knowing what litigation cost was (and is) itself a 
challenge, and in the 1960s, the American Bar Foundation surveyed 450 state 
court judges to learn more about “official charges” imposed by courts, requisite 
“auxiliary charges” such as fees for service, and lawyers’ fees and costs.160  That 
study concluded that court costs and fees were both “substantial” and in some 
instances constituted a “substantial deterrent” to poor individuals and proposed 
a model statute as well as consideration of abolition of fees.161  Legislative 
initiatives—such as the creation of the Legal Services Corporation in 1974162—
 
 157. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION 
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1919); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE  (2004); Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short 
History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11 (2003). 
 158. Silverstein, supra note 146, at 23–24, 32–33; see also George E. Brand, The Impact of the 
Increased Cost of Litigation, 35 J. AM.  JUDICATURE SOC’Y 102 (1951); Legislation: Small Claims 
Courts, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 932 (1934). 
 159. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (2010). 
 160. See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966, supra note 150, at 2.  For example, a filing fee in 1966 
of twelve dollars would, in 2011 dollars, cost $83.20.  See id.; Seven Ways to Compute the Relative 
Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH.COM, 
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (converting 1966 fee to 
2011 value).  And, as of 2011, the federal government imposed a fee of $350 for the filing of a civil 
complaint.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006).  For information on the states, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, CIVIL FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL COURTS, APRIL 2012 (2012), available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/~/media/Files/PDF/Infor 
mation%20and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20A 
pril%202012.ashx. 
 161. See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966, supra note 150, at 2–6. 
 162. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996–2996l (2006). 
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intersected with explorations of constitutional claims that the U.S. Constitution 
demanded opening up courts.  During the 1960s and 1970s, commentators and 
litigators focused on federal court litigation to enshrine constitutional rights of 
access and to mitigate the problems of poverty.163  State right-to-remedy clauses 
were not much discussed; instead, rights were extrapolated from the Sixth 
Amendment,164 the Petitioning Clause,165 and the Due Process166 and Equal 
Protection Clauses.167  The factors on which claims were advanced included the 
stakes of a court’s decision, asymmetrical access of disputants to resources or to 
information, and the needs of society to provide fair and equal treatment to 
litigants who were similarly situated, save for their resources. 
In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court issued judgments requiring 
fee waivers or subsidized lawyers or experts for specified populations, often 
identified by a mix of means-testing and the subject matter in dispute.168  The 
doctrines that resulted were hailed by some commentators as central to the 
functioning of courts in egalitarian constitutional democracies,169 and criticized 
by others as illicit judicial extrapolation of substantive due process rights.170 
A classic example is the 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,171 which 
read the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel” to require that states provide 
lawyers for indigent criminal defendants facing prosecutors seeking felony 
convictions.172  Federal constitutional law also relied on the Due Process Clause 
 
 163. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The 
Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595, 597, 624–28 
(1973) (advocating that the bar be seen as a public utility and so regulated); Michelman, Part I, 
supra note 93. 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 165. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 166. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 168. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (requiring an indigent defendant who 
demonstrates “his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial” be provided 
a competent psychiatrist); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (mandating counsel be 
provided for indigent criminal defendants). 
 169. See, e.g., JONATHAN LIPPMAN, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 4–5 
(2011), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/news/SOJ-2011.pdf [hereinafter 
LIPPMAN, 2011 STATE OF THE JUDICIARY]. 
 170. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85. 
 171. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 172. Id. at 344–45.  The development of criminal defendants’ rights (to witnesses, to see the 
indictment, as well as to counsel) and their relationship to private and state prosecutorial powers in 
England, are sketched in HELLER, supra note 131, at 3–12.  The provisions for counsel in capital 
cases in Massachusetts traced to 1780, and the obligation initially rested with the state, and then 
moved “to the bar, to the court, and, finally, to the defendant.”   See Rogers, supra note 131, at 441, 
465.  Rogers attributed the decline in a high standard of such lawyering to the “democratization of 
the procedure for appointing counsel in 1911 and the Supreme Judicial Court’s insistence from 
1923” on that, instead of high quality, a defendant had to prove ineffective assistance.  Id.   
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as the basis of constitutional obligations to give indigent criminal defendants 
other resources, such as experts and translators necessary to mount a defense.173  
That idea is not completely confined to the criminal context.  Indigent men 
defending lawsuits by private parties alleging that they had fathered children 
gained the constitutional right to state-funded testing to rebut that claim.174  As 
Chief Justice Burger explained for a unanimous Court in 1981, the “requirement 
of ‘fundamental fairness’ expressed by the Due Process Clause” would not 
otherwise be “satisfied.”175 
In addition to income inequalities, concerns about power asymmetries have 
driven efforts to rectify differing abilities to obtain information.  Courts have 
 
  In the federal system, Section 35 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted litigants to 
“plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at 
law as by the rules of the said courts . . . .”  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.  In 
the Act of April 30, 1790, Congress provided that “every person so accused and indicted for 
[treason or other capital crime], shall also be allowed and admitted to make his full defense by 
counsel learned in the law; and the court before whom such person shall be tried, or some judge 
thereof, shall . . . immediately upon his request assign to such person such counsel, not exceeding 
two, as such person shall desire, to whom such counsel shall have free access at all seasonable 
hours . . . .”  Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118.  This statute was modeled after the 
English Treason Act of 1695, and a Massachusetts statute of 1777.  The federal statute expanded 
the scope from treason to all capital crimes, and incorporated the provision for appointed counsel, 
albeit individuals who were generally not compensated. 
  The current federal statute attempts to ensure quality through requiring the appointment 
of two lawyers.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006) (“Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital 
crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant 
is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request, assign 2 such counsel, 
of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases, and who shall have free 
access to the accused at all reasonable hours.”). 
  Between 1791 and 1938, when the Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), 
“the right conferred on the accused by the Sixth Amendment . . . was generally understood as 
meaning” an entitlement to retain counsel in the federal courts and not the right to appointment of 
counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer.  See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955); Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth 
Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 1, 7–8 (1944).  Thereafter, judges had the “duty” to inquire and 
to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in federal courts.  Holtzoff, supra, at 9.  In 1944, the 
federal criminal rules codified the practice.  Id. at 16–19 (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46, 
Assignment of Counsel, discussing the burden of volunteering on lawyers, and advocating for the 
creation of a public defender office).  Again, compensation was a distinct question, and appointed 
lawyers were not guaranteed payment until the enactment in 1964 of the Criminal Justice Act.  See 
David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 751 n.69 
(1980). 
 173. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).  But see Dist. Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319–20, 2323 (2009) (holding that due process did not oblige Alaska 
to provide a DNA test to a convicted defendant alleging innocence). 
 174. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 175. Id. at 16.  (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)); see also id. 
at 9 (describing the “constitutional duty” a man had to support a child he fathered). 
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concluded that governments must, as a matter of due process, provide 
exculpatory, material information to all criminal defendants—whether rich or 
poor.176  The underlying rationale is courts’ dependency on litigants to generate 
knowledge sufficient to legitimate judgment.  In the words of the 1963 decision 
of Brady v. Maryland, mandating that exchange: “Society wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair . . . .”177  That lack of 
access to information may also undermine the legitimacy of civil judgments has 
prompted the development of a host of sub-constitutional discovery rights in 
both civil and criminal cases. 
Asymmetrical power and high stakes have also been the predicate for civil 
litigants in certain family conflicts to be accorded equipage rights based on the 
Due Process Clause, sometimes interacting with equal protection analyses.  In 
1981, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the right to counsel in the context of 
a person faced with termination of her right to be a child’s parent.178  The Court 
fashioned a presumption against counsel in civil cases; while a person facing the 
loss of that status had no per se right to counsel, if a sufficient showing was made 
in an individual case, due process required that counsel be provided.179  Rights 
to state-paid transcripts, if needed for appeals of terminations of parental rights, 
followed in 1996.180  Moreover, state courts have relied on their own 
constitutions to find counsel-rights in other circumstances, such as child custody 
determinations and civil contempt detentions.181 
Another line of cases focused on the constitutionality of criminal fines that 
could result in individuals spending longer periods of time in jail for failure to 
pay.182  In Williams v. Illinois, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the Court 
that the state could not extend a person’s time of incarceration “beyond the 
maximum duration fixed by statute” based solely on the fact that a defendant 
was “financially unable to pay a fine.”183  Thereafter, the Court concluded that 
 
 176. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Enforcement is, however, limited.  See Connick 
v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 177.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 178. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20–21. 
 179. Id. at 31–33.  But see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), discussed infra notes 208–
09 and accompanying text. 
 180. See M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
 181. For cases holding that counsel is required in child custody determinations, see, for 
example, In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983); O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); and In re application to adopt 
H.B.S.C., 12 P.3d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).  For cases holding that counsel is required in certain 
civil contempt/detention proceedings, see, for example, Parcus v. Parcus, 615 So. 2d 75 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1992); Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164 (Del. 1996); and May v. 
Coleman, 945 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Ky. 1997). 
 182. See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 32–33 (1926); see also, 
e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 183. Williams, 399 U.S. at 243. 
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once a state decided that an “appropriate and adequate penalty” for a crime was 
a fine or restitution, it could not “imprison a person solely because” of inability 
to pay.184  Rather, imprisonment can only take place after determining a willful 
refusal to pay and that “alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State’s 
interest in punishment and deterrence.”185 
The variegated constitutional case law documents both the development of 
aspirations to provide equal treatment for disparately-situated disputants and the 
difficulty of doing so.186 The results are eclectic and uneven, including a few 
constitutionally-mandated subsidies for criminal and civil litigation, and a host 
of legislative efforts to implement those obligations as well as, in some 
instances, to provide more.187  A widespread consensus is that states have yet to 
fund Gideon’s mandate to provide adequate legal services for criminal 
defendants.188  Further, states have begun to impose additional fees, fines, and 
special assessments (as states seek to augment limited budgets) that have 
resulted in a resurgence of “debtors’ prisons,” populated by individuals held in 
contempt for failure to comply with court payment orders.189 
Asymmetrical access across sets of litigants reveals another quandary for 
courts’ legitimacy and rights to remedies.  The differential resources and 
capacities of similarly- situated litigants can result in “like” cases not being 
treated “alike.”  Constitutional adjudication on intra-litigant equity initially 
focused on criminal defendants.  For example, in 1956, the Court concluded that 
unfairness resulted if some defendants could afford to pay for transcripts for 
appeals and for lawyers while others could not, or if some could afford appellate 
 
 184. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68. 
 185. Id. at 672. 
 186. See generally THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010); 
Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 305 
(2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010). 
 187. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006); Legal Services Corporation 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006); Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE tit. 8, ch. 2.1 
(West 2012) (creating a pilot program for poor litigants to obtain counsel). 
 188. AM. BAR ASSOC., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004) (“Throughout the [2003 Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants] hearings, witnesses from each of the twenty-two states examined reported grave 
inadequacies in the available funds and resources for indigent defense.”), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_ 
sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 189. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), discussed infra notes 208–09; see also 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
5 (2010); ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4–5 (2010). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
968 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
counsel and others could not.190  In the 1970s, in Bounds v. Smith, the Court 
recognized that prisoners’ rights to “petition for redress” required prisons to 
provide access to lawyers or resources such as law libraries.191  In addition, 
various forms of aggregation—from class actions to statutory regimes such as 
the Fair Labor Standards Act—enable groups of litigants to share the costs of 
pursuing remedies and to obtain relief across a set of similarly-situated 
individuals.192 
 Rules and statutes permitting aggregation reflect efforts to deal with those 
hoping to get into court, rather than those (such as Clarence Gideon) who have 
been commanded to appear.  While a “hodge-podge” of state statutes sometimes 
permitted filing “in forma pauperis” and hence, without prepaying fees, many 
limitations existed.193  In response, some states concluded that courts had the 
inherent power to waive fees.  In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court identified a 
constitutional obligation, in a small slice of cases, to waive fees for those too 
poor to pay.194  The central federal ruling, Boddie v. Connecticut, responded to 
 
 190. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“There can be no equal justice where the 
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”).  In 1963, the Court held that, 
although the Constitution did not require appeal as a matter of fair process, states had to subsidize 
appellate lawyers for indigent criminal defendants if appeals were generally available.  Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1963) (announced the same day as Gideon). 
 191. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).  As discussed infra notes 203–05 and 
accompanying text, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), limited the application of Bounds, which 
had required prison officials to permit either access to legal assistance or law libraries for prisoners.   
Moreover, Congress can impose significant restrictions on access opportunities.  See Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 192.  Many statutory regimes reflect efforts to make decisions fair across a set of individuals 
proceeding single file.  Sentencing guidelines are one such example, and the implementation 
reflects the complexity of determining when persons are enough alike to be treated the same.  
Congress and the courts have struggled with mandates that judges punish similarly those persons 
whose crimes and backgrounds are comparable and justify the differentiations (“departures”) made.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K (2010).  See generally Judith Resnik, Compared 
to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and Lawyers’ Powers, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011). 
 193. Maguire, supra note 147, at 385–86.  As he noted, in 1923, the federal statute applied only 
to “citizens” with an additional provision for “all seaman, irrespective of nationality.”  Id. at 386.  
As of the 1960s, the federal government and twenty-one states had “provisions for poor persons to 
file suit without payment of fees in courts of general jurisdiction.”  See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 
1966, supra note 150, at 3.  “The report characterized the provisions as ‘fragmentary, inadequate, 
and inconsistent from state to state.’”  Id. 
 194. See generally Michelman, Part I, supra note 93 (discussing the Supreme Court’s access 
fee decisions in Boddie v. Connecticut, United States v. Kras, and Ortwein v. Schwab); Michelman, 
Part II, supra note 150.  Michelman argued that all exclusionary filing fees were unconstitutional 
burdens on what he termed “effective” access rights to courts.  Michelman, Part I, supra note 93, 
at 1161–68.  The parallels between effective access to courts and to voting that he drew (see 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS 969 
a class of “welfare recipients residing in the State of Connecticut” who argued 
that state-imposed fees of sixty dollars for filing and service, coupled with no 
mechanism to waive that requirement, precluded them from filing for divorce.195  
In 1971, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court that the combination of “the basic 
position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values and 
the . . . state monopolization” of lawful dissolution resulted in a due process 
obligation by the state to provide access.196 
The concurring opinions filed in Boddie illuminate the constitutional 
complexities of elaborating what forms of access are compelled, and the 
subsequent retreat from obligations of prisons to provide legal assistance 
delineates the resistance that some justices have expressed to affirmative rights 
of assistance.  In Boddie, Justice Douglas argued that the majority’s reliance on 
the Due Process Clause was unwise, as too “subjective.”197  Instead, he read the 
Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of “invidious discrimination . . . based 
on . . . poverty” to require subsidizing access.198  Justice Brennan agreed that 
Boddie presented a “classic problem of equal protection”199 on top of due 
process; the state’s legal monopoly required access for all attempting to 
“vindicate any . . . right arising under federal or state law.”200  (Two years later 
 
Michelman, Part II, supra note 150, at 534–40) were evident in two decisions in 2011, when the 
same five-person majority rejected claims that economic barriers to litigation and to politics 
required regulation.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Ariz. 
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).  In Arizona Free 
Enterprise, the Court held that states lacked “a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing 
field’” and that a public election financing law violated free speech rights.  Id. at 2825–26. 
 195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).  Unlike the practice challenged in 
Connecticut in Boddie, many jurisdictions had provisions for fee waivers, such that individuals 
could file in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  The federal statute, first enacted in 1892, applied (as noted 
above) only to citizens.  See Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252.  The standards for 
permitting such filing, in the context of appeals, was the topic of Coppedge v. United States, 369 
U.S. 438 (1962).  Chief Justice Warren required that leave to appeal be granted without unduly 
exacting standards that would undermine “equality of consideration for all litigants.”  Id. at 447.  
Subsequently, the Court authorized screening to assess facts under congressional revisions of the 
“IFP” statute that permits more dismissals based on a review of the papers.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(d), (e)(2) (2006); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 
 196. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.  See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text for discussion of 
fee waivers under state law.  In May of 2012, a trial judge in British Columbia issued a parallel 
decision, holding unconstitutional the provincial government’s failure to provide fee waivers in a 
system, imposed in 1998, of much higher fees—including $500 a day for trial days after the third 
day, and $800 a day for trial days after the tenth.  See Vilardell v. Dunham, 2012 BCSC 748 (Can.). 
 197. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 384–85. (Douglas, J., concurring) (raising the specter of Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 198. Id. at 386. 
 199. Id.at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 200. Id. at 387.  The sole dissenter, Justice Black, thought the Court had invaded state 
prerogatives.  Id. at 393–94 (Black, J., dissenting).  Yet, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari 
in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 166 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. 1969), Justice Black argued that the 
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in the context of equalizing access to quality schooling for children, the Court 
rejected poverty as a suspect classification for purposes of the federal equal 
protection guarantee.201) 
The breadth of Brennan’s approach, coupled with limited resources, has not 
garnered wide judicial support, even in the case of other poor civil litigants 
seeking fee waivers.202  Furthermore, in 1996, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court 
rejected imposing expectations on prison officials to assist prisoners in accessing 
courts and described instead a right to be free from “officials . . . actively 
interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare legal documents.”203  Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence went further, questioning the basis of a federal 
constitutional right of access and of any affirmative obligations imposed (“our 
transcript and fee cases did not establish a freestanding right of access to the 
courts, meaningful or otherwise,”204 and the states had no obligations “to finance 
and support prisoner litigation.”205).  Furthermore, in 2002, the Court (with 
Justice Souter writing the opinion) described the prior law as recognizing access 
rights only as “ancillary to the underlying claim” rather than as freestanding.206 
Thus, despite several calls for abolishing fees or mandating waivers,207 as 
well as for providing other forms of equipage (such as lawyers) for impoverished 
civil litigants, the U.S. Supreme Court has to date identified only a narrow band 
(largely in family conflicts) eligible for constitutional entitlements to 
government subsidies to use courts.  Moreover, by 2011, in Turner v. Rogers, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not require a 
lawyer for an indigent person facing detention (in that instance for a year) as a 
civil contemnor for failure to pay child support to a private opponent.208  The 
Court reserved the question of right to counsel if the opponent were the state.209 
 
rationale of Boddie required that no person be denied access “because he cannot pay a fee, finance 
a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.”  Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 
954, 595–56 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 201. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 28 (1973). 
 202. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (rejecting a constitutional challenge 
to the lack of fee waivers for bankruptcy petitions); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) 
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to an appellate filing fee of twenty-five dollars applied to 
indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decisions). 
 203. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). 
 204. Id. at 365, 369 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 205. Id. at 384–85 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 206. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).  The majority put the prison-litigation 
line of cases into a set of “systemic official action” that frustrated access, and the fee and transcript 
cases as also putting up impediments to claims that otherwise would have been brought.  Id. at 413–
14. 
 207. See, e.g., Michelman, Part I, supra note 93, at 1165; Michelman, Part II, supra note 150, 
at 530–31; Willging, supra note 150, at 300–02. 
 208. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 209. Id. at 2520. 
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In the same term, in two cases implicating due process concerns but turning 
on statutes and rules, the Court limited the ability to rely on lawyers providing 
services to a group as a way to mitigate the challenges of small-value claims or 
well-heeled opponents.  In A.T.&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court 
enforced consumer cell-phone provisions that prohibited purchasers for bringing 
class claims in either courts or arbitration—and thereby made unavailable the 
aggregation of small-value claims as a means of reducing access barriers.210  
Similarly, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court imposed more stringent 
requirements on class actions, and again made more difficult the pooling of 
resources by groups sharing lawyers.211 
But the question of the relationship of due process to litigation is not limited 
to equipage of litigants.  Another facet probes the quality of the decision-making 
process itself and imposes a layer of constitutional regulation over court (and 
administrative) adjudication.  For example, although Turner v. Rogers did not 
require lawyers for all civil contemnors opposing private plaintiffs, the Court 
did hold that, in the absence of a lawyer, “fundamental fairness” required that a 
judge make findings that a potential contemnor had the ability to comply with 
the court order and was willfully disobedient.212  The Turner assessment is part 
of a series of “fair hearing” cases in which the Court has concluded that, when 
individuals are at risk of losing certain forms of property and liberty (such as 
statutory entitlements to government benefits, jobs, or licenses213), process is 
due.  Depending on the context, constitutionally fair decision-making entails 
various attributes, including opportunities to be heard,214 in-person hearings in 
certain circumstances,215 specific allocations of burdens of proof,216 reasons for 
the decisions rendered by impartial decision-makers,217 oversight of whether 
evidence supports a criminal verdict and of the quality of eyewitness 
identification,218 and review of the award of punitive damages.219 
 
 210. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–45, 1753 (2011). 
 211. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–52 (2011).  See generally Judith 
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and 
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000). 
 212. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2520. 
 213. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734–37, 751–55 (1964). 
 214. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 215. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 216. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 217. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); Goldberg, 397 U.S. 
at 271. 
 218. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977).  But constitutional oversight of evidentiary rules is constrained.  See Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
 219. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
972 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
In short, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed distinct lines of 
constitutional analyses that—depending on the context—mandate subsidies to 
address resource asymmetries between adversaries, shape processes to reduce 
intra-litigant disparities, facilitate access to courts, and regulate decision-making 
procedures.  Underlying the doctrinal mélange of fairness and equal protection 
are different normative theories, themselves doing work in more than one arena.  
Some of the inquiry into the quality of procedure, for example, is justified 
through utilitarian concerns for accuracy, as well as by interests in guarding 
against non-arbitrary treatment by the government.  Given that the linguistic 
lineage of rights to remedies and due process traces back to traditions around the 
Magna Carta, non-arbitrary treatment has a historical pedigree independent of 
democracy.220 
But democratic values have come to provide new understandings of the 
purposes of non-arbitrary treatment, sounding today in terms of dignity, 
equality, and in the sovereignty of the people.  Similarly, the demand for 
subsidizing and equalizing opportunities to participate, like the insistence on 
publicity, comes in service of democratic values that recognize the contribution 
of and need for diverse voices and participants being heard in social orders and 
that aspire (per Dworkin) to treat all with equal respect.  But the support for 
litigants to use courts does not stem from efforts focused solely on individual 
need.  The state (in the personage of the judge) is a self-interested actor.  
Undergirding the attention to individuals and concerns about the fairness of 
outcomes in particular cases is a pervasive concern that courts, as structures of 
governance themselves, need the participatory parity of litigants to legitimate 
the judgments rendered.  “Connective justice” becomes an apt phrase to cover 
the interdependencies expressed through court action. 
B. Resources for Courts—Provided and (on Rare Occasions) Compelled 
Turn from mandates to courts about litigant subsidies and the procedures 
offered to direct funding for courts.  Federal and state governments take for 
granted their obligations to support courts.  That point is not surprising, given 
that judiciaries do a great deal of work for legislatures by enforcing criminal and 
civil laws. 
Federal budgetary allotments (which can be specified more readily than the 
allocations in each of the states) show continual legislative investments in 
adjudication.221  For example, between 1971 and 2005, the U.S. judiciary budget 
 
 220. Koch, supra note 106, at 367; Miller, supra note 121, at 4. 
 221. Article III of the U.S. Constitution protects judges from the diminution of their salaries 
but does not directly protect court budgets.  See Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist as 
Third Branch Leader, 89 JUDICATURE 116, 120 tbl.1 (2005); Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the 
Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 993; Judith Resnik, 
Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (1999). 
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grew from under one-tenth of a percent of the federal budget to two-tenths;222 in 
1971, the federal judiciary was allotted $145 million and, by 2005, $5.7 billion 
dollars.223  During that interval, staff doubled from about 15,000 to more than 
32,000.224  Further, as other government agencies have had cuts in funding in 
the last two years, the federal judiciary has been able to maintain its fiscal 
allocations (about seven billion dollars, in 2011), even if not successful in 
obtaining salary increases for judges.225 
State legislatures have likewise consistently funded their judicial systems, 
although given the mix of state and local sources of funding, identifying the total 
amount invested is difficult.  (Estimates are that most states devote from about 
one to almost four percent of their budgets to courts.226)  State courts provide 
vastly more services and do so with relatively less resources (when measured by 
judges’ salaries, caseload, and support staff) than does the federal bench.227  
Court leaders are thus acutely conscious of the high demand for the services 
provided, and a sequence of reports written under the auspices of the American 
Bar Association have warned that courts are at risk because of a lack of 
resources.228  Moreover, the contemporary landscape is awash with grave 
concerns about the ability of governments to meet fiscal obligations of all kinds. 
 
 222. Wheeler, supra note 221, at 120 & tbl.1. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 120. 
 225. For fiscal year 2012, “the Judiciary received $6.97 billion, about a 1 percent increase above 
the fiscal year 2011 enacted level, and $206 million above the House bill and $36 million above 
the Senate bill funding levels.”  FY2012 Funding Approved, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts, Office of Pub. Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 1, 7, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/news/ttb/ar 
chive/2011-12%20Dec.pdf. 
 226. William T. (Bill) Robinson, III, Rising to Historic Challenge: Funding for State Courts, 
Preserving Justice, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2012, at 8, 9.  The complexity of determining what funds 
go to courts comes in part from different services coming within court budgets in various 
jurisdictions.  Some states allocate resources for criminal justice services—such as probation 
officials and public defenders through court budgets—and other jurisdictions have county as well 
as state-wide funding for courts.  See generally COSCA Budget Survey Responses, NAT’L CENTER 
FOR ST. CTS. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20 
and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/budget_survey_121811.ashx (compiling 
states’ cost-saving measures, detailing their funding sources, and outlining their justice services). 
 227. Robinson, supra note 226, at 10 (noting that approximately ninety-five percent of cases 
are filed in state courts); see also Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial 
Court, Address at the New York Bar Association’s Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: At the Tipping 
Point: State Courts and the Balance of Power 3, 7–12 (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.ab 
cny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf [hereinafter M. Marshall, Cardozo Lecture]. 
 228. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM (A Report to the American Bar 
Association, Aug. 8-9, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/ 
public_education/pub-ed-lawday_abaresolution_crisiscourtsdec2011.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, 
FUNDING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A CALL TO ACTION: A Report to the American Bar Association 
(Aug. 1992). 
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Efforts by state courts to diversify services are matched by evidence of 
retrenchment in services.  In 2009, New Hampshire, lacking funds, episodically 
suspended civil jury trials.229  Forty states cut funding for courts in 2010, and 
some states reported a ten percent decline in their budgets.230  Six states closed 
courthouses a day a week; and nine sent judges on unpaid furloughs.231  By July 
2011, California budget cuts resulted in a proposed layoff of forty percent of 
staff and the closing of many courtrooms in the San Francisco Superior Court.232  
The court’s presiding judge described the “civil justice system in San Francisco 
[as] collapsing.”233  Moreover, in 2009, California tallied 4.3 million people in 
civil litigation without the assistance of lawyers.234  In 2010, New York counted 
2.3 million civil litigants without lawyers—including almost all tenants in 
eviction cases, debtors in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five percent of 
parents in child support matters.235  Furthermore, a national assessment used the 
phrase “geography as destiny” for one of its findings—that legal services for 
those in need are not distributed by need but by place; while civil legal assistance 
had succeeded in responding to a diverse set of groups and their needs, 
coordination was poor, and individuals faced great challenges in gaining access 
to what was available.236 
The responses to these data include calls for financial assistance from the 
federal government237 as well as many state-based initiatives to expand as well 
as to reconfigure court and legal services.  One focus is on the rights of civil 
litigants to have lawyers; a national “Civil Gideon” effort, championed by bench 
and bar leaders, aims to guarantee counsel rights for certain categories of 
 
 229. James Podgers, Witnesses Describe State and Local Courts Reeling from Budget 
Cutbacks, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/beggaring_jus 
tice_witnesses_describe_state_and_local_courts_reeling_aba/. 
 230. Robinson, supra note 226, at 9. 
 231. Id. 
 232. California: Huge Cuts for Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, at A15 (quoting Judge 
Katherine Feinstein). 
 233. Id.  See generally Robinson, supra note 226, at 9–10. 
 234. This figure was cited in support of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, creating a pilot 
program for poor litigants to obtain counsel.  See Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 457, § 1(b), 2009 Cal. 
Stat. 2498, 2499. 
 235. LIPPMAN, 2011 STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 169, at 4; see also TASK FORCE TO 
EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 1 (2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.courts.state. 
ny.us/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-TaskForceREPORT.pdf. 
 236. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT, at v, ix, (American Bar 
Foundation, Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/ 
documents/access_across_america_first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_ 
project.pdf. 
 237. See M. Marshall, Cardozo Lecture, supra note 227, at 11–13. 
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impoverished litigants.238  As Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of New York put 
it, 
efforts and more around the country reinforce the idea that legal representation 
in cases involving the basic necessities of life is fundamental to the delivery of 
justice.  Equal justice for all under the law is inextricably linked to court funding 
levels.  However, increasing court funding without ensuring access to justice is 
a hollow victory.  The state courts must have the resources they need, not just as 
an end in itself, but to support their constitutional and ethical role as the protector 
of the legal rights of all Americans.  Every person, regardless of means, is 
entitled to their day in court. 
  The rule of law—the very bedrock of our society—loses its meaning when 
the protection of our laws is available only to those who can afford it.  We might 
as well close the courthouse doors if we are not able to provide equal justice for 
all—our very reason for being.  This is the fundamental challenge facing the 
justice system today.239 
Another trajectory is to augment assistance for self-represented litigants,240 
and a third is to reformulate methods of dispute resolution to be less expensive, 
more attractive, and, in some instances, less lawyer dependent.  During the last 
few decades, for example, state courts have expanded their repertoire through 
the “problem-solving courts” that include drug courts, re-entry courts, juvenile 
courts, mental health courts, and business courts.241 
These developments reflect not only contemporary difficulties stemming 
from the high number of criminal prosecutions and the many rights-holders who 
 
 238. Evocative of Justice Brennan’s Boddie analysis, the American Bar Association resolved 
that counsel should be provided “as a matter of right at public expense to low-income persons in 
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those 
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody . . . .”  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA BASIC 
PRINCIPLES FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2010); see also AM. BAR 
ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 64 (3d ed. 
1992) (also noting that counsel rights should apply to “extradition, mental competency, post-
conviction relief, and probation and parole revocation, regardless of the designation of the tribunal 
in which they occur or classification of the proceedings as civil in nature”); Jonathan Lippman, 
Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Remarks at 2010 Law Day Ceremony, Law in the 21st 
Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging Challenges 3–4 (May 3, 2010), available 
at http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Law Day 2010.pdf. 
 239. Jonathan Lippman, Speech at the Midyear Meeting of the National Association of Women 
Judges at Harvard Law School, Courts in Times of Fiscal Crisis—Who Needs Courts? 10–11 (Mar. 
9, 2012) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Lippman, Courts in Times of Fiscal Crisis].  See 
generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), http://dev.law 
help.org/documents/501631LSC-justicegap.pdf. 
 240. See Randall T. Shepard, The Self-Represented Litigant: Implications for the Bench and 
Bar, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 607, 617 (2010). 
 241. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CALIFORNIA’S COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING A 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUDICIARY 2 (2005). 
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cannot afford to pay all that litigation entails.  Court leaders have also become 
concerned that litigants with resources may choose to turn to alternative private 
providers whom they pay directly for their services.242  Further, current legal 
doctrine puts some would-be plaintiffs into alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms (such as mandatory arbitration), whether desired or not.  Because 
courts have—by law and practice—let go of their monopoly over services and 
opened entry to other institutions, courts have become competitors for high-end 
investors with private providers.243 
Having provided a glimpse at the diversification of services courts now 
struggle to “scale-up” to reach more claimants, a word is in order about a small 
line of cases that recognize court authority (often as a matter of inherent powers 
and other times under the rubric of separation of powers) to compel provision of 
resources when legislatures fail to do so.244  Recent and high-visibility examples 
include a lawsuit by the Chief Judge of the State of New York for increases in 
judicial salaries245 and rulings by state courts that resources for state public 
defenders are inadequate.246  In addition, an odd-lot set of judgments insist that 
courts can, as a matter of “self-preservation” (to borrow a term from a 1930 
 
 242. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 262 (1996). 
 243. Bryant Garth identified this risk in the 1990s, as he analyzed court promotion of ADR.  
See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the 
Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 945–49 (1993). 
 244. See, e.g., Cnty. of Barnstable v. Commonwealth (Barnstable II), 661 N.E.2d 47 (Mass. 
1996); Cnty. of Barnstable v. Commonwealth (Barnstable I), 572 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1991); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971); see also Michael L. Buenger, Of 
Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal 
Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979 (2003–04); Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court 
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993).  The court in Commonwealth 
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate posited that the judiciary “must possess the inherent power to determine and 
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its 
mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a 
co-equal, independent Branch of our Government.”  Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 
197.  Analysis of the bases in state constitutions for courts to function as well as the difficulties of 
judges ordering that their co-branches of government fund courts is provided in Durham, supra 
note 66. 
 245. See Chief Judge of N.Y. v. Governor of N.Y., 887 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773–74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2009).  In the early 1990s, then Chief Judge Sol Wachtler sued New York State Governor Mario 
Cuomo for the failure to provide budgetary funds as requested by the judiciary.  The litigation and 
its denouement are detailed in Jackson, supra note 244, at 217–18, 249. 
 246. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009); 
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). 
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California decision) order specific payments of small sums due individuals such 
as employees and to require repairs of its facilities.247 
This brief account is aimed as a reminder of another aspect of the taken-for-
grantedness of court services, even as their availability may be outstripped by 
demand.  Efforts to force funding through litigation are relatively scarce, not 
only because of various doctrinal impediments (such as justiciability) but more 
importantly because legislatures regularly supply significant resources to their 
coordinate branches, on which they depend.  Courts are a central method by 
which states secure their own peace and security and stabilize commercial 
activities.  The struggle is not over whether but rather how much a state can 
afford, and how to allocate investments in a portfolio of services, ranging from 
criminal prosecution, defense, and detention to family conflicts, traffic cases, 
and general civil litigation. 
C. Reading Rights to Remedies 
I have argued that governmental reliance on courts, coupled with 
constitutional recognition of their centrality through open-courts and right-to-
remedy clauses atop interpretations of due process, equal protection, petition, 
jury, and other constitutional rights, have generated and sustained government 
support over centuries for courts.  During the second half of the twentieth 
century, legislatures and courts expanded the bases for calling on courts, the 
services provided, and subsidized subsets of users. 
In this section, I explore the degree to which open-courts and right-to-
remedy clauses have been read to create judicially-enforceable claims.  An 
obvious touchstone is Marbury v. Madison; although the U.S. Constitution has 
no express remedial texts, the Court’s interpretation included the iconic 
statement in that a person “who considers himself injured, has a right to resort 
to the laws of his country for a remedy.”248  That idea laces case law in state 
courts, many of which rely on the express terms of their constitutions, as the 
epigrams that opened this section illustrate.  All told, forty-one states have 
 
 247. See Millholen v. Riley, 293 P. 69, 70, 71 (1930); see also Ted Z. Robertson & Christa 
Brown, The Judiciary’s Inherent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air 
Conditioning, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 863 (1989). 
 248. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).  See generally Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1731 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).  Theories of due process entitlements 
to judicial review are augmented by specific clauses of the Constitution, such as those protecting 
against the takings of property and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
V; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  Further, the Supreme Court has also recognized the right to litigate 
a claim as a form of property not to be extinguished without procedural protections.  See, e.g., 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
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express guarantees, detailed in Appendix 1.249  Depending on the formulation, 
these provisions could be read to protect discrete rights, such as access to courts 
for disputants and third-party observers, as well as funding for courts, and as 
constraints on new legislation limiting pursuit of remedies in court.250  
Constitutional statements—that rights must be decided according to the “Law of 
the Land”251 or by “due course of law”252—can be equated with substantive “due 
process” limitations on government action, as well as with entitlements to 
procedural opportunities to contest a judgment.  Terms directed at the 
administration of justice without “sale” or “delay”253 could also be read, akin to 
the “speedy trial” provisions for criminal defendants, to impose time frames on 
when justice needs to be provided, to protect against bribery, excessive costs or 
assessments, or even as obligations to waive fees.  
 
 249.  See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies.  
One count, by Koch, supra note 106, at 434, identified thirty-eight such provisions.  As categorized 
by Friesen and Phillips, forty states have express constitutional rights-to-remedies clauses.  
FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-91 to 6-92 app. 6 (2006), and 2011 Supp, at 132; Phillips, supra note 
106, at 1310 & n.6.  I would add Michigan to those lists as its 1963 Constitution provides that “[a] 
suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper 
person or by an attorney,” MICH. CONST. 1963, art. I, § 13, which is similar to Georgia’s 1983 
Constitution: “No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or 
by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”  GA. CONST. of 1983, art. 
I, § 1, para. 12.  Further, as Appendix 1 details, the remedies/access clauses have occasionally been 
amended, sometimes to make the language inclusive and in other times to clarify the mandate (from 
“ought” to “shall” for example as in amendments to the Missouri Constitution), and in other 
instances to respond to a particular legislative or court decisions.  See infra Appendix 1, State 
Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies (detailing such changes). 
  As Appendix 2 (State Constitutions without Express Remedies Clauses and with Due 
Process or Open/Public Courts Provisions), infra details, the remaining nine states have texts 
referencing other court-based rights, and some but not all of their courts have interpreted their 
provisions to provide enforceable rights of access to courts.  As a New York court in 1902 
explained: “In view of the great purposes of government, and the understanding of the framers of 
our constitutional system, there can be no doubt [of the] . . . guaranty to every member of this state 
free access to the courts, and a full opportunity to have a judicial determination of all controversies 
which might involve his rights, whether such rights were the outgrowth of contracts or of violated 
duty.”  Williams v. Vill. of Port Chester, 76 N.Y.S. 631, 634 (App. Div. 1902). 
 250. See, e.g., Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 
1996) (identifying Texas’s open courts provision to block “unreasonable financial barriers” 
imposed by legislatures).  The court held that Texas’s requirement that taxpayers pay portions of 
the tax admittedly due before contesting disputed portions was permissible, but requiring 
prepayment of disputed assessments violated the “opens courts guarantee.”  Id. at 690–91. 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 252. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 253. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17.  The term sale appears in twenty-seven constitutions; 
the term “delay” appears in thirty-six constitutions.  FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-92 app. 6.  As 
Maguire pointed out, the reference to “sale,” dating from the Magna Carta, likely did not mean no 
fees but rather required they be set at a “reasonable level.”  Maguire, supra note 147, at 364–65. 
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These analytic distinctions, the longevity of the constitutional statements, 
and the scope of legislative elaboration of causes of action, remedies, and of 
courts have prompted a vast number of decisions over two hundred years.  Lines 
of cases, using shorthand such as the “Remedy by Due Course of Law” Clause 
or the “Justice Without Purchase” Clause,254 address specific facets of the 
provisions, and a number of law review articles have likewise puzzled about 
their history and contemporary import.255  Here I sketch the contours. 
First, a few state courts have held that legislative support of their services is 
obligatory, even as the implications of such pronouncements are wide-ranging.  
The legal bases have generally been a mix of separation of powers and courts’ 
inherent authority.256  A very few of these cases also rest their judgments on state 
open courts/remedies clauses.  The Texas Supreme Court put it simply—that the 
state’s open-court clause required that “courts must actually be open and 
operating.”257  Likewise, an Alabama decision explained that courts had a 
“constitutional duty . . . [to] be available for the delivery of justice . . . .  Absent 
adequate and reasonable judicial resources, the people of our State are denied 
their constitutional rights.”258 
 
 254. See, e.g., Allen v. Emp’t Dep’t, 57 P.3d 903, 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
 255. See, e.g., FRIESEN, supra note 136, ch. 6 (considering the history and contemporary 
meaning of access-to-courts and right-to-remedy clauses); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of 
the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279 (1995); 
Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the Origins 
of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001); Koch, supra note 106; Linde, supra note 
121, at 136–38; Phillips, supra note 106; Schuman, supra note 61.  As Schuman, explained, several 
articles hone in on particular state constitutions.  Schuman, supra note 61, at 1203 n.40.  Further, 
some commentators delineate certain protections as “substantive” or “procedural,” as they also 
delineate the types of state court approaches, in terms of levels of scrutiny of legislative action and 
modes of reasoning.  Id. at 1202–05.  This literature has not focused on the word “everyone” in the 
clauses and the import of changing definitions of who falls within those parameters. 
 256. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971) (holding 
that the Judiciary “must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment” of money 
necessary to carry out its constitutional duties because it is a co-equal and independent branch, 
which must protect itself from the impairment of its duties). 
 257. See Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996). 
 258. See Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1993).  The court held the governor’s cuts of 
the judiciary budget unconstitutional.  Id. at 895–96, 902.  The court relied not only on Alabama’s 
provision on open courts and remedies, ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13, on which enforcement of other 
state and federal constitutional rights also depended, but also on another constitutional obligation, 
added in 1973 as part of a major reform of the court system, that the legislature provide “adequate 
and reasonable financing” to courts, ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.10.  Folsom, 631 So. 2d at 893–
902. 
  A North Carolina opinion involving the adequacy of court facilities also relied on that 
state’s open courts/remedy clause.  A superior court judge challenged the state’s failure to provide 
adequate county court facilities.  In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 
1991).  The Supreme Court of North Carolina noted the array of duties dependent on the capacity 
to do the work (such as statutory obligations to preserve documents, to protect the secrecy of grand 
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Second, a substantial body of law understands open or public court 
provisions, coupled with First Amendment, due process, rights to jury trials, and 
common law practices, to ensure that the public (and the press) can observe court 
proceedings.259  Jeremy Bentham’s call for “publicity” in courts is now read to 
be entrenched in both federal and state constitutions.  The general rule is that 
neither the Constitution nor the common law tolerates blanket closures of 
criminal or civil proceedings.260  In addition to preliminary hearings and trials, 
many courts have insisted that the voir dire in jury selection and court documents 
are presumptively open, and that the burden rests on the state to explain any 
closures.261 
Third, state courts have reached widely different conclusions (sometimes 
within the same jurisdiction in different eras) about whether litigants can rely on 
open courts/remedy clauses as support for, or as a shield against, limitations on 
access and on the kinds of cases that can be pursued.  One series of decisions 
related to filing fees, assessments, and taxes that parse charges, their amounts, 
and their purposes.  For example, in 1917, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that courts had the inherent capacity to waive fees so that poor people 
could bring cases.262  Further, judges have decided that some forms of charges 
were illicit “taxes” that violated either “open court” or “no sale” provisions.263  
 
jury proceedings, and to establish courtrooms and judicial facilities) as well as the state 
Constitution’s open courts provision.  Id. at 127.  In Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 
the issue was an obligation of a county council to pay a probation officer hired by a court.  Noble 
Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 125 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1955).  The Supreme Court of Indiana 
invoked both the open court provision and the requirement for public criminal trial as obliging 
support for adequate staffing.  Id. at 713–14; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 
A.2d 193, 204 (Pa. 1971) (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting) (commenting that “the clear 
mandate of Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . provides: ‘All courts shall be 
open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have 
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay . . . .’  
It is evident that these fundamental guarantees could not be honored if the Judiciary were without 
reasonably adequate resources.”). 
 259. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7–15 (1986); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569–80 (1980).  See generally Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public 
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987). 
 260. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 555. 
 261. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722, 724–25 (2010) (reversing a conviction 
because a “lone courtroom observer” was excluded from voir dire); see also Doe v. Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 280 P.3d 377 (Or. 2012). State 
constitutional interpretations of the scope of public access rights varies somewhat.  See Koch, supra 
note 106, at 446. 
 262. See Martin v. Superior Court, 168 P. 135, 137–38 (Cal. 1917); see also Isrin v. Superior 
Court, 403 P.2d 728, 736 (Cal. 1965). 
 263. See, e.g., Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 117 So. 385, 386–87 (Fla. 1928) 
(concluding that imposing a ten dollar fee to be used for county purposes was a “tax” that violated 
the state’s open court clause); State ex rel. Davidson v. Gorman, 41 N.W. 948, 949 (Minn. 1889) 
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As a 1910 Missouri court explained when banning a three-dollar surcharge 
imposed by one county, compelling litigants to “purchase justice” was illegal 
because “the constitution[] . . . provides [that justice] shall not be sold.”264  Some 
decisions turn on whether filing fees go to court-related services and are 
therefore licit, or instead to “fund general welfare programs,” rendering them 
unconstitutional.265  Fees that are court-focused have generally been upheld, 
especially when judges have the discretion to waive them in particular cases.266 
 
(holding that probate charges keyed to the value of the estate were unconstitutional, as taxes rather 
than “reasonable . . . fees or costs”).  In 2010, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that court fees 
used for general revenues were permissible because the legislature appropriated more funds to 
courts than those the courts took in through fees.  See Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745 (Fla. 2010). 
  One high-profile example of fees as barriers comes from Texas.  For a time, Texas required 
that an appellant post a supersedeas bond in an amount related to the judgment won below.  
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (citing then-current TEX. R. CIV. P. 364).  Large 
judgments can result in pressures to settle or not to appeal.  See id. at 7.  Current Texas law no 
longer requires bonds as a condition for perfecting an appeal but does so for a stay of the execution 
of a judgment.  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1–.2, 25.1.  Texas rules provide that alternate security may be 
used in appropriate circumstances; judgment debtors must only post a supersedeas bond in the 
amount of compensatory (and not punitive) damages, interest and costs; this amount must not 
exceed the lesser of fifty percent of the judgment debtor’s current net worth or 25 million dollars; 
and that the trial court may reduce the amount of supersedeas upon a showing of substantial 
economic harm.  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1, 24.2(a)–(b).  Some decisions have suggested that the earlier 
mandatory supersedeas requirement, absent proper accommodations for those who are unable to 
post, was unconstitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 480, 481–82, 484–
85 (Tex. 1993) (holding that a requirement that state mineral lessees pay disputed royalties before 
seeking judicial review of an audit by the General Land Office violated the open courts provision); 
see also Elaine A. Carlson, Reshuffling the Deck: Enforcing and Superseding Civil Judgments on 
Appeal After House Bill 4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1035, 1079 (2005). 
 264. Hays v. C. C. & H. Mining & Milling Co., 126 S.W. 1051, 1054 (Mo. 1910) (holding that 
a 1901 act imposing a three dollar extra fee to file in Jasper County was unconstitutional as a “tax” 
before its courts would be “opened” and violated the right that justice be “administered . . . without 
sale, denial or delay”). 
 265. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986).  See, e.g., Harrison v. Monroe Cnty., 716 
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1986) (prohibiting fees if not “reasonably related to the expense of the 
administration of justice”); LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 341 (citing cases in Illinois, Florida, Missouri, 
and Minnesota to support its holding that “filing fees that go to fund general welfare programs, and 
not court-related services, are unconstitutional”).  The court in LeCroy v. Hanlon held that “filing 
fees that go to state general revenues—in other words taxes on the right to litigate that pay for other 
programs besides the judiciary—are unreasonable impositions on the state constitutional right of 
access to the courts.”  LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 342.  But see Marshall v. Holland, 270 S.W. 609 
(Ark. 1925) (upholding filing fees that included sums for general revenues).  What activities are 
“court-related” is another question.  Illinois courts have concluded that a five-dollar assessment on 
divorce filers to use for domestic-violence shelters was not permissible but a one-dollar assessment 
to go to a nonprofit dispute resolution center was.  Compare Wenger v. Finley, 541 N.E.2d 1220 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989), with Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1984). 
 266. See, e.g., Allen v. Emp’t Dep’t, 57 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); see also Bailey v. Frush, 
5 Or. 136, 137–38 (Or. 1873).  In contemporary discussions, some jurists argue that courts should 
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Fiscal stresses are placing new pressures on courts to fund their own work 
and “related services” or state programs more generally.  Objecting to that trend, 
a 2011 “policy paper” for the Conference of State Court Administrators insisted 
that courts ought not to be used by states as “revenue centers.”267  Less mention 
is made of the fact that courts gain a good deal of their revenue from “non-
contentious” matters, such as probate in state systems and bankruptcy filings in 
the federal system that produce a steady stream of income for courts.268  For 
example, more than a million bankruptcy petitions are filed annually in the 
federal courts, and the filing fee for one subset—those seeking a discharge under 
Chapters 11—was as of November of 2012, $1167.269 
Another genre of claims stems from legislative limitations placed on specific 
subsets of substantive claims, often enacted as part of administrative or 
alternative dispute resolution efforts or as “tort reform.”  While some 
administrative schemes mitigate the costs of litigation, they may be 
accompanied by parallel caps on the recoveries.270  Waves of litigation thus 
challenge enactment of statutes that authorize the enforcement of arbitration 
contracts, Workers’ Compensation, the repeal of certain common law causes of 
action, or the imposition, for certain kinds of plaintiffs, of restrictive statutes of 
limitations and caps on damages.271 
Depending on the state, a particular right-to-remedy clause has been read as 
aspirational only and therefore as not providing litigants with a cause of action 
or defense to new rules imposed by either the legislature or the judiciary.272  In 
contrast, other courts have read their state clauses to limit legislative changes to 
rights extant (sometimes characterized as “vested”) before that state’s 
constitution, or to limit legislative alterations of common law rights, or to 
prevent the imposition of barriers to courts without a “quid pro quo”—the 
 
be supported by general revenues rather than court-based fees.  See, e.g., Lippman, Courts in Times 
of Fiscal Crisis, supra note 239, at 5. 
 267. CARL REYNOLDS & JEFF HALL, 2011–2012 POLICY PAPER: COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE 
CENTERS (2011), available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/CourtsAreNotRevenue 
Centers-Final.pdf. 
 268. The degree to which localities rely on such filings in England and Wales is noted by Lord 
Justice Thomas. Thomas, The Maintenance of Local Justice, supra note 41, at 23. 
 269. See Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeships Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-121, § 
3(a), 126 Stat. 346, 348 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(3)).  Judges may waive fees but only 
if the filer’s income is 150 percent or less of federal poverty guidelines.  28 U.S.C. § 1930(f) (2006). 
 270. As Silverstein noted, some administrative systems such as workers’ compensation did not 
impose filing fees, while courts did.  Silverstein, supra note 146, at 24. 
 271. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1326–37, summarized these iterations.  He identified the 
earliest state court opinions, one upholding a legislative abolition of a common-law claim in 
Massachusetts in 1814, and the other rejecting a limitation in Tennessee in 1821.  Id. at 1326. 
 272. See Phillips, supra note 106, at 1338–39; Schuman, supra note 61, at 1205–06. 
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creation of an alternative remedy, often in an administrative forum.273  While 
some commentators have sought to rationalize the case law, others see 
“inexplicable” disparities of outcomes, incapable of being correlated to the text 
or history of particular state provisions.274 
An example of a robust invocation of the right-to-remedy clause comes from 
Nebraska.  That state’s supreme court has twice—in 1889 and in 1991—refused 
to enforce contracts calling for arbitration in lieu of litigation.275  As explained 
more than a century ago, in 1902, to enforce contracts to arbitrate would “open 
a leak in the dike of constitutional guaranties which might some day carry all 
away.”276  Many decades later, in 1987, Nebraska’s legislature enacted a version 
of the Uniform Arbitration Act whose words track parts of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, albeit with more constraints (such as that contracts be “entered 
into voluntarily and willingly”) and more exemptions (such as those arising 
under the state’s Fair Employment Practice Act).  In 1991, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that the Act violated the state constitution’s open 
court/rights-to-remedy clause.277 
In response, various businesses, the state’s Chamber of Commerce, and 
others proposed amending the constitution to authorize such legislation.  
Although opposed by a group including trial lawyers,278 Nebraska’s Constitution 
changed in 1996.  Added to the mandates that courts be open and “every 
person . . . shall have a remedy” was the proviso that the legislature could 
“provide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, and 
 
 273. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1335–39; see also FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-9 to 6-11; 
2011 Supp. at 105–32; Schuman, supra note 61, at 1206–17.  Friesen also noted that state courts 
have also relied on other parts of their constitutions (such as rights to jury trials and due process) 
when evaluating legislative limitations on common law rights.  FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-3, 
and at 2011 Supp. at 105 (discussing the few constitutions that also forbid “legislative abrogation 
and diminution of traditional damage remedies”). 
 274. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1314.  Phillips argued, however, that state courts ought to 
provide enforcement of a “narrow but potent protection” against legislative encroachment of basic 
rights, and that the primary rights Blackstone considered absolute—”personal security, personal 
liberty, and property”—provided guidance on which rights were appropriately within that “narrow” 
band.  Id. at 1344–45. 
 275. State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1991); German-Am. Ins. Co. 
v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406 (Neb. 1889). 
 276. Phx. Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902). 
 277. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, at 130.  Several state courts have addressed 
the issue of arbitration; many have not found mandatory arbitration provisions to be violative of 
open court rights.  See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Colo. 1989); 
FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-76 to 6-83.  A few have, however, found limits on judicial review of 
arbitration awards to run afoul of constitutional remedy rights. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v Pinnacle Med., Inc., 753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000). 
 278. See, e.g., Editorial, 1996 Field of Amendments Contains Two Worthy of a Yes, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 7, 1996, at 10; Leslie Boellstorff, Amendments May Be ‘Innocent 
Bystanders,’ OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 12, 1996, at 4B. 
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other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into voluntarily and which 
are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”279  (How the United States Supreme Court’s 
broad interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act280 affects the state’s 
judgments has been the subject of some Nebraska decisions,281 and the state-
federal interaction is the topic of Professor Wolff’s essay in this Symposium.282) 
Several other state courts have also concluded that open court/right to 
remedies clauses generate judicially enforceable entitlements.  The test in Texas, 
for example, is that legislatures cannot “abrogate well-established common law 
causes of action unless the reason” to do so “outweighs the litigants’ 
constitutional right of redress.”283  Missouri provides another example, with case 
law developed based on its constitutional provision (set forth in 1820 and 
amended in 1875 and in 1945), mandating that courts provide “certain remedy 
afforded for every injury to person, property or character.”284 
As then-Judge Wolff explained the state’s approach, a statute “may modify 
or abolish a cause of action that had been recognized by common law or by 
statute” as long as doing so is not “arbitrary or unreasonable.”285  Under that test, 
 
 279. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended 1996).  See generally John M. Gradwohl, Arbitrability 
Under Nebraska Contracts: Relatively Clarified at Last, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207 (1997). 
Montana’s remedy clause was amended in 1972, in response to a state court decision finding that a 
third party had no liability to an independent contractor injured and compensated through workers’ 
compensation. See Aschraft v. Mont. Power Co., 480 P.2d 812 (Mont. 1971), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (amended 1972).  In 1965, Utah ruled its 
state’s arbitration violative of its open courts clause.  See Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ins. Co., 
398 P.2d 873 (Utah 1965).  Thereafter, the legislature amended the Act to make it prospective, and 
the Court upheld the provision.  See Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981).  
See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976) (invalidating 
as violating jury rights, equal protection, and court access rights, the Ohio Medical Malpractice 
Act’s mandate to use compulsory arbitration). 
 280. See, e.g., Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 281. See, e.g., Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Hunan, Inc., 757 N.W.2d 205 (Neb. 
2008); Cornhusker Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2002). 
 282. See generally Wolff, supra note 38. 
 283. See, e.g., Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996). 
 284. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14.  Note that Missouri’s 1820 constitutional formulation was that 
courts “ought to be open,” MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7 (“That courts of justice ought to 
be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property, or 
character; and that right and justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay . . . .”), 
and that in 1875 the text shifted from “ought to be open” to “shall be open,” MO. CONST. of 1875, 
art. II, § 10.  In 1945, the wording shifted from the exhortative 1820 language, “ought to be 
administered without sale, denial, or delay,” MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7, and 1875 
language, “should be administered without sale, denial or delay,” MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 10, 
to the mandatory “shall be administered without sale, denial or delay,” MO. CONST. art. I, § 14 
(ratified in 1945, current in 2012). 
 285. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
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the court struck a statute conditioning a tort action against a dram shop on the 
seller’s conviction for providing liquor to the intoxicated person who caused the 
injury.  The court held that the vagaries of prosecutorial decisions rendered the 
constraint arbitrary.286  But many limits have been sustained; for example, the 
court upheld legislation requiring that a person owing child support and seeking 
modification first post a bond (sometimes involving thousands of dollars) for the 
sums not yet paid.287 
Return then to view the historical arc from the 1676 Charter of the English 
Colony of West New Jersey (invoked at the outset—that “in all publick courts 
of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons . . . may 
freely come into, and attend”288) to the dozens of remedy provisions of state 
constitutions, and the due process, petitioning, and other clauses of state and 
federal constitutions.  Over the course of three centuries, positive entitlements 
to a particular, individualized, government service—protection of property and 
person—became entrenched.  As individuals of all races, genders, and classes 
gained juridical personhood, those entitlements also served to generate subsidies 
(both for courts and their users) to protect adjudication’s intelligibility and 
legitimacy.  Efforts to respond to inequality, such as insisting that states waive 
fees to court in certain instances paralleled the end of poll taxes for voting, as 
the democratic project came to be inclusive. 
As also noted at the outset, courts were one of several venues in which 
questions of equality emerged.  Given that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
application of the Equal Protection Clause to the poor, as a category, the Court 
nonetheless carved out access to courts as an arena in which equality concerns, 
interacting with due process interpretations, had purchase.  Closing courthouse 
doors to impoverished segments of the population is a harm that would be felt 
by and undermine the state’s ability to do its own work.  The government, like 
individuals, relies on decisions conforming to the “law of the land.”  Thus, the 
Court used due process ideology to delineate a discrete arena in which poverty 
was to be ameliorated by the state.  The result was to make courts a more 
inclusive democratic venue.  Paralleling the insistence that states waive fees for 
those seeking divorce were injunctions that states not impose poll taxes for 
voting.  Litigating and voting are both personal rights and structural necessities, 
 
 286. Id. at 545–46, 552 & n.21.  However, the Court also noted that the legislature, which had 
created this kind of cause of action, could also abolish it altogether.  Id. at 554.  Moreover, the 
legislature was not obliged to substitute an alternative.  See Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 
S.W.2d 898, 906 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the “‘reasonable substitute’ holdings” of the Texas 
and Florida Supreme Courts as “arbitrarily and unnecessarily limit[ing] the legitimate lawmaking 
role of the legislative branch” and holding that the “common law is in force in Missouri only to the 
extent that it has not been subsequently changed by the legislature or judicial decision”). 
 287.  Weigand v. Edwards, 296 S.W.3d 453 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 288. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, supra note 8, at ch. XXIII. 
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and both are forms of political participation that help to anchor the stability of 
democratic states. 
IV.  THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUBSTANTIVE 
ENTITLEMENTS: AN EXEMPLUM IUSTITIAE 
Eight lessons can be drawn from this account of state and federal 
commitments to courts.  First, the United States, at both national and state levels, 
is obliged as a matter of constitutional law to provide some forms of services to 
individuals to obtain remedies in open court for some kind of harms.  Second, 
these commitments have been materialized and expanded over the course of 
three centuries, and most of the credit for doing so—in terms of expanding the 
kinds of harms legally cognizable as well as the resources to pursue them in 
court—goes to legislatures. 
Thus, and third, courts should be understood as institutions that have been 
remarkably successful in attracting huge amounts of public funds and of private 
investments.  How much is hard to know.  In many jurisdictions, court budgets 
include funds for services such as probation and public defenders.  Moreover, 
some courts receive funding from local, as contrasted with state, sources.  Thus, 
while the National Center for State Courts has a database of court budgets, the 
difficulties of delineating spending sources and the diverse services that budget 
allocations cover make a full and accurate accounting of the billions of public 
dollars difficult.289  Yet more opaque are the amount of moneys invested by 
private litigants—investing their own resources to generate judge-made law as 
well as into systemic changes, from rulemaking and legislation to contributions 
aimed at getting specific individuals on (or off) the bench by way of appointment 
or election.  Calculating the sums spent on auxiliary institutions that courts have 
spawned—the related industries of lawyers, administrators, notaries, probation, 
forensic experts, and other information services—is likewise difficult.290 
The utility of those investments raises yet other issues.  Just as tracking how 
much is spent in and around courts is difficult, so too is deciding whether to 
commodify and how to identify and to measure the outputs of court—from the 
participatory processes to the impact of the judgments rendered on the disputants 
to their influence on or use by third parties.  A few states have used econometrics 
to approximate the utilities produced by their court systems—such as the ability 
 
 289. See COSCA Budget Survey Responses, supra note 226. 
 290. One estimate is that U.S. law firms earned fifty-one billion dollars in gross profits in 2003, 
and that focus is far from the total output of the “Legal Services Industry” (LSI).   See NEIL 
RICKMAN & JAMES M. ANDERSON, INNOVATIONS IN THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (RAND, 2011), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP354.pdf. 
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of businesses to know that they can collect debts and enforce contracts.291  
Critics in turn claim that court-based activities harm productivity outside of 
court and waste resources in court, resulting in a loss of revenues. 
Fourth, the contemporary pressures on courts come in part from the 
remarkable surge in criminal filings and in part from courts’ own successes as 
attractive venues for civil litigants.  In many respects, courts are only starting to 
grapple with the challenges raised by economically disparate claimants in 
criminal and civil cases.  Given the fiscal retrenchment of government services 
more broadly, the turn to a focus on budgets, lawyer-less litigants, and 
alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution aim to respond to the complex and 
ambitious project of applying twentieth-century egalitarian norms to eighteenth-
century statements of rights to remedies, drafted in an era when members of the 
propertied classes were the prototype litigants and governments’ criminal justice 
systems were nascent.  One could thus characterize the last decades of new 
programs and investments as a “progressive realisation” of these ambitious 
social services—here borrowing again the terms used by the South African 
Constitution.292 
Fifth, one set of responses, the promotion of alterative dispute fora, produces 
a new set of problems for courts, faced now with the divesture of work that was 
once uniquely within their purview.  Court-mandated use of private providers, 
for example, enables such providers to attract cases otherwise eligible for 
adjudication.  If high-end users opt out on the civil side, the public court system 
becomes the repository of the problems of the poor and its widespread legislative 
support, predicated in part on the universal nature of judicial services, may 
become more vulnerable.  Court leaders now speak of the importance of making 
the “business case” for why legislatures should fund courts.293  Evidence of the 
need for concern comes from the federal system.  In lieu of the twentieth-century 
 
 291. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 13–14; WASH. ECON. GRP., INC., THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN FLORIDA’S COURTS DUE TO UNDER-
FUNDING OF COURT SYSTEM 7–10 (2009). 
 292. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 1 § 26(2). 
 293. See, e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, SAVING JUSTICE: WHERE NEXT FOR LEGAL AID? VIEWS 
FROM THE RESPONSES TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE GREEN PAPER CONSULTATION REFORM OF 
LEGAL AID IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5 (2011), available at http://www.justice-for-
all.org.uk/dyn/1323258153870/Saving-justice.pdf (referencing the “business case” research by 
Citizens Advice to estimate the cost-benefit ratio for key civil categories of legal aid advice); see 
also Hon. Margaret H. Marshall, Remarks at the Kentucky Law Journal Symposium on State 
Courts: Putting it All Together: Or What Can We Do Now (Sept. 24, 2011) (referring to Chief 
Justice Minton as “the CEO of one of Massachusetts’ most successful, global companies”) (on file 
with author); Hon. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, First Annual Address to the State Bar of California (Sept. 
17, 2011) (“[A]nd we have done our part . . . with shrinking resources, trying to provide the same 
level of service. . . .  We have tried technological business models.”) (on file with author); Hon. 
Sue Bell Cobb, State of the Judiciary Address, Alabama (Jan. 26, 2010) (“Courts must undertake 
fundamental change such as . . . redesigning business processes . . . .”) (on file with author). 
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spiral of more civil filings and more demands for the public services of judges, 
a flattening demand curve appeared during the first decade of the twenty-first.294 
Sixth, bringing courts into the framework of positive and negative state 
duties undermines that delineation as it also suggests the need for other analytic 
categories.  The provision of courts makes plain that positive rights are not 
“foreign” to the U.S. experience as is sometimes posited.295  In lieu of attention 
focused either on individual positive entitlements or prohibitions on state 
actions, theories of rights need to take account of the history of courts, which 
demonstrates that some rights both impose obligations on states as they 
recognize and enable individuals and entities to pursue their own interests and 
to participate in public norm development.  These communal rights expose and 
mediate conflicts through the generation of state-based and state-funded 
institutions. 
Once the depth of the traditions of and normative utilities for state-
provisioning are acknowledged, the political and judicial questions that emerge 
are about what forms of services ought to be provided and what forms of 
subsidies are needed.  One way to read the many decisions, through litigation 
and legislation, on court access and substantive rights is as a massive and 
sprawling multi-century debate, across and within jurisdictions, about how to 
allocate, to ration, and to reconfigure services.  At times, courts have found 
aspects of these issues justiciable and become as adjudicators co-venturers in an 
ongoing discursive exchange about their own availability.  More often, chief 
justices enter the discussion not by way of adjudication but through their 
function as CEOs of their court systems to advocate in their own jurisdictions 
for support.  But as the preemption rule that emerged from the AT&T litigation 
on mandatory arbitration illustrates, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the 
room provided to states and thereby cut off experimentation in sorting out how 
courts are to attract resources, what sort of cases should be given what kinds of 
process, and how to manage judicial services.296 
Seventh, debates about the scope of government obligations to subsidize 
court use, about protecting access rights, and about what constitutes “fair” 
hearings are part of a larger and intense conflict in the United States (and 
elsewhere) about regulation and privatization.  When federal and state 
constitutions are read to oblige redistributive efforts to facilitate use of courts, 
public regulatory opportunities are enhanced.  While T.H. Marshall foresaw in 
 
 294. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG RANGE PLAN 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, at I-18 (2008), available at http://199.107.22.105/library/Implementa 
tion_the_Long_Range_Plan.pdf; see also Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 18, at 
827–31. 
 295. To borrow from Moliere, we have been “speaking prose” all along.  MOLIÈRE, LE 
BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME 41 (Curtis Hidden Page trans., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1908) (1670). 
 296. See generally Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11. 
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1949 the challenges entailed when social, political, and civil rights come 
together to expand the relationship and obligations between citizenships and 
their polities, he thought that “economic inequalities” would be difficult to 
sustain in the face of the “enrichment of the status of citizenship,”297 and that 
government support was the natural response.  Instead, economic inequalities in 
the United States have grown, dramatically.  Courts are one arena in which the 
state has persistently sought to mitigate those inequalities, and often done so 
under the banner of due process, embroidered with equality concerns.  Courts 
serve to turn “everyone” into rights-holders by redistributing power and 
affording each person status. 
But as the refusal to accord detainees at Guantánamo Bay equal litigation 
rights illustrates, the political commitment to that form of status can fray.  
Barring some from full participatory rights in courts marks them as outsiders.298  
Likewise, the practice of funding courts from general revenues is coming under 
siege, as courts raise fees and impose new charges.  A person seeking 
modification of a child support order in Alabama has to pay a fee of $248, 
without adjustments that would make this “tax on distress” (to borrow from 
Bentham) progressive.299  Funds to support some of California’s efforts to create 
“Civil Gideon” legal services come from increased fees for various court 
services, such as enforcing judgments and certifying a copy of a document.300  
In the federal system, the reauthorization of judgeships in bankruptcy came at 
the price of increased fees for those using that system.301  England and Wales 
have gone further and embraced “full-cost pricing,” such that, for a certain kind 
of case, “a fee payable for a hearing” could be more than 1,000 pounds.302 
 
 297. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 45. 
 298. Outside status is an interaction between identity and class.  See Nancy Fraser, From 
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 
68, 70–74 (1995).  Fraser argued that people “subject to both cultural injustice and economic 
injustice need both recognition and redistribution.”  Id. at 74.  Courts in turn are mechanisms for 
redistribution of both status and economic capacity. 
 299. See ALA. CODE § 12-19-71(a)(7) (2012). 
 300. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2009); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70626(e) (West 2009). 
 301. Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeships Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-121, § 3(a), 
126 Stat. 346, 348 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(3)) (increasing the fee for filing under 
Chapter 11 from $1000 to $1167).  As noted, waivers, under limited circumstances, are available.  
See 28 U.S.C § 1930(f)(1); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1821 TEMPORARY 
BANKRUPTCY JUDGESHIPS EXTENSION ACT OF 2011 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s1821.pdf. 
 302. See The Civil Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order, 2011, S.I. 586 (L.2) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/586/pdfs/uksi_20110586_en.pdf. The 
current system interacts with what is called fee “remissions,” that provide for waivers for those 
who genuinely cannot afford to pay fees.  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATORY 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FEES (AMENDMENT) ORDER 2011, at 11 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM], available at http://www.legisla 
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Figure 8: COURTROOM INTERIOR, JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY FEDERAL, 
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, 1998 
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998.  Image provided by and reproduced with 
permission of the photographer and courtesy of the court. 
My eighth and final point flows from the others; courts have a distinctive 
claim for public support as well as for public regulation because governments 
 
tion.gov.uk/uksi/2011/587/pdfs/uksiem_20110587_en.pdf; HER MAJESTY’S COURTS SERV. 
(HMCS), COURT FEES: DO YOU HAVE TO PAY THEM? (2011), available at http://www.men 
said.com/documents/fl/ex160a.pdf.   The government reported that, in 2009 and 2010, court fees 
raised about £479 million and covered eighty-two percent of the full cost of running the civil and 
family courts and probate service (which cost  £619 million a year in total).  The effort to recoup 
“full-costs” aims to support a variety of court expenses, including facilities and judicial salaries, 
through fees.  See 2011 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, supra, at 6; see also, HM 
TREASURY, MANAGING PUBLIC MONEY, ch. 6 (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury. 
gov.uk/d/mpm_whole.pdf (explaining that “[t]he norm is to charge [publically provided services] 
at full cost”); RUPERT M. JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS (2009), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-56F09672EB6A/0/ 
Jacksonfinalreport140110.pdf (broadly surveying the costs of civil litigation in England and 
Wales).  Criticism can be found in FRANCIS PLOWDEN, REVIEW OF COURT FEES IN CHILD CARE 
PROCEEDINGS (2009), available at http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/1044/1/court-fees-child-care-proceed 
ings.pdf (describing the increases in fees paid by local government authorities in child care 
proceedings in England and Wales), and in Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 40. 
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need the infrastructure that courts provide, and democracies need the 
opportunities for the multi-party interactions that adjudication entails.  Courts 
offer links between individuals and government, and hence have a special claim 
on resources.  Diminution of opportunities to use open courts impoverishes the 
status of individuals and diminishes the effectiveness of government.  I opened 
this Lecture with reflection on what didactic images of Justice and courthouses 
can teach.  By way of closing, it is appropriate to return to a few, final pictures.  
Courtrooms are the signature feature of courts, and a carefully designed example 
is shown in Figure 8.  This picture comes from the 1998 federal courthouse in 
Boston.  As a judge central to that building project explained, “[t]he most 
prominent geometric feature . . . is the repetition of encompassing circles” that 
underscores that courtroom activities are a “shared community undertaking;”303 
each side of the courtroom is marked by arches of equal size behind the judge, 
the jury, and the public to make plain that all are “equally ennobled.”304 
Such courtrooms are artifacts of the entitlement that “all courts shall be 
open,” producing a government-sponsored occasion to impose, albeit fleetingly, 
the dignity reflected in the status held by a juridical person, competent to sue or 
be sued, able to prompt an answer from and entitled to be treated on a par with 
one’s adversary—whether that be an individual, a corporation, or the 
government itself.  The odd etiquette of the courtroom disciplines both 
disputants and the state, as all are required to respond respectfully to claims.  The 
public enactment documents how government officials treat individuals and 
enables debate about compliance with those goals as well as about the content 
of the governing legal norms. 
No such options can be derived from the next image, my own cell phone 
contract (figure 9), provided several years ago.305  The materials require waiver 
of rights to court and to class actions, whether in court or in arbitration.  Claims 
may only be brought against the service provider individually and exclusively 
through a private arbitration process—in this instance, run by the American 
Arbitration Association—designated by that provider.306  As noted, in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a bare majority of the United State Supreme Court 
held that federal arbitration law makes such provisions enforceable, despite state 
court conclusions that such one-sided provisions are unconscionable.307 
 
 303. Douglas P. Woodlock, Communities and the Courthouses They Deserve. And Vice Versa., 
24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.  271, 279–80 (2012). 
 304. Id. at 280. 
 305. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134–35 fig.12 
(2006). 
 306. Id.  This contract is typical of those provided.  See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra 
note 11, at 119. 
 307. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  Several other states had, 
like California, found that kind of provision unenforceable.  See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, 
supra note 11, at 129 & n.309. 
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The poor visual quality of this document contrasts with the intensely 
communitarian and self-conscious design of the Boston courtroom.  The fine 
print of the cell phone document makes the point perfectly, for we, readers, are 
not really invited to read it, or to think about it, or to try to negotiate it.  Indeed, 
its unreadability is economical, for the provision is a “take it or leave it” clause, 
avoided only by not buying that phone service.  Calling this document a 
“contract” is thus a misnomer, for it is neither bargained for nor subject to 
bargaining.308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132, 143 (1970); Resnik, 
Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, at 118, 128. 
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Figure 9: CELLULAR PHONE CONTRACT 
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Rather, these provisions are the manifestation of the power of a sector of 
providers, able (now that the Supreme Court has found enforceable such limits 
on rights to remedies309) to insist that purchasers of cell phones individually use 
the private “court” systems chosen by the sellers or, alternatively, hope for action 
from their state attorney generals or the Federal Trade Commission.  The other 
option is to “lump it” and seek no redress. 
The cell phone document encodes what is fundamentally wrong with the 
form of an alternative it imposes.  The provider obliges consumers to use 
confidential dispute resolution services that obliterate the chance for an audience 
 
 309. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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to learn about what transpired.  Further, by precluding class actions, the system 
has cut out ex ante mechanisms for redistributing resources.310  Gone are Jeremy 
Bentham’s “auditors”311 and the potential for his imagined Tribunal of Public 
Opinion to function, for no one can evaluate the exchanges between the 
decision-makers and the disputants.  Lost are opportunities to assess whether 
procedures and decision-makers are fair, how resources affect outcomes, 
whether similarly-situated litigants are treated comparably, and why one would 
want to get into (or avoid) court.  Instead, a private transaction has been 
substituted and, unlike public adjudication, control over the meaning of the 
claims made and the judgments rendered rests with the corporate provider of the 
service. 
The artistry of the photographer William Clift in Reflection, Old St. Louis 
County Courthouse (Figure 10) provides the coda.312  The domed courthouse, 
seen in the glass of the modern building in which it is mirrored, is where the trial 
of Dred and Harriet Scott took place; their names stand now for the horrors of 
slavery and the failures of law.313  Although a Missouri jury had, in the 1850s, 
ordered the Scotts free, the state Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that they were legally slaves.314  T.H. Marshall had insisted on access 
to courts as central to civil rights.315  Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution put slaves (“beings of an inferior 
 
 310. The cell phone provider promised—in a unilateral provision that could be withdrawn—to 
pay a $7500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees to 
consumers who win more than was offered at settlement.  Id. at 1744.  Further, the dispute 
resolution service, the American Arbitration Association, caps fees at $125 for arbitrations of 
$10,000 or less.  AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY 
PROCEDURES 8 (2011), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/govern 
mentandconsumer/documents/document/mdaw/mda4/~edisp/adrstg_015806.pdf.  But given that 
many claims are less than that amount—the Concepcions alleged a thirty-dollar overcharge—few 
will pursue the remedy absent aggregation of claims.  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 311. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 356. 
 312. William Clift, Reflection, Old St. Louis County Courthouse, taken in 1976 in conjunction 
with the Seagram Court House Project, is provided and reproduced with his permission.  See COURT 
HOUSE: A PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENT 31, 251 (Richard Pare ed., 1978). 
 313. See DONALD F. DOSCH, THE OLD COURTHOUSE: AMERICANS BUILD A FORUM ON THE 
FRONTIER 103–06 (Dan Murphy ed., 1979).  The building, opening in 1828, was used as both a 
state and federal courthouse.  St. Louis Old Courthouse, St. Louis, WORLDSITEGUIDES.COM, 
http://www.worldsiteguides.com/north-america/us/st-louis/st-louis-old-courthouse/ (last visited 
May 26, 2012).  It was enlarged thereafter with wings that shifted the former federal style building 
to that of a Greek Revival structure by the 1840s, and was remodeled again in the 1850s.  Old 
Courthouse Architecture, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/jeff/planyourvisit/old-
courthouse-architecture.htm (last visited May 26, 2012); Setting the Stage, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, 
http://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/9stlouis/9setting.htm (last visited May 26, 2012). 
 314. DOSCH, supra note 313, at 106–07. 
 315. See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8. 
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order”) outside citizenship, lacking juridical voice even to challenge the state 
holding.316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: WILLIAM CLIFT, REFLECTION, OLD ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
COURTHOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1976 
Photographer: William Clift, provided and reproduced with the permission of the 
photographer. 
The Old St. Louis Courthouse was also the site of Virginia Minor’s litigation 
seeking, in 1872, to vote as a citizen of the United States.317  In 1874, in Minor 
v. Happersett, she argued that the Privileges and Immunities clause of the (then 
recent) Fourteenth Amendment endowed her, as a woman, with new rights.318  
The Supreme Court of the United States denied her equality.  Minor was (unlike 
the Scotts) recognized as a citizen of the United States but not entitled to vote, 
an opportunity that, the Court held, depended on state law.319 
 
 316. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).  The Court also struck 
provisions of the Missouri Compromise that declared it a free territory, id. at 452, and held that the 
Fifth Amendment protected the rights of slaveholders in the “property” that was their slaves, id. at 
450–51.  See also DOSCH, supra note 313, at 107; LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE 
ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 317–18 (2009). 
 317. DOSCH, supra note 313, at 99. 
 318. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165 (1874). 
 319. Id. at 165, 178; DOSCH, supra note 313, at 99–100. 
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The Old Courthouse stands as a testament to injustices promulgated in the 
name of constitutions, both state and federal.  Its display underscores that I make 
no claim that courts are intrinsically committed to the justice of equality.  Polities 
make their courts just, or not.  But courts operating under democratic precepts 
offer the potential to redistribute resources and power from government to 
individual, from one side of a case to another, and from disputants and decision-
makers to the audience.  Through participatory parity, public processes can teach 
about practices of norm development and offer the opportunity for popular input 
to produce changes in legal rights. 
When issues are engaged in open court processes, we—those outside the 
immediate dispute—have a role in understanding, legitimating, delegitimating, 
and interpreting what law means, what justice entails, what the predicates of its 
practices are, and whether the resulting violence is acceptable or intolerable.  
Such “democratic iterations”320 provide dense sets of interactions that can, over 
time, function as mechanisms to limit the scope of rulers’ powers and to change 
normative precepts.  Exemplary of those changes are the repudiations of Dred 
Scott and of Minor v. Happersett—undone by the Civil War, constitutional 
amendments thereafter, and political and social movements (of which the 
litigations were a part) that embrace a profoundly different conception of 
personhood and of justice.  And of course, democratic engagement does not 
inevitably yield results that could be termed progressive.  Like other sites of 
democratic ordering, popular will can be propelled in a variety of directions. 
The authority of the audience and the potential for dispute resolution to be 
redistributive are at stake as courts and legislatures debate the permissible 
boundaries of the privatization of courts.  Recall that Foucault mapped how, 
when the “great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the 
very people to whom it was addressed,” the state developed prisons to assert 
coercion removed from public view.321  Adjudication is now following a parallel 
path, putting at risk the modern phenomenon of “rights” of access to court for 
“everyone,” newly empowered to seek accountings from previously impervious 
actors.  Public and private disciplinary powers—from the U.S. government at 
Guantánamo Bay to cell phone providers mandating confidential arbitrations—
increasingly rely on practices that do not admit of a need to show their processes 
in order to justify the exercise of authority. 
William Clift’s late twentieth-century photograph of the Old St. Louis 
Courthouse records that trajectory.  “In the 1930s, the courthouse was 
abandoned in favor of a new Civil Courts Building and then rescued for 
renovation as a national monument—formally confirmed in 1940 under 
 
 320. See Seyla Benhabib, Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the Global, in 
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 45, 45 (Robert Post ed., 2006). 
 321. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 63, 74. 
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President Franklin Roosevelt.”322  The building now functions as a museum, 
which is what may be the twenty-first century fate of other monumental 
courthouses.  Moreover, what Clift shows is the Old Courthouse reflected in 
another structure—known in the 1970s as the Equitable Life Building.323  The 
third building, larger than and behind the reflected image of the courthouse, is 
in turn the current regional headquarters of the American Arbitration 
Association, one of the private providers of dispute resolution services.  
Sandwiched between two office buildings, the Old Courthouse is subsumed by 
the corporate structures that surround it. 
  
 
 322. See DOSCH, supra note 313, at 111. 
 323. Id. at 92–93.  That building, designed by Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum and built in 1971, 
was renovated in the 1990s and purchased by the Herzt Investment Group in 2007 from the AXA 
Equitable Life Insurance Company.  Id. at 93 n.339; see also Lisa R. Brown, Equitable Building 
Under Contract, Millennium Center Sold, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Jan. 5–11, 2007, at 45A. 
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APPENDIX 1 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: 
TEXTUAL COMMITMENTS TO RIGHTS TO REMEDIES 
State 
Declaration
/ 
Constitutio
n when first 
enacted 
Text Current const. Current text 
Date 
Curren
t Text 
Enacte
d 
Alabama 
Const. of 
1819, art. I, 
§ 14 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1901, 
art. I, § 
13 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same (That 
all courts 
shall be open; 
and that every 
person for 
any injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, person 
or reputation, 
shall have a 
remedy by 
due process 
of law; and 
right and 
justice shall 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay.) 
1819 
Arizona 
Const. of 
1912, art. II,  
§ 11 (1st 
Const.) 
Justice in all 
cases shall be 
administered 
openly, and 
without 
unnecessary 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1912, 
art. II,  § 
11 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1912 
Arkansas 
Const. of 
1868, art. I, 
§ 10 (3rd 
Const.) 
Every person is 
entitled to a 
certain remedy 
in the laws for 
all injuries or 
Const. 
of 1874, 
art. II, § 
13 
(current 
Same (Every 
person is 
entitled to a 
certain 
remedy in the 
1868 
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wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property or 
character; he 
ought to obtain 
justice freely 
and without 
purchase; 
completely and 
without denial; 
promptly and 
without delay; 
conformably to 
the laws. 
through 
2011) 
laws for all 
injuries or 
wrongs he 
may receive 
in his person, 
property or 
character; he 
ought to 
obtain justice 
freely, and 
without 
purchase; 
completely 
and without 
denial; 
promptly and 
without 
delay; 
conformably 
to the laws.) 
Colorado 
Const. of 
1876, art. II, 
§ 6 (1st 
Const.) 
That courts of 
justice shall be 
open to every 
person, and a 
speedy remedy 
afforded for 
every injury to 
person, 
property, or 
character; and 
that right and 
justice should 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1876, 
art. II, § 
6 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1876 
Connecticut 
Const. of 
1818, art. I, 
§ 12 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done to him in 
his person, 
Const. 
of 1965, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
Same (All 
courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done to him 
1818 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS 1001 
property, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
through 
2011) 
in his person, 
property or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay.) 
Delaware 
Const. of 
1792, art. I, 
§ 9 (2nd 
Const.) 
All court[s] 
shall be open; 
and every man, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
reputation, 
person, 
movable or 
immovable 
possessions, 
shall have 
remedy by the 
due course of 
law, and justice 
administered 
according to 
the very right 
of the cause 
and the law of 
the land, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
unreasonable 
delay or 
expense; . . . . 
Const. 
of 1897, 
art. I, § 
9 (as 
amende
d in 
1977 
and 
1999, 
current 
through 
2010) 
All courts 
shall be open; 
and every 
person for an 
injury done 
him or her in 
his or her 
reputation, 
person, 
movable or 
immovable 
possessions, 
shall have 
remedy by 
the due 
course of law, 
and justice 
administered 
according to 
the very right 
of the cause 
and the law 
of the land, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
unreasonable 
delay or 
expense. 
1999 
Florida 
Const. of 
1839, art. I, 
That all courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
Const. 
of 1968, 
art. I, § 
The courts 
shall be open 
to every 
1968 
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§ 9 (1st 
Const.) 
person, for an 
injury done 
him, in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
21 
(current 
through 
2010) 
person for 
redress of any 
injury, and 
justice shall 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay. 
Georgia 
Const. of 
1877, art. I, 
§ 1, ¶ 4 (7th 
Const.) 
No person shall 
be deprived of 
the right to 
prosecute or 
defend his own 
cause in any of 
the Courts of 
this State, in 
person, by 
attorney, or 
both. 
Const. 
of 1983, 
art. I, § 
1, ¶ 12 
(current 
through 
2011) 
No person 
shall be 
deprived of 
the right to 
prosecute or 
defend, either 
in person or 
by an 
attorney, that 
person’s own 
cause in any 
of the courts 
of this state. 
1983 
Idaho 
Const. of 
1890, art. I, 
§ 18 (1st 
Const.) 
Courts of 
justice shall be 
open to every 
person, and a 
speedy remedy 
afforded for 
every injury of 
person, 
property or 
character, and 
right and 
justice shall be 
administered 
without sale, 
Const. 
of 1890, 
art. I, § 
18 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1890 
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denial, delay, 
or prejudice. 
Illinois 
Const. of 
1818, art. 
VIII, § 12 
(1st Const.) 
Every person 
within this 
State ought to 
find a certain  
 
 
remedy in the 
laws for all 
injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property, or 
character; he 
ought to obtain 
right and 
justice freely, 
and without 
being obliged 
to purchase it, 
completely and 
without denial, 
promptly and 
without delay, 
conformably to 
the laws. 
Const. 
of 1970, 
art. I, § 
12  
 
 
(current 
through 
2012) 
Every person 
shall find a 
certain 
remedy in the  
 
 
laws for all 
injuries and 
wrongs which 
he receives to 
his person, 
privacy, 
property or 
reputation. 
He shall 
obtain justice 
by law, 
freely, 
completely, 
and promptly. 
1970 
Indiana 
Const. of 
1816, art. I, 
§ 11 (1st 
Const.) 
[A]ll Courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person, for an 
injury done 
him, in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation shall 
have remedy 
by the due 
course of law; 
and right and 
justice 
administered 
Const. 
of 1851, 
art. 1, § 
12 (as 
amende
d in 
1984, 
current 
through 
2011) 
All courts 
shall be open; 
and every 
person, for 
injury done to 
him in his 
person, 
property, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law. Justice 
shall be 
administered 
1984 
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without denial 
or delay. 
freely, and 
without 
purchase; 
completely, 
and without 
denial; 
speedily, and 
without 
delay. 
Kansas 
Const. of 
1859, Bill of 
Rights, § 18 
(1st Const.) 
All persons, for 
injuries 
suffered in 
person, 
reputation or 
property, shall 
have remedy 
by due course 
of law, and 
justice 
administered 
without delay. 
Const. 
of 1859, 
Bill of 
Rights, 
§ 18 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1859 
Kentucky 
Const. of 
1792, art. 
XII, § 13 
(1st Const.) 
[A]ll courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person for an 
injury done 
him in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by the 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
administered, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1891, 
Bill of 
Rights, 
§ 14 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same (All 
courts shall 
be open and 
every person 
for an injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, person 
or reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay.) 
1792 
Louisiana 
Const. of 
1864, tit. 
VII, art. 110 
(5th Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open; and 
every person, 
for any injury 
Const. 
of 1974, 
art. I, § 
22 
All courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person shall 
1974 
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done him, in 
his lands, 
goods, person, 
or reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered 
without denial 
or 
unreasonable 
delay. 
(current 
through 
2012) 
have an 
adequate 
remedy by 
due process 
of law and 
justice, 
administered 
without 
denial, 
partiality, or 
unreasonable 
delay, for 
injury to him 
in his person, 
property, 
reputation, or 
other rights. 
Maine 
Const. of 
1819, art. I, 
§ 19 (1st 
Const.) 
Every person, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
person, 
reputation, 
property, or 
immunities, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law; 
and right and 
justice shall be 
administered 
freely and 
without sale, 
completely and 
without denial, 
promptly and 
without delay. 
Const. 
of 1819, 
art. I, § 
19 (as 
amende
d in 
1988, 
current 
through 
2011) 
Every person, 
for a[n] injury 
inflicted on 
the person or 
the person’s 
reputation, 
property or 
immunities, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law; and right 
and justice 
shall be 
administered 
freely and 
without sale, 
completely 
and without 
denial, 
promptly and 
without 
delay. 
1988 
Maryland 
Const. of 
1776, Decl. 
of Rights, 
That every 
freeman, for 
any injury done 
Const. 
of 1867, 
Decl. of 
That every 
man, for any 
injury done to 
1864 
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art. 17 (1st 
Const.) 
him in his 
person or 
property, ought 
to have 
remedy, by the 
course of the 
law of the land, 
and ought to 
have justice 
and [r]ight 
freely without 
sale, fully 
without any 
denial, and 
speedily 
without delay, 
according to 
the law [of] the 
land. 
Rights, 
art. 19 
(current 
through 
2011) 
(same as 
Const. 
of 1864) 
him in person 
or property 
ought to have 
remedy by 
the course of 
the Law of 
the Land, and 
ought to have 
justice and 
right, freely 
without sale, 
fully without 
any denial, 
and speedily 
without 
delay, 
according to 
[the] Law of 
the Land. 
Massachusett
s 
Const. of 
1780, pt. I, 
art. XI (1st 
Const.) 
Every subject 
of the 
commonwealth 
ought to find a 
certain remedy, 
by having 
recourse to the 
laws, for all 
injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property, or 
character. He 
ought to obtain 
right and 
justice freely, 
and without 
being obliged 
to purchase it; 
completely, 
and without 
any denial; 
promptly, and 
Const. 
of 1780, 
pt. I, art. 
XI 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1780 
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without delay; 
conformably to 
the laws. 
Michigan 
Const. of 
1850, art. 
VI, § 24 
(2nd Const.) 
Any suitor in 
any court of 
this State shall 
have the right 
to prosecute or 
defend his suit, 
either in his 
own proper 
person, or by 
an attorney or 
agent of his 
choice. 
Const. 
of 1963, 
art. I, § 
13 
(current 
through 
2010) 
A suitor in 
any court of 
this state has 
the right to 
prosecute or 
defend his 
suit, either in 
his own 
proper person 
or by an 
attorney. 
1963 
Minnesota 
Const. of 
1857, art. I, 
§ 8 (1st 
Const.) 
Every person is 
entitled to a 
certain remedy 
in the laws for 
all injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property or 
character; he 
ought to obtain 
justice freely 
and without 
purchase; 
completely and 
without denial, 
promptly and 
without delay, 
conformable to 
the laws. 
Const. 
of 1974, 
art. I, § 
8 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Every person 
is entitled to a 
certain 
remedy in the 
laws for all 
injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may 
receive to his 
person, 
property or 
character, and 
to obtain 
justice freely 
and without 
purchase, 
completely 
and without 
denial, 
promptly and 
without 
delay, 
conformable 
to the laws. 
1974 
Mississippi 
Const. of 
1817, art. I, 
§ 14 (1st 
Const.) 
[A]ll courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person, for an 
Const. 
of 1890, 
art. III, 
§ 24 
Same (All 
courts shall 
be open; and 
every person 
1817 
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injury done 
him, in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy, by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered, 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
(current 
through 
2011) 
for an injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, person 
or reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
shall be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay.) 
Missouri 
Const. of 
1820,  art. 
XIII, § 7 (1st 
Const.) 
That courts of 
justice ought to 
be open to 
every person, 
and certain 
remedy 
afforded for 
every injury to 
person, 
property, or 
character; and 
that right and 
justice ought to 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay; and that 
no private 
property ought 
to be taken or 
applied to 
public use 
without just 
compensation. 
Const. 
of 1945, 
art. I, § 
14 
(current 
through 
2011) 
(same as 
Const. 
of 1875, 
art. II, § 
10) 
That the 
courts of 
justice shall 
be open to 
every person, 
and certain 
remedy 
afforded for 
every injury 
to person, 
property or 
character, and 
that right and 
justice shall 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay. 
1875 
Montana 
Const. of 
1889, art. 
Courts of 
justice shall be 
open to every 
Const. 
of 1973, 
art. II, § 
Courts of 
justice shall 
be open to 
1973 
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III, § 6 (1st 
Const.) 
person, and a 
speedy remedy 
afforded for 
every injury of 
person, 
property or 
character; and 
that right and 
justice shall be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or delay. 
16 
(current 
through 
2010) 
every person, 
and speedy 
remedy 
afforded for 
every injury 
of person, 
property, or 
character. No 
person shall 
be deprived 
of this full 
legal redress 
for injury 
incurred in 
employment 
for which 
another 
person may 
be liable 
except as to 
fellow 
employees 
and his 
immediate 
employer 
who hired 
him if such 
immediate 
employer 
provides 
coverage 
under the 
Workmen’s 
Compensatio
n Laws of 
this state. 
Right and 
justice shall 
be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. 
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Nebraska 
Const. of 
1866, art. I, 
§ 9 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
land, goods, 
person or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and justice 
administered 
without denial 
or delay. 
Const. 
of 1875, 
art. I, § 
13 (as 
amende
d 1996, 
current 
through 
2011) 
All courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person, for 
any injury 
done him or 
her in his or 
her lands, 
goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have a 
remedy by 
due course of 
law and 
justice 
administered 
without 
denial or 
delay, except 
that the 
Legislature 
may provide 
for the 
enforcement 
of mediation, 
binding 
arbitration 
agreements, 
and other 
forms of 
dispute 
resolution 
which are 
entered into 
voluntarily 
and which are 
not revocable 
other than 
upon such 
grounds as 
exist at law or 
in equity for 
1996 
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the 
revocation of 
any contract. 
New 
Hampshire 
Const. of 
1784, pt. I, 
art. 14 (2nd 
Const.) 
Every subject 
of this state is 
entitled to a 
certain remedy, 
by having 
recourse to the 
laws, for all 
injuries [h]e 
may receive in 
his person, 
property or 
character, to 
obtain right 
and justice 
freely, without 
being obliged 
to purchase it; 
completely, 
and without 
any denial; 
promptly, and 
without delay, 
conformably to 
the laws. 
Const. 
of 1784, 
pt. I, art. 
14 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1784 
North 
Carolina 
Const. of 
1868, art. I, 
§ 35 (2nd 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
administered 
without sale, 
Const. 
of 1971, 
art. I, § 
18 
(current 
through 
2011) 
All courts 
shall be open; 
every person 
for an injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, 
person, or 
reputation 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law; and right 
and justice 
shall be 
administered 
1971 
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denial, or 
delay. 
without favor, 
denial, or 
delay. 
North Dakota 
Const. of 
1889, art. I, 
§ 22 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every man for 
any injury done 
him in his 
lands, goods, 
person or 
reputation shall 
have remedy 
by due process 
of law, and 
right and 
justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or delay. 
Suits may be 
brought against 
the state in 
such manner, 
in such courts, 
and in such 
cases, as the 
legislative 
assembly may, 
by law, direct. 
Const. 
of 1981, 
art. I, § 
9 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1889 
Ohio 
Const. of 
1802, art. 
VIII, § 7 (1st 
Const.) 
[A]ll courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person, for an 
injury done 
him in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by the 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
Const. 
of 1851, 
art. I, § 
16 (as 
amende
d in 
1913, 
current 
through 
2011) 
All courts 
shall be open, 
and every 
person, for an 
injury done 
him in his 
land, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and shall 
have justice 
1913 
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administered 
without denial 
or delay. 
administered 
without 
denial or 
delay. Suits 
may be 
brought 
against the 
state, in such 
courts and in 
such manner, 
as may be 
provided by 
law. 
Oklahoma 
Const. of 
1907, art. II, 
§ 6 (1st 
Const.) 
The courts of 
justice of the 
State shall be 
open to every 
person, and 
speedy and 
certain remedy 
afforded for 
every wrong 
and for every 
injury to 
person, 
property or 
reputation; and 
right and 
justice shall be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, delay or 
prejudice. 
Const. 
of 1907, 
art. II, § 
6 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1907 
Oregon 
Const. of 
1857, art. I, 
§ 10 (1st 
Const.) 
No court shall 
be secret, but 
justice shall be 
administered, 
openly and 
without 
purchase, 
completely and 
without delay, 
and every man 
Oregon 
Const. 
of 1857, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1857 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1014 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law 
for injury done 
him in his 
person, 
property, or 
reputation. 
Pennsylvania 
Const. of 
1776, art. II, 
§ 26 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
justice shall be 
impartially 
administered 
without 
corruption or 
unnecessary 
delay . . . . 
Const. 
of 1969, 
art. I, § 
11 
(current 
through 
2012) 
(same as 
Const. 
of 1790, 
art. IX, 
§ 11) 
All courts 
shall be open; 
and every 
man for an 
injury done 
him in his 
lands, goods, 
person or 
reputation 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or 
delay. 
1790 
Rhode Island 
Const. of 
1843, art. I, 
§ 5 (1st 
Const.) 
Every person 
within this 
state ought to 
find a certain 
remedy, by 
having 
recourse to the 
laws, for all 
injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property, or 
character. He 
ought to obtain 
right and 
justice freely 
Const. 
of 1986, 
art. I, § 
5 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Every person 
within this 
state ought to 
find a certain 
remedy, by 
having 
recourse to 
the laws, for 
all injuries or 
wrongs which 
may be 
received in 
one’s person, 
property, or 
character. 
Every person 
ought to 
1986 
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and without 
purchase, 
completely and 
without denial; 
promptly and 
without delay; 
conformably to 
the laws. 
obtain right 
and justice 
freely, and 
without 
purchase, 
completely 
and without 
denial; 
promptly and 
without 
delay; 
conformably 
to the laws. 
South 
Carolina 
Const. of 
1868, art. I, 
§ 15 (6th 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be public, and 
every person, 
for any injury 
that he may 
receive in his 
lands, goods, 
person or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law 
and justice 
administered 
without 
unnecessary 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1895, 
art. I, § 
9 (as 
amende
d in 
1971, 
current 
through 
2011) 
All cou[r]ts 
shall be 
public, and 
every person 
shall have 
speedy 
remedy 
therein for 
wrongs 
sustained. 
1971 
South Dakota 
Const. of 
1889, art. 
VI, § 20 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every man for 
an injury done 
him in his 
property, 
person or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
and right and 
justice 
Const. 
of 1889, 
art. VI, 
§ 20 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1889 
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administered 
without denial 
or delay. 
Tennessee 
Const. of 
1796, art. 
XI, § 17 (1st 
Const.) 
That all Courts 
shall be open 
and every man, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
Lands, Goods, 
person or 
reputation shall 
have remedy 
by due course 
of Law and 
right and 
Justice 
administered 
without Sale, 
denial or delay. 
Suits may be 
brought against 
the State in 
such manner, 
and in such 
Courts as the 
Legislature 
may by law 
direct, 
provided the 
right of 
bringing Suit 
be limited to 
the Citizens of 
this State. 
Const. 
of 1870, 
art. I, § 
17 
(current 
through 
2011) 
(same as 
Const. 
of 1834, 
art. I, § 
17) 
That all 
courts shall 
be open; and 
every man, 
for an injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, person 
or reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law, and right 
and justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial, or 
delay. Suits 
may be 
brought 
against the 
State in such 
manner and 
in such courts 
as the 
Legislature 
may by law 
direct. 
1834 
Texas 
Const. of 
1845, art. I, 
§ 11 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open; and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done him in his 
lands, goods, 
person, or 
reputation, 
shall have 
Const. 
of 1876, 
art. I, § 
13 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same (All 
courts shall 
be open, and 
every person 
for an injury 
done him in 
his lands, 
goods, 
person, or 
1845 
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remedy by due 
course of law. 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by 
due course of 
law.) 
Utah 
Const. of 
1895, art. I, 
§ 11 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done to him in 
his person, 
property or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law, 
which shall be 
administered 
without denial 
or unnecessary 
delay; and no 
person shall be 
barred from 
prosecuting or 
defending 
before any 
tribunal in this 
State, by 
himself or 
counsel, any 
civil cause to 
which he is a 
party. 
Const. 
of 1895, 
art. I, § 
11 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1895 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1018 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
Vermont 
Const. of 
1786, ch. I, 
art. IV (2nd 
Const.) 
Every person 
within this 
Commonwealt
h ought to find 
a certain 
remedy, by 
having 
recourse to the 
laws, for all 
injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property or 
character: he 
ought to obtain 
right and 
justice freely, 
and without 
being obliged 
to purchase 
it— completely 
and without 
any denial, 
promptly and 
without delay; 
conformably to 
the laws. 
Const. 
of 1793, 
ch. I, 
art. IV 
(as 
amende
d in 
1991, 
current 
through 
2010) 
Every person 
within this 
state ought to 
find a certain 
remedy, by 
having 
recourse to 
the laws, for 
all injuries or 
wrongs which 
one may 
receive in 
person, 
property or 
character; 
every person 
ought to 
obtain right 
and justice, 
freely, and 
without being 
obliged to 
purchase it; 
completely 
and without 
any denial; 
promptly and 
without 
delay; 
co[n]formabl
y to the laws. 
1991 
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Washington 
Const. of 
1889, art. I, 
§ 10 (1st 
Const.) 
Justice in all 
cases shall be 
administered 
openly, and 
without 
unnecessary 
delay. 
Const. 
of 1889, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1889 
West Virginia 
Const. of 
1872, art. 
III, § 17 
(2nd Const.) 
The courts of 
this State shall 
be open, and 
every person, 
for an injury 
done to him, in 
his person, 
property or 
reputation, 
shall have 
remedy by due 
course of law; 
and justice 
shall be 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or delay. 
Const. 
of 1872, 
art. III, 
§ 17 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1872 
Wisconsin 
Const. of 
1848, art. I, 
§ 9 (1st 
Const.) 
Every person is 
entitled to a 
certain remedy 
in the laws, for 
all injuries or 
wrongs which 
he may receive 
in his person, 
property, or 
character; he 
ought to obtain 
right and 
justice freely, 
and without 
being obliged 
to purchase it, 
completely, 
and without 
denial, 
Const. 
of 1848, 
art. I, § 
9 
(current 
through 
2012) 
Same 1848 
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promptly, and 
without delay, 
conformably to 
the laws. 
Wyoming 
Const. of 
1889, art. I, 
§ 8 (1st 
Const.) 
All courts shall 
be open and 
every person 
for an injury 
done to person, 
reputation or 
property shall 
have justice 
administered 
without sale, 
denial or delay. 
Suits may be 
brought against 
the State in 
such manner 
and in such 
courts as the 
legislature may 
by law direct. 
Const. 
of 1889, 
art. I, § 
8 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1889 
 
With the exception of Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin, information comes from John Joseph 
Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, www.stateconsti 
tutions.umd.edu (last visited May 14, 2012).  Mistakes in that database have 
been indicated by bracketing the incorrect language.  For states not included in 
Wallis’s database, information comes from: Georgia Constitution Web Page, 
GEORGIAINFO, http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm (last visited 
May 14, 2012); MASS. CONST. of 1780, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ 
ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm; MASS. CONST., available at http://www.malegislature. 
gov/laws/constitution.; MO. CONST. of 1820, available at http://clio.mis 
souristate.edu/ftmiller/localhistory/docs/moconst1820.htm; MO. CONST., 
available at http://www.sos.mo.gov/pubs/missouri_constitution.pdf.; NEB. 
CONST. of 1866, available at http://ia700406.us.archive.org/28/items/constitu 
tionofst00innebr/constitutionofst00innebr.pdf; Nebraska State Constitution [of 
1875] Article I-13, NEB. LEGISLATURE, http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/ 
articles.php?article=I-13 (last visited May 14, 2012); see also ROBERT D. 
MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 44 (1993); OR. CONST. of 1857, available at http://blue 
book.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/const.htm; OR. CONST., available at 
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http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/const2010.pdf.; TENN. CONST., 
available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/about/docs/TN-Constitution.pdf; TENN. 
CONST. of 1796, available at http://www.tn.gov/tsla/founding_docs/33633_ 
Transcript.pdf.; VT. CONST. of 1777, available at http://vermont-archives.org/ 
govhistory/constitut/con77.htm; VT. CONST. of 1786, available at http://ver 
mont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con86.htm; VT. CONST. of 1793, 
available at http://vermont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con93.htm; VT. 
CONST., available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/const2.htm.; WIS. 
CONST. of 1848, available at http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/ 
search.asp?id=1627. 
  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1022 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
APPENDIX 2 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS WITHOUT EXPRESS REMEDIES CLAUSES 
AND WITH DUE PROCESS OR OPEN/PUBLIC COURTS PROVISIONS 
State 
Declaration/
Constitution 
when first 
enacted 
Text Current 
const. Current text 
Date 
Current 
Text 
Enacted 
Alaska 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
1 (Inherent 
rights) (1st 
Const.) 
This 
constitution is 
dedicated to 
the principles 
that all persons 
have a natural 
right to life, 
liberty, the 
pursuit of 
happiness, and 
the enjoyment 
of the rewards 
of their own 
industry; that 
all persons are 
equal and 
entitled to 
equal rights, 
opportunities, 
and protection 
under the law; 
and that all 
persons have 
corresponding 
obligations to 
the people and 
to the State. 
Const. of 
1959, 
art. I, § 1 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1959 
 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
7 (Due 
process) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be deprived of 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
without due 
process of law.  
The right of all 
Const. of 
1959, 
art. I, § 7 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1959 
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persons to fair 
and just 
treatment in the 
course of 
legislative and 
executive 
investigations 
shall not be 
infringed. 
 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
10 (Treason) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be convicted of 
treason, unless 
on the 
testimony of 
two witnesses 
to the same 
overt act, or on 
confession in 
open court.  
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1959, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1959 
 
 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
11 (Criminal 
Prosecutions) 
(1st Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
shall have the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public 
trial . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1959, 
art. I, § 
11 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1959 
California 
Const. of 
1879, art. I, § 
7 (Jury trial 
right) 
(2nd Const.) 
A trial by jury 
may be waived 
in all criminal 
cases, not 
amounting to 
felony, by the 
consent of both 
parties, 
expressed in 
open Court, 
and in civil 
actions by the 
Const. of 
1879, 
art. I, § 
16 (as 
amended 
in 1998) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
A jury may be 
waived in a 
criminal 
cause by the 
consent of 
both parties 
expressed in 
open court by 
the defendant 
and the 
defendant’s 
counsel. . . . 
1998 
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consent of the 
parties, 
signified in 
such manner as 
may be 
prescribed by 
law.  In civil 
actions, and 
cases of 
misdemeanor, 
the jury may 
consist of 
twelve, or of 
any number 
less than 
twelve upon 
which the 
parties may 
agree in open 
Court.  
(emphasis 
added) 
In civil causes 
the jury shall 
consist of 12 
persons or a 
lesser number 
agreed on by 
the parties in 
open court.  
In civil causes 
other than 
causes within 
the appellate 
jurisdiction of 
the court of 
appeal the 
Legislature 
may provide 
that the jury 
shall consist 
of eight 
persons or a 
lesser number 
agreed on by 
the parties in 
open 
court. . . .  In 
criminal 
actions in 
which a 
misdemeanor 
is charged, 
the jury shall 
consist of 12 
persons or a 
lesser number 
agreed on by 
the parties in 
open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
 
Const. of 
1849, art. I, § 
8 (Due 
No person 
shall . . . be 
deprived of 
Const. of 
1879, 
art. I, § 
A person may 
not be 
deprived of 
1979 
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process) (1st 
Const.) 
life, liberty, or 
property 
without due 
process of 
law . . . . 
7, ¶ a (as 
amended 
in 1974 
and 
1979) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
life, liberty, or 
property 
without due 
process of law 
or denied 
equal 
protection of 
the laws . . . . 
 
Const. of 
1849, art. I, § 
10 (Right to 
petition) 
(1st Const.) 
 
The people 
shall have the 
right freely to 
assemble 
together to 
consult for the 
common good, 
to instruct their 
representatives, 
and to petition 
the legislature 
for redress of 
grievances. 
Const. of 
1879, 
art. I, § 
3, ¶ a (as 
amended 
in 2004) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
 
 
The people 
have the right 
to instruct 
their 
representative
s, petition 
government 
for redress of 
grievances, 
and assemble 
freely to 
consult for the 
common 
good. 
2004 
 
Const. of 
1879, art. I, § 
13 (Speedy 
public trial) 
(2nd Const.) 
In criminal 
prosecutions, 
in any Court 
whatever, the 
party accused 
shall have the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public 
trial . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1879, 
art. I, § 
15 (as 
amended 
in 1974) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
The defendant 
in a criminal 
cause has the 
right to a 
speedy public 
trial . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
1974 
 
Const. of 
1849, art. I, § 
20 (Treason) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be convicted of 
treason, unless 
on the evidence 
of two 
witnesses to 
the same overt 
act, or 
confession in 
Const. of 
1879, 
art. I, § 
18 (as 
amended 
in 1974) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
A person may 
not be 
convicted of 
treason except 
on the 
evidence of 
two witnesses 
to the same 
overt act or 
1974 
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open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
by confession 
in open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
Hawaii 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
4 (Due 
Process) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be deprived of 
life, liberty or 
property 
without due 
process of law, 
no[r] be denied 
the equal 
protection of 
the laws, nor 
be denied the 
enjoyment of 
his civil rights 
or be 
discriminated 
against in the 
exercise 
thereof because 
of race, 
religion, sex or 
ancestry. 
Const. of 
1978, 
art. I, § 5 
(current 
through 
2011) 
 
Same (No 
person shall 
be deprived of 
life, liberty or 
property 
without due 
process of 
law, nor be 
denied the 
equal 
protection of 
the laws, nor 
be denied the 
enjoyment of 
the person’s 
civil rights or 
be 
discriminated 
against in the 
exercise 
thereof 
because of 
race, religion, 
sex or 
ancestry.) 
1959 
 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
6 (Rights of 
citizens) 
(1st Const.) 
No citizen shall 
be 
disfranchised, 
or deprived of 
any of the 
rights or 
privileges 
secured to 
other citizens, 
unless by the 
law of the land. 
Const. of 
1978, 
art. I, § 8 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1959 
 
Const. of 
1959, art. I, § 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
Const. of 
1978, 
art. I, § 
Same in 
relevant part 
1959 
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11 (Rights of 
the accused) 
(1st Const.) 
shall enjoy the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury of the 
district wherein 
the crime shall 
have been 
committed . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
14 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Iowa 
Const. of 
1857, art. I, § 
9 (Due 
process) 
(2nd Const.) 
[N]o person 
shall be 
deprived of 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
without due 
process of law. 
Const. of 
1857, 
art. I, § 9 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1857 
 
Const. of 
1857, art. I, § 
10 (Speedy 
public trial) 
(2nd Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
and in cases 
involving the 
life or liberty 
of [a]n 
individual, the 
accused shall 
have a right to 
a speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1857, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1857 
 
Const. of 
1846, art. I, § 
16 (Treason) 
(1st Const) 
No person shall 
be convicted of 
treason unless 
on the evidence 
of two 
witnesses to 
the same overt 
act, or 
confession in 
Const. of 
1857, 
art. I, § 
16 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1846 
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open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
Nevada 
Const. of 
1864, art. I, § 
8 (Due 
process) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, 
or property, 
without due 
process of 
law . . . . 
Const. of 
1864, 
art. I, § 
8, cl. 5 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same in 
relevant part 
1864 
 
Const. of 
1864, art. I, § 
19 (Treason) 
(1st Const.) 
And no person 
shall be 
convicted of 
treason, unless 
on the 
testimony of 
two witnesses 
to the same 
overt act, or on 
confession in 
open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1864, 
art. I, § 
19 
(current 
through 
2010) 
Same 1864 
New Jersey 
Const. of 
1844, art. I, § 
1 (Natural and 
unalienable 
rights) (2nd 
Const.) 
All men are by 
nature free and 
independent, 
and have 
certain natural 
and inalienable 
rights, among 
which are those 
of enjoying and 
defending life 
and liberty; 
acquiring, 
possessing and 
protecting 
property, and 
of pursuing and 
obtaining 
safety and 
happiness. 
Const. of 
1947, 
art. I, § 1 
(current 
through 
2011) 
All persons 
are by nature 
free and 
independent 
and have 
certain natural 
and 
unalienable 
rights, among 
which are 
those of 
enjoying and 
defending life 
and liberty, of 
acquiring, 
possessing, 
and protecting 
property, and 
of pursuing 
and obtaining 
1947 
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safety and 
happiness. 
 
Const. of 
1844, art. I, § 
8 (Speedy 
public trial) 
(2nd Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
shall have the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1947, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1844 
 
Const. of 
1844, art. I, § 
14 (Treason) 
(2nd Const.) 
No person shall 
be convicted of 
treason, unless 
on the 
testimony of 
two witnesses 
to the same 
overt act, or on 
confession in 
open court. 
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1947, 
art. I, § 
17 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1844 
New Mexico 
Const. of 
1911, art. II, § 
4 (Inalienable 
rights) (1st 
Const.) 
All persons are 
born equally 
free, and have 
certain natural, 
inherent, and 
inalienable 
rights, among 
which are the 
rights of 
enjoying and 
defending life 
and liberty, of 
acquiring, 
possessing, and 
protecting 
property, and 
of seeking and 
obtaining 
Const. of 
1911, 
art. II, § 
4 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1911 
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safety and 
happiness. 
 
Const. of 
1911, art. II, § 
14 (Speedy 
public trial) 
(1st Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
shall have the 
right to . . . a 
speedy public 
trial by an 
impartial jury 
of the county 
or district in 
which the 
offense is 
alleged to have 
been 
committed.  
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1911, 
art. II, § 
14 (as 
amended 
in 1924, 
1980, 
and 
1994) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same in 
relevant part 
1911 
 
Const. of 
1911, art. II, § 
16 (Treason) 
(1st Const.) 
No person shall 
be convicted of 
treason unless 
on the 
testimony of 
two witnesses 
to the same 
overt act, or on 
confession in 
open court.  
(emphasis 
added) 
Const. of 
1911, 
art. II, § 
16 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1911 
 
Const. of 
1911, art. XX, 
§ 20 (Waiver 
of indictment) 
(1st Const.) 
Any person 
held by a 
committing 
magistrate to 
await the 
action of the 
grand jury on a 
charge of 
felony or other 
infamous 
crime, may in 
open court 
Const. of 
1911, 
art. XX, 
§ 20 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1911 
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with the 
consent of the 
court and the 
district 
attorney to be 
entered upon 
the record, 
waive[] 
indictment and 
plead to an 
information in 
the form of an 
indictment 
filed by the 
district 
attorney . . . . 
(emphasis 
added) 
New York 
Const. of 
1777, art. XIII 
(Rights and 
privileges) 
(1st Const.) 
And this 
convention 
doth further, in 
the name and 
by the 
authority of the 
good people of 
this State, 
ordain, 
determine, and 
declare, that no 
member of this 
State shall be 
disfranchised, 
or deprived of 
any the rights 
or privileges 
secured to the 
subjects of this 
State by this 
constitution, 
unless by the  
 
 
 
Const. of 
1938, 
art. I, § 1 
(as 
amended 
in 1959) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
No member 
of this state 
shall be 
disfranchised, 
or deprived of 
any of the 
rights or 
privileges 
secured to any 
citizen 
thereof, 
unless by the 
law of the 
land, or the 
judgment of 
his [or her] 
peers, except 
that the 
legislature 
may provide 
that there 
shall be no  
 
 
 
1959 
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law of the land, 
or the 
judgment of his 
peers. 
primary 
election held 
to nominate 
candidates for 
public office 
or to elect 
persons to 
party 
positions for 
any political 
party or 
parties in any 
unit of 
representation 
of the state 
from which 
such 
candidates or 
persons are 
nominated or 
elected 
whenever 
there is no 
contest or 
contests for 
such 
nominations 
or election as 
may be 
prescribed by 
general [l]aw. 
 
Const. of 
1938, art. I, § 
2 (Waiver of 
jury trial) 
(5th Const.) 
A jury trial 
may be waived 
by the 
defendant in all 
criminal cases, 
except those in 
which the 
crime charged 
may be 
punishable by 
death, [by a] 
written 
Const. of 
1938, 
art. I, § 2 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1938 
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instrument 
signed by the 
defendant in 
person in open 
court before 
and with the 
approval of a 
judge or justice 
of a court 
having 
jurisdiction to 
try the offense. 
(emphasis 
added) 
 
Const. of 
1938, art. I, § 
6 (Waiver of 
indictment) 
(5th Const.) 
No person shall 
be held to 
answer for a 
capital or 
otherwise 
infamous 
crime . . .  
unless on 
indictment of a 
grand jury, and 
in any trial in 
any court 
whatever the 
party accused 
shall be 
allowed to 
appear and 
defend in 
person and 
with counsel as 
in civil actions 
and shall be 
informed of the 
nature and 
cause of the 
accusation and  
 
 
 
Const. of 
1938, 
art. I, § 6 
(as 
amended 
in 1973) 
(current 
through 
No person 
shall be held 
to answer for 
a capital or 
otherwise 
infamous 
crime . . . 
unless on 
indictment of 
a grand jury, 
except that a 
person held 
for the action 
of a grand 
jury upon a 
charge for 
such an 
offense, other 
than one 
punishable by 
death or life 
imprison-
ment, with the 
consent of the 
district 
attorney, may  
 
 
 
1973 
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be confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him.  
waive 
indictment by 
a grand jury 
and consent to 
be prosecuted 
on an 
information 
filed by the 
district 
attorney; such 
waiver shall 
be evidenced 
by written 
instrument 
signed by the 
defendant in 
open court in 
the presence 
of his 
counsel. 
(emphasis 
added) 
Virginia 
Const. of 
1776, Bill of 
Rights, § 8 
(Speedy trial; 
due process) 
(1st Const.) 
[I]n all capital 
or criminal 
prosecutions a 
man hath a 
right . . . to a 
speedy trial . . . 
[N]o man 
[shall] be 
deprived of his 
liberty, except 
by the law of 
the land or the 
judgment of his 
peers. 
Const. of 
1971, 
art. I, § 8 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Trial right: 
[I]n criminal 
prosecutions a 
man hath a 
right . . . to a 
speedy and 
public 
trial . . . . 
 
Due process: 
He shall not 
be deprived of 
life or liberty, 
except by the 
law of the 
land or the 
judgment of 
his peers . . . . 
Public 
trial: 
1971 
 
Due 
process: 
1971 
 
 
Const. of 
1902, art. I, § 
[N]o person 
shall be 
deprived of his 
Const. of 
1971, 
art. I, § 
[N]o person 
shall be 
deprived of 
1971 
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11 (Due 
process) 
(5th. Const.) 
property 
without due 
process of 
law . . . . 
11 
(current 
through 
2011) 
his life, 
liberty, or 
property 
without due 
process of 
law . . . . 
 
Historical information in this chart on Alaska, California (except for most recent 
version), Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York 
comes from John Joseph Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
PROJECT, www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited May 14, 2012).  
Corrections to that database are indicated by bracketing incorrect language.  For 
California’s most recent constitution with dates of amendment, see CAL. 
CONST., available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes. xhtml.  For 
Virginia, information comes from: VA. CONST. of 1776, available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm; VA. CONST. of 1902, available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x030202240; VA. CONST., available at 
http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/search/Constitution.htm. 
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APPENDIX 3 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS 
IN THE THIRTEEN ORIGINAL STATES 
State 
Declaration/ 
Constitution 
when first 
enacted 
Text Current 
const. Current text 
Date 
Current 
Text 
Enacted 
Connecticut 
Const. of 
1818, art. I, § 
9 (2nd Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
shall have the 
right to be 
heard by 
himself and by 
counsel; to 
demand the 
nature and 
cause of the 
accusation; to 
be confronted 
by the 
witnesses 
against him; to 
have 
compulsory 
process to 
obtain witnesse
s in his favor; 
and in all 
prosecutions, 
by indictment 
or information, 
a speedy public 
trial by an 
impartial jury. 
He shall not be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself, nor be 
deprived of 
Const. of 
1965, 
art. I, § 8 
(as 
amended 
in 1996) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same, with 
addition of 
victims’ 
rights 
paragraph in 
1996 (In all 
Criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
shall have a 
right to be 
heard by 
himself and 
by counsel; to 
be informed 
of the nature 
and cause of 
the 
accusation; to 
be confronted 
by the 
witnesses 
against him; 
to have 
compulsory 
process to 
obtain 
witnesses in 
his behalf; to 
be released on 
bail upon 
sufficient 
security, 
except in 
Relevant 
text: 
1818 
 
With 
victims’ 
rights 
paragrap
h: 1996 
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life, liberty, or 
property, but 
by the course 
of law.  And no 
person shall be 
holden to 
answer for any 
crime, the 
punishment of 
which may be 
death or 
imprisonment 
for life, unless 
on a 
presentment or 
indictment of a 
grand jury; 
except in the 
land or naval 
forces, or in the 
militia when in 
actual service 
in time of war 
or public 
danger. 
capital 
offenses, 
where the 
proof is 
evident or the 
presumption 
great; and in 
all 
prosecutions 
by 
information, 
to a speedy, 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury.  No 
person shall 
be compelled 
to give 
evidence 
against 
himself, nor 
be deprived of 
life, liberty or 
property 
without due 
process of 
law, nor shall 
excessive bail 
be required 
nor excessive 
fines 
imposed. No 
person shall 
be held to 
answer for 
any crime, 
punishable by 
death or life 
imprison-
ment, unless 
upon probable 
cause shown 
at a hearing in 
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accordance 
with 
procedures 
prescribed by 
law, except in 
the armed 
forces, or in 
the militia 
when in 
actual service 
in time of war 
or public 
danger.) 
Delaware 
Const. of 
1792, art. I, § 
7 (2nd Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
hath a right to 
be heard by 
himself and his 
counsel, to be 
plainly and 
fully informed 
of the nature 
and cause of 
the accusation 
against him, to 
meet the 
witnesses in 
their 
examination 
face to face, to 
have 
compulsory 
process in due 
time, on 
application by 
himself, his 
friends, or 
counsel, for 
obtaining 
witnesses in his 
favor, and a 
Const. of 
1897, 
art. I, § 7 
(as 
amended 
in 1999) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
hath a right to 
be heard by 
himself or 
herself and 
his or her 
counsel, to be 
plainly and 
fully 
informed of 
the nature and 
cause of the 
accusation 
against him or 
her, to meet 
the witnesses 
in their 
examination 
face to face, 
to have 
compulsory 
process in due 
time, on 
application by 
himself or 
herself, his or 
her friends or 
1999 
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speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury; he shall 
not be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself, nor 
shall be 
deprived of 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
unless by the 
judgment of his 
peers or the 
law of the land. 
counsel, for 
obtaining 
witnesses in 
his or her 
favor, and a 
speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury; he or she 
shall not be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself or 
herself, nor 
shall he or she 
be deprived of 
life, liberty or 
property, 
unless by the 
judgment of 
his or her 
peers or by 
the law of the 
land. 
Georgia 
Const. of 
1798, art. III, 
§ 8 (3rd 
Const.) 
Within five 
years after the 
adoption of this 
constitution, 
the body of our 
laws, civil and 
criminal, shall 
be revised, 
digested, and 
arranged under 
proper heads, 
and 
promulgated in 
such manner as 
the legislature 
may direct; and 
no person shall 
Const. of 
1983, 
art. I, § 
1, ¶ 14 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Every person 
charged with 
an offense 
against the 
laws of this 
state shall 
have the 
privilege and 
benefit of 
counsel; shall 
be furnished 
with a copy of 
the accusation 
or indictment 
and, on 
demand, with 
a list of the 
1983 
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be debarred 
from 
advocating or 
defending his 
cause before 
any court or 
tribunal, either 
by himself or 
counsel, or 
both. 
witnesses on 
whose 
testimony 
such charge is 
founded; shall 
have 
compulsory 
process to 
obtain the 
testimony of 
that person’s 
own 
witnesses; 
and shall be 
confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
testifying 
against such 
person. 
Maryland 
Const. of 
1776, Decl. of 
Rights, art. 19 
(1st Const.) 
[I]n all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
every man hath 
a right to be 
informed of the 
accusation 
against him; to 
have a copy of 
the indictment 
or charge in 
due time (if 
required) to 
prepare for his 
defence; to be 
allowed 
counsel; to be 
confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him; to 
have process 
Const. of 
1867, 
Decl. of 
Rights, 
art. 21 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1776 
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for his 
witnesses; to 
examine the 
witnesses, for 
and against 
him, on oath; 
and to a speedy 
trial by an 
impartial jury, 
without whose 
unanimous 
consent he 
ought not to be 
found guilty. 
Massachusetts 
Const. of 
1780, pt. I, 
art. XII (1st 
Const.) 
No subject 
shall be held to 
answer for any 
crimes or [] 
offence until 
the same is 
fully and 
plainly, 
substantially 
and formally, 
described to 
him; or be 
compelled to 
accuse, or 
furnish 
evidence 
against 
himself; and 
every subject 
shall have a 
right to 
produce all 
proofs that may 
be favorable to 
him; to meet 
the witnesses 
against him 
face to face, 
Const. of 
1780, pt. 
I, art. XII 
(current 
through 
2011) 
Same 1780 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1042 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
and to be fully 
heard in his 
defense by 
himself, or his 
council at his 
election.  And 
no subject shall 
be arrested, 
imprisoned, 
despoiled, or 
deprived of his 
property, 
immunities, or 
privileges, put 
out of the 
protection of 
the law, exiled 
or deprived of 
his life, liberty, 
or estate, but 
by the 
judgment of his 
peers, or the 
law of the land.  
And the 
legislature 
shall not make 
any law that 
shall subject 
any person to a 
capital or 
infamous 
punishment, 
excepting for 
the government 
of the army 
and navy, 
without trial by 
jury. 
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New 
Hampshire 
Const. of 
1784, art. I, § 
15 (2nd 
Const.) 
No subject 
shall be held to 
answer for any 
crime, or 
offence, until 
the same is 
fully and 
plainly, 
substantially 
and formally, 
described to 
him; or be 
compelled to 
accuse or 
furnish 
evidence 
against 
himself.  And 
every subject 
shall have a 
right to 
produce all 
proofs that may 
be favorable to 
himself; to 
meet the 
witnesses 
against him 
face to face, 
and to be fully 
heard in his 
defence by 
himself, and 
counsel.  And 
no subject shall 
be arrested, 
imprisoned, 
despoiled or 
deprived of his 
property, 
immunities, or 
privileges, put 
out of the 
Const. of 
1784, 
art. I, § 
15 (as 
amended 
in 1966 
(counsel 
at state 
expense) 
and 1984 
(standard 
of proof 
for 
commit
ment of 
crimi-
nally 
insane)) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
No subject 
shall be held 
to answer for 
any crime, or 
offense, until 
the same is 
fully and 
plainly, 
substantially 
and formally, 
described to 
him; or be 
compelled to 
accuse or 
furnish 
evidence 
against 
himself.  
Every subject 
shall have a 
right to 
produce all 
proofs that 
may be 
favorable to 
himself; to 
meet the 
witnesses 
against him 
face to face, 
and to be 
fully heard in 
his defense, 
by himself, 
and counsel.  
No subject 
shall be 
arrested, 
imprisoned, 
despoiled, or 
deprived of 
his property, 
immunities, 
1984 
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protection of 
the law, exiled 
or deprived of 
his life, liberty, 
or estate, but 
by the 
judgment of his 
peers or the 
law of the land. 
or privileges, 
put out of the 
protection of 
the law, 
exiled or 
deprived of 
his life, 
liberty, or 
estate, but by 
the judgment 
of his peers, 
or the law of 
the land; 
provided that, 
in any 
proceeding to 
commit a 
person 
acquitted of a 
criminal 
charge by 
reason of 
insanity, due 
process shall 
require that 
clear and 
convincing 
evidence that 
the person is 
potentially 
dangerous to 
himself or to 
others and 
that the 
person suffers 
from a mental 
disorder must 
be 
established. 
Every person 
held to 
answer in any 
crime or 
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offense 
punishable by 
deprivation of 
liberty shall 
have the right 
to counsel at 
the expense of 
the state if 
need is 
shown; this 
right he is at 
liberty to 
waive, but 
only after the 
matter has 
been 
thoroughly 
explained by 
the court. 
New Jersey 
Const. of 
1776, art. 16 
(1st Const.) 
[A]ll criminals 
shall be 
admitted [] the 
same privileges 
of witnesses 
and counsel, as 
their 
prosecutors are 
or shall be 
entitled to. 
Const. of 
1947, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2011) 
(same as 
Const. of 
1844, 
art. I, § 
8.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
shall have the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury; to be 
informed [o]f 
the nature and 
cause of the 
accusation; to 
be confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him; 
to have 
compulsory 
process for 
obtaining 
witnesses in 
his favor; and 
1844 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1046 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:917 
to have the 
assistance of 
counsel in his 
defense. 
New York 
Const. of 
1777, art. 34 
(1st Const.) 
[I]n every trial 
on 
impeachment, 
or indictment 
for crimes or 
misdemeanors, 
the party 
impeached or 
indicted shall 
be allowed 
counsel, as in 
civil actions. 
Const. of 
1938, 
art. I, § 6 
(as 
amended 
in 1949, 
1959, 
1973, 
and 
2001) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
No person 
shall be held 
to answer for 
a capital or 
otherwise 
infamous 
crime . . . 
unless on 
indictment of 
a grand jury, 
except that a 
person held 
for the action 
of a grand 
jury upon a 
charge for 
such an 
offense, other 
than one 
punishable by 
death or life 
imprison-
ment, with the 
consent of the 
district 
attorney, may 
waive 
indictment by 
a grand jury 
and consent to 
be prosecuted 
on an 
information 
filed by the 
district 
attorney; such 
waiver shall 
be evidenced 
2001 
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by written 
instrument 
signed by the 
defendant in 
open court in 
the presence 
of his [or her] 
counsel. In 
any trial in 
any court 
whatever the 
party accused 
shall be 
allowed to 
appear and 
defend in 
person and 
with counsel 
as in civil 
actions and 
shall be 
informed of 
the nature and 
cause of the 
accusation 
and be 
confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him 
[or her].  No 
person shall 
be subject to 
be twice put 
in jeopardy 
for the same 
offense; nor 
shall he [or 
she] be 
compelled in 
any criminal 
case to be a 
witness 
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against 
himself [or 
herself] . . . .  
No person 
shall be 
deprived of 
life, liberty or 
property 
without due 
process of 
law. 
North 
Carolina 
Const. of 
1868, art. I, § 
11 (2nd 
Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
every man has 
the right to be 
informed of the 
accusation 
against him 
and to confront 
the accusers 
and witnesses 
with other 
testimony, and 
to have counsel 
for his defence, 
and not be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself . . . . 
Const. of 
1971, 
art. I § 
23 
(current 
through 
2011) 
(same as 
1946 
amendm
ent to 
Const. of 
1868, 
art. I, § 
11) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
every person 
charged with 
a crime has 
the right to be 
informed of 
the accusation 
and [to] 
confront the 
accusers and 
witnesses 
with other 
testimony, 
and to have 
counsel for 
defense, and 
not be 
compelled to 
give self-
incriminating 
evidence, or 
to pay costs, 
jail fees, or 
necessary 
witness fees 
of the 
defense, 
unless found 
guilty. 
1946 
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Pennsylvania 
Const. of 
1790, art. IX, 
§ 9 (2nd 
Const.) 
That in all 
criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
hath a right to 
be heard by 
himself and his 
counsel, to 
demand the 
nature and 
cause of the 
accusation 
against him, to 
meet the 
witnesses face 
to face, to have 
compulsory 
process for 
obtaining 
witnesses in his 
favor, and, in 
prosecutions 
by indictment 
or information, 
a speedy public 
trial by an 
impartial jury 
of the vicinage; 
that he cannot 
be compelled 
to give 
evidence 
against 
himself, nor 
can he be 
deprived of his 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
unless by the 
judgment of his 
peers or the 
law of the land. 
Const. of 
1969, 
art. I, § 9 
(as 
amended 
in 1984 
and 
1995) 
(current 
through 
2012) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions 
the accused 
hath a right to 
be heard by 
himself and 
his counsel, to 
demand the 
nature and 
cause of the 
accusation 
against him, 
to be 
confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him, 
to have 
compulsory 
process for 
obtaining 
witnesses in 
his favor, and 
in 
prosecutions 
by indictment 
or 
information, a 
speedy public 
trial by an 
impartial jury 
of the 
vicinage; he 
cannot be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself, nor 
can he be 
deprived of 
his life, 
liberty or 
property, 
1995 
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unless by the 
judgment of 
his peers or 
the law of the 
land.  The use 
of a 
suppressed 
voluntary 
admission or 
voluntary 
confession to 
impeach the 
credibility of 
a person may 
be permitted 
and shall not 
be construed 
as compelling 
a person to 
give evidence 
against 
himself. . . . 
Rhode Island 
Const. of 
1843, art. I, § 
10 (1st 
Const.) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
the accused 
shall enjoy the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public trial, by 
an impartial 
jury; to be 
informed of the 
nature and 
cause of the 
accusation, to 
be confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against him, to 
have 
compulsory 
process for 
Const. of 
1986, 
art. I, § 
10 
(current 
through 
2011) 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, 
accused 
persons shall 
enjoy the 
right to a 
speedy and 
public trial, 
by an 
impartial jury; 
to be 
informed of 
the nature and 
cause of the 
accusation, to 
be confronted 
with the 
witnesses 
against them, 
to have 
1986 
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obtaining them 
in his favor, to 
have the 
assistance of 
counsel in his 
defence, and 
shall be at 
liberty to speak 
for himself; nor 
shall he be 
deprived of 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
unless by the 
judgment of his 
peers, or the 
law of the land. 
compulsory 
process for 
obtaining 
them in their 
favor, to have 
the assistance 
of counsel in 
their defense, 
and shall be at 
liberty to 
speak for 
themselves; 
nor shall they 
be deprived of 
life, liberty, or 
property, 
unless by the 
judgment of 
their peers, or 
the law of the 
land. 
South 
Carolina 
Const. of 
1868, art. I, § 
13 (6th 
Const.) 
No person shall 
be held to 
answer for any 
crime or 
offence until 
the same is 
fully, fairly, 
plainly, 
substantially 
and formally 
described to 
him; or be 
compelled to 
accuse or 
furnish 
evidence 
against 
himself; and 
every person 
shall have a 
right to 
Const. of 
1895, 
art. I, § 
14 (as 
amended 
in 1971) 
(current 
through 
2011) 
The right of 
trial by jury 
shall be 
preserved 
inviolate.  
Any person 
charged with 
an offense 
shall enjoy 
the right to a 
speedy and 
public trial by 
an impartial 
jury; to be 
fully 
informed of 
the nature and 
cause of the 
accusation; to 
be confronted 
with the 
1971 
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produce all 
proofs that may 
be favorable to 
him, to meet 
the witnesses 
against him 
face to face, to 
have a speedy 
and public trial 
by a[n] 
impartial jury, 
and to be fully 
heard in his 
defence by 
himself or by 
his counsel, or 
by both, as he 
may elect. 
witnesses 
against him; 
to have 
compulsory 
process for 
obtaining 
witnesses in 
his favor, and 
to be fully 
heard in his 
defense by 
himself or by 
his counsel or 
by both. 
Virginia 
Const. of 
1776, Bill of 
Rights § 8 
(1st Const.) 
That in all 
capital or 
criminal 
prosecutions a 
man bath a 
right to 
demand the 
cause and 
nature of his 
accusation, to 
be confronted 
with the 
accusers and 
witnesses, to 
call for 
evidence in his 
favor, and to a 
speedy trial by 
an impartial 
jury of twelve 
men of his 
vicinage, 
without whose 
unanimous 
Const. of 
1971, 
art. I, § 8 
(current 
through 
2011) 
That in 
criminal 
prosecutions a 
man hath a 
right to 
demand the 
cause and 
nature of his 
accusation, to 
be confronted 
with the 
accusers and 
witnesses, and 
to call for 
evidence in 
his favor, and 
he shall enjoy 
the right to a 
speedy and 
public trial, 
by an 
impartial jury 
of his 
vicinage, 
1971 
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consent he 
cannot be 
found guilty; 
nor can he be 
compelled to 
give evidence 
against 
himself; that no 
man be 
deprived of his 
liberty, except 
by the law of 
the land or the 
judgment of his 
peers. 
without 
whose 
unanimous 
consent he 
cannot be 
found guilty. 
He shall not 
be deprived of 
life or liberty, 
except by the 
law of the 
land or the 
judgment of 
his peers, nor 
be compelled 
in any 
criminal 
proceeding to 
give evidence 
against 
himself, nor 
be put twice 
in jeopardy 
for the same 
offense. 
Laws may be 
enacted 
providing for 
the trial of 
offenses not 
felonious by a 
court not of 
record 
without a 
jury, 
preserving the 
right of the 
accused to an 
appeal to and 
a trial by jury 
in some court 
of record 
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having 
original 
criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Laws may 
also provide 
for juries 
consisting of 
less than 
twelve, but 
not less than 
five, for the 
trial of 
offenses not 
felonious, and 
may classify 
such cases, 
and prescribe 
the number of 
jurors for 
each class. 
In criminal 
cases, the 
accused may 
plead guilty. 
If the accused 
plead not 
guilty, he 
may, with his 
consent and 
the 
concurrence 
of the 
Commonweal
th’s attorney 
and of the 
court entered 
of record, be 
tried by a 
smaller 
number of 
jurors, or 
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waive a jury. 
In case of 
such waiver 
or plea of 
guilty, the 
court shall try 
the case. 
. . . . 
 
 Historical information in this chart on Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 
New Hampshire (except for amendments), New Jersey, New York (except for 
amendments), North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina 
comes from John Joseph Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
PROJECT, www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited May 15, 2012).  For 
states not included in Wallis’s database, information comes from Georgia 
Constitution Web Page, GEORGIAINFO, http://georgiainfo.gali 
leo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm (last visited May 15, 2012); MASS. CONST. of 1780, 
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm; MASS. CONST., 
available at http://www.malegislature.gov/laws/constitution; SUSAN E. 
MARSHALL, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 
65 (2004); N.Y. CONST., available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/info/con 
stitution.htm.; VA. CONST. of 1776, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/ 
docs/va-1776.htm; VA. CONST., available at http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/ 
search/Constitution.htm. 
 
 
